


TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING RADICALISM & VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN OIC COUNTRIES



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FOREWORD

The rise of radical and violent extremist groups and the atrocities they have committed in many parts of the globe in general and OIC countries in particular coupled with the negative and sometimes devastating human, social and economic consequences of their acts has pushed the subject of radicalism and violent extremism to the very top of the agenda of the OIC countries and the international society alike.

The OIC has been among the first to recognize the phenomena and formulate a policy against it. The Organization has issued in 1999 a convention and a code of conduct on combating international terrorism and has not relented in its effort since then. More recently, in the 13th session of the Islamic Summit conference held in Istanbul in April of 2016, the Kings and Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the OIC voiced their alarm by the threat terrorism poses to peace and stability in many OIC Member States, and reaffirmed their strong condemnation of the atrocious and deliberate terrorist attacks that have occurred against the member countries and in various parts of the world. Moreover, the recently adopted OIC-2025 Programme of Action identifies “Counter-terrorism, Extremism, Violent Extremism, Radicalization, Sectarianism, & Islamophobia” as one of the priority areas.

As the main socio-economic research arm of the OIC, SESRIC has also been quick to respond. Following the meeting of the OIC institutions on “Combating Terrorism, Violent Extremism and Radicalization”, which was held at the OIC General Secretariat in August 2015, SESRIC has sprung to action and formed a cross functional team at the Centre to work on the project of combating terrorism and violent extremism. One of the outputs of this team has been this report “Towards Understanding Radicalism & Violent Extremism in OIC Countries” which now sits in your hands.

SESRIC prepared this report based on the premises that; it has become crystal clear that hard security measure alone will not suffice to confront radicalism and violent extremism. The truth is that we cannot counter and defeat what we don’t understand. This fact highlights the need for a thorough understanding of the issues revolving around radicalism and violent extremism. Such understanding is crucial if the efforts to defeat radicalism and violent extremism are to succeed.

We pray Allah the Almighty that this humble contribution by SESRIC will add value to developing a better understanding of the critical issues related to Radicalism and Violent Extremism in OIC countries.

Amb. Musa Kulaklikaya
Director General
SESRIC

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This report has been prepared by a research team at SESRIC led by Fadi Farasin with the participation of Adam Atauallah Bensaid, Cihat Battaloglu, Kenan Bagci and Neslihan Cevik. The work was conducted under the general supervision of Nabil Dabour, Director of Research Department at SESRIC, who provided directions, comments and feedback.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Concepts, Trends & Narratives

Radicalism and violent Extremism are extremely complex sets of phenomena, covering a great diversity of issues with different causes and consequences. Radicalism indicates a way of thinking or behaving that is based on the belief that important political or social changes are necessary. Radicalism has a long history, but its systematic analysis has a short past. Historically, many radical movements evolved into violent extremism but this is not a general rule as many radicals never cross the line towards violent extremism. The concept radicalism, therefore, interchanges often with violent extremism, terrorism, and political violence and the borderline between these concepts is often blurred in discussions.

At the beginning of the 20th century, anarchist movements turned to terrorist tactics by revolutionaries, and defined their actions as a means for the polarization of the populous. Self-determination (or nationalism) had also been another prominent doctrine, when anti-colonial mass movements and violent radical groups were challenging colonial power. In the second half of the 20th century, radical movements had started to be seen in a more organized form where the majority of them transformed into international terrorist organizations.

In recent times, the emergence of Al-Qaeda as a global terrorist organisation carrying out devastating strikes across the world shed a spotlight on radicalism and terrorism. The current wave of terrorist groups creates different definitions and narratives related with radicalism, terrorism and violent extremism. Socio-economic, political and personal grievances are effectively used by the current radical groups to influence public opinion, disseminate messages, gain new recruits, and elicit sympathy. More critically, the abusive interpretation of specific religious terms is at the heart of radical narratives. Terrorist groups and radical movements utilise Islamic terms to legitimate their actions. Current global terrorism misinterprets the Islamic terms of Jihad and Dar-al Harb to justify the killing of other people. The concept of Takfir is articulated as the main discourse to legitimize the violence against Muslims and governments in Islamic countries in particular. Therefore it is very crucial that a clear distinction be made between Islam and terrorism when talking about or defining the current radical wave and the new wave of global terrorism. It should also be emphasized that in the case of current global terrorism: it is not Islam that has radicalised Muslims, but rather radicals that have radicalised Islam.

Root Causes of Radicalism & Violent Extremism

Understanding the root causes of radicalism is essential if the efforts to confront radicalism and violent extremism are to succeed. Radicalism is not a simple reality, it is multidimensional and its causes are varied and intertwined; however, this not prevent the pinpointing of some of its root causes in OIC countries, namely; socio-economic root causes, demographic stress and the youth bulge, government ineffectiveness and corruption.

The overwhelming majority of people engaged in radicalism and violent extremism happen to be young adults. This is of high relevance to the OIC countries since their demographic structure is younger than the rest of the world. The share of OIC countries in total world youth population is in steady increase in contrast to non-OIC developing countries and the developed world. In 1990, 19.9% of the world's youth lived in OIC countries, but this percentage increased to 26.7% in 2015 and is projected to reach 30.9% by 2030. Theoretically speaking, the youth bulge should carry a lot of potential to OIC countries in term of economic development; yet, it also carries a lot of threat. The youth bulge when associated with widespread unemployment carries the risk of serving as a radicalising element for youth which is exactly the case in many OIC countries. Unemployment of youth in OIC countries is more than 16% and also well above the averages of non-OIC developing and developed countries. Youth who cannot find decent jobs -and as a result cannot get married- end up excluded from the economy and society alike. This causes tremendous frustration to youth and without the availability of conduits to channel this frustration, a portion of those youth end up being driven down the path of radicalism and violent extremism believing that it is the only solution to implement change. Also, terrorist organizations use the fact of youth unemployment as part of their narratives in order to attract followers and in some cases utilise the promise of a job as part of their recruitment campaigns.

Poor socioeconomic conditions, such as poverty, lack of education and economic inequality can be radicalising elements. However, the analysis shows that in the OIC Arab group - a group of high significance for the study of radicalism and violent extremism – the socioeconomic conditions are positive when compared with other country groups. This does not mean that there is a disconnect between socio-economic conditions and radicalism in the OIC Arab group since people in the region frequently express their dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic situation. More critically, radical extremist groups often make reference to the issues of poverty and inequality in their narratives. The conclusion is that the issue at hand here is not absolute deprivation but rather relative deprivation, referring to the gap between perceptions of what people believe they deserve and what they actually receive. People in the region have high expectations while the socio-economic realities fail to

satisfy these expectations. In a nutshell, the driver of radicalism in the OIC Arab group is not absolute deprivation, but relative deprivation.

Some of the root causes of radicalism and violent extremism in OIC countries can be traced to the states themselves. One of the root causes related to states is government ineffectiveness in providing services - such as health and education- to their populations. The analysis reveals that many OIC countries perform rather weakly when it comes to government effectiveness. This is especially true for OIC countries in the Arab group and OIC countries in the African group. This leaves a gap that is then filled by radical and violent extremist groups. By filling the gap left by states and by providing services to the population, radical and violent extremist groups gain a footing in society and gain some degree of legitimacy in the eyes of some of the population they serve. This in turn provides radical and violent extremist groups with an audience to propagate their radical views and ideology and a pool of potential recruits. Corruption is another root cause related to states. People perception of state corruption is high in many OIC countries. This leads to the erosion of state legitimacy in the eye of the population and increases ordinary citizens' opportunity and willingness to engage in radical activities and violence. Also perceptions of state corruption provide radical and violent extremist groups with a line of attack frequently used in their propaganda. This shows that the perception of corruption in OIC countries is a serious issue that can no longer be ignored.

Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism

Economic impacts of constantly increasing terrorist attacks are definitely detrimental as they create an environment of deep uncertainty and imperfect information. This limits investor and consumer confidence and results in reduced private sector investment and household spending. Investors consider the increasing violence as worrisome sign of overall deterioration in the business environment and weaker national governments, and may respond with major change in their investment decisions. Economic impacts amplify in countries that rely more on sectors that are particularly vulnerable to terrorism, such as finance, transportation and tourism sectors.

Strong policy response to major terror attacks may mitigate the short-term impacts on critical sectors, but longer-term impacts may prevail. The rise in security-related public and private spending is likely to have a permanent negative effect on production and productivity levels. Repeated terrorist attacks exacerbate these trends. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the ability of a country to withstand terrorist attacks without experiencing significant economic effects depends on the development levels of an economy and its institutions. Given the enormous shortcomings in some OIC member

countries in terms of economic and institutional capacities, terrorism may turn to a constant source of instability and fragility.

The review of the economic impacts of terrorism in OIC countries shows that there are increasingly more damages to infrastructure and public facilities in OIC countries due to terror attacks. In some OIC countries, economic impact of violence and conflict exceeds 50% of national GDP. OIC countries that have higher values of terrorism index tend to have lower rates of trade openness, measured as the ratio of total trade to GDP. Tourism sectors in some OIC countries contracted due to terrorist attacks in tourist destinations. It is also highlighted that the costs of borrowing increases with higher number of terrorist attacks and reduces trade and investment in affected countries.

Social Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism

Since the turn of the Millennium, terrorism has brought severe costs to societies and individuals virtually in every corner of the globe. However, discussions on effects of terrorism on societies have so far been confined mainly to measuring terror's cost in economic and structural terms, neglecting social losses caused by terrorism across spheres of society, from health to cultural and political outcomes. Accordingly, there is a need to shed some light on the social effects of terrorism in OIC countries, especially in the socio-psychological, political and cultural domains. These categories by no means exhaust the spectrum of social effects of terrorism; yet, they provide policymakers a starting point and a benchmark to make further projections.

In regards to socio-psychological impacts of terrorism; direct and media-based contact with terrorism as well as the broader context created by terrorism affects mental health of youth and children, in addition to trauma at the collective level. This demonstrates that terrorism is a determinant of public mental health. In the political arena, terrorism leads to a vicious circle of violence -terrorism leads to harsher responses and harsher responses in turn aggravate terrorist activity-. Also terrorism triggers xenophobia, discrimination, and social polarization; in addition, terrorism has adverse effects on the sensitive balance between civil rights and security. Such impacts in OIC countries disturb the political environment; in transitioning democracies, it hinders and delays consolidation of democracy, while in established democracies, terrorism undermines democratic achievements and processes. Equally important is the understudied subject of cultural looting and destruction of educational institutions by acts of terror, and their impacts on society, particularly regarding school attendance and educational attainment—which affect a country's human development and its future economic and social progress.

De-radicalisation Models & Approaches

Amidst the search for a sustainable strategy against radicalism and violent extremism, de-radicalisation gains recognition for its potential and adaptability. The need for de-radicalization models is a necessity, given their significant role within broader security strategies. In this context, there is a need to identify catalysts, drivers and factors for radicalisation in OIC member countries, and design programs to reverse these effects in the radicalised and protect the masses from strains of extremist thought. This may be carried out in a number of ways, with varying levels of public funding, ranging from engaging civil society networks to provide resources and intervention capacity, to integrating de-radicalisation programs in prison complexes. Highlighted are the specific cases of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, chosen to present workable de-radicalisation models taking into consideration the diversity of OIC member states. In this respect, different approaches are taken with regards to specific program outcomes. Regardless of the adopted approach however, de-radicalisation should have a scientific, precise approach to program subjects, launching interventions from a solid psychological, ideological and theological basis. In this respect, de-radicalisation models present a modular potential for expansion into other critical fields of countering violent extremism, growing capacity for online de-radicalisation, counter-narrative campaigning, and educational curriculum reform. Taken as an offsetting balance to hard security strategies, the approach presents a vital and much needed means of further understanding and contending with the challenges of radicalism and violent extremism in OIC member countries.

1. Main Concepts Trends & Narratives

Understanding radicalism and violent extremism requires as a first step a clear comprehension of the concepts related to this phenomenon. It also requires an understanding of how radicalism and violent extremism have evolved over time and how the current trends of radicalism and violent extremism are different from previous ones. Equally important is the identification of narratives used by radical and violent extremist groups and how those narratives are being used.

This chapter is an attempt to examine all the above and by doing so serves as the introduction for the report and paves the way for the subsequent chapters. This chapter starts by defining the main concepts that are used through the report such as; radicalism, extremism and terrorism. It then moves on to discuss the main trends of radicalism and violent extremism at both the global and OIC levels. In discussing the main trends, this chapter presents the trends of violent extremisms in comparative analysis. Particularly, 'old' and 'new' forms of radicalism are discussed. This section concludes by exploring the narratives utilised by radical and violent extremist organizations underpinned by an abusive interpretation of Islam.

1.1 Main Concepts

Radicalism and Violent Extremism are very complex sets of phenomena, covering a great diversity of issues with different causes and consequences. A number of key concepts are used through the report such as; radicalism, radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. These concepts need to be examined in order to conceptualize radicalism and violent extremism, and to define the differences between these concepts.

Literally, radicalism refers to a way of thinking or behaving that is based on the belief that important political or social changes are necessary. The history of 'radicalism' offers some guidance on how the concept of 'radicalism' has changed much of its meaning over time. The term 'radical', while already in use in the 18th century and often linked to the Enlightenment and the French and American revolutions of that period, became widespread in 19th century. During those years, it was a relative concept, but often referred to a political agenda advocating thorough social and political reform. Political parties calling themselves radical, mainly advocated republicanism anchored in liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, progressive political

positions. Many of the radicals in the late 19th and early 20th century were mostly non-violent activists (Schmid, 2013).

The meaning of 'radicalism', however, has changed during the late 20th century. The contemporary use of radicalism moved from republican and liberal agenda (in 19th century) to the opposite direction, embracing fundamentalist and regressive views. This new form of radicalism has certain characteristics, which might be common with (violent) extremism, such as alienation from the state, anger over a country's foreign policy, and feelings of discrimination (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). Radicalism became a concept often equated with radicalization and extremism; however, this is wrong! Certain differences between these concepts exist as the following paragraphs make clear.

Radicalization is defined as a multi-staged and multifaceted phenomenon, which varies with place and time. When analysing the literature, the earlier notions of radicalization were used in the 1970s in studies on political violence and depicted "the interactive (social movements/state) and processual (gradual escalation) dynamics in the formation of violent, often clandestine groups" (Della Porta and LaFree, 2012, p.6). Until the 2000s there had been virtually no mentioning of radicalization in texts on terrorism and political violence (Neumann, 2013).

Since, 2004/05, the concept of radicalization has become a part of the long-neglected search for the root causes of terrorism (Schmid, 2013). At the same time, the urgency to better understand what gave rise to the so-called processual "new terrorism" led to the emergence of the concept of radicalization as a less value-laden, more liberal alternative to the "simple accounts of terrorism" (Kundnani, 2012, p.5).

In mainstream political debates, the concept of radicalization is still understood as a process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs, which might eventually turn into violent extremism; although, it should be emphasized that not all radicalisation processes end up turning into violent extremism. For this reason it is beneficial to re-conceptualize the term radicalization in two forms: violent radicalisation and nonviolent radicalisation.

Violent radicalisation is defined as "the active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal", while non-violent radicalisation – refers to "the process by which individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo but do not undertake, or directly aid or abet terrorist activity." (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010, p.10)

Radicals might be violent or not, whereas extremists are violent. Extremists have some distinguishing features such as the rejection of pluralism and diversity, use of force

over persuasion, and close-mindedness compared to more rational radicals. The concept “violent extremism” is often interchanged with terrorism and political violence. The literature covering ‘violent extremism’ employs the concept in a way that suggests it is self-evident and self-explanatory (Nasser-Eddine, etc., 2011).

As can be inferred from the above discussion, the borderline between these concepts is often blurred. Particularly, when discussing terrorism, the complexity increases, because analysis of terrorism encompasses history, politics, economics, social anthropology and psychology as well as sociology, ideology and religion (Schmid, 2013).

The term terrorism describes the use, or threat of use, of violence against civilian targets for political or ideological goals. There are many attempted detailed typologies of terrorism, which may be international, transnational, or national. In the literature, there are number of studies identifying different types of terrorism as a foundation for comparative analysis. In this regard, one of the most useful and elaborate typologies was developed by Schultz (1980) who identifies three general categories of terrorism as follows:

1. **Revolutionary Terrorism:** the threat and/or development of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of successfully effecting a complete revolutionary change (i.e., a change of fundamental political-social processes) within the political system. Such means may be employed by revolutionary elements indigenous to a particular political system or by similar groups acting outside the geographic boundaries of the system.
2. **Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism:** the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of effecting various changes in the particular political system. The goal is to bring about certain changes in the body politic, not to abolish it in favour of a complete system change. Perhaps the broadest of the three categories, groups included here span the political spectrum from left to right.
3. **Establishment Terrorism:** the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence in varying degrees, by an established political system, against both external and internal opposition. Specifically such means may be employed by an established political system against other nation-states and groups external to the particular political system, as well as internally to repress various forms of domestic opposition/unrest and/or to move the populace to comply with programs/goals of the state.

In addition to the different typologies of terrorism, terrorism defines itself to each group differently. Socio-political realities, religious affiliation, and cultural identification

create different forms of non-state violent groups. In this regard, Change Institute (2008) categorizes terrorism as follows:

1. Pathological/criminal' terrorism: terrorists groups operating without significant identifiable public support
2. Liberation movements: non-state groups conducting violent action in the face of a perceived injustice and a desire to promote political aims on behalf of an identified populous
3. Guerrilla/ civil Warfare: non-state groups conducting violent action against military targets but will also include civilian targets often with more or less defined 'front lines'
4. State sponsored terrorism: non-state individuals or groups given variable degrees of support by states or individual components of a state in order to advance a particular view of strategic state interests (Change Institute, 2008)

1.2 Historical and Contemporary Trends

Radicalism has a long history, but its systematic analysis has a short past. At the beginning of the 20th century, anarchist movements turned to violent terrorist tactics. They saw their actions as a means for polarizing the populous. The activists of the time defined themselves as terrorists as a direct challenge to the authority of the state and its systems of management and criminalization of violence. In the ideological realm, Marxism was the primary ideological challenger to the primacy of western style capitalism and liberal democracy. It was adopted by a range of terrorist groups (i.e. The New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines) to varying degrees by using the powerful narrative: eradicate the hegemonic economic system and cultural superstructures (Rapoport, 2006).

Self-determination (or nationalism) was another prominent doctrine throughout the 20th century, when anti-colonial mass movements and violent radical groups were challenging colonial power. Particularly, after World War I and World War II, the use of violent action in support of self-determination become more widespread through the targeting of military and colonial institutions. The principle of self-determination was based on the belief in identifiable collective identities -usually ethnic and/or cultural- as the basis for political organization. Violence was characterized in this case as 'politics by other means' and a necessity forced upon a group by the actions of an enemy.

In the second half of the 20th century, radical movements started to be seen in more organized form; the majority of them transformed into international terrorist organisations. The nationalistic claims in radical (or terrorist) movements were

combined with the belief that the existing national and global systems are not just. The links and joint action between previously national groups, who increasingly shared comparable ideologies, became more common (i.e. ETA-Spain). Particularly after 1970s, violence at national level crossed the border and terrorism started to become a global phenomenon.

With the end of the cold war, a unipolar world order emerged and the Marxist or nationalistic motivations in radical and terrorist movements shifted clearly to a wave which was based on the religious and ideological motivations. The new discourse was based on misinterpreted religious and ideological terms and instrumentalised to support specific contexts and aims of global terrorism. In this new wave of terrorism, religious and ideological narratives become highly important, particularly as attractors for radical ideas and recruits. Al-Qaeda simplified this new wave of terrorism. The emergence of Al-Qaeda as a global terrorist organization carrying out devastating strikes across the world shed a spotlight on radicalism and violent extremism. The attention has intensified later with the rise of DAESH, its atrocities and the regional surge in terrorist groups pledging allegiance to it. This in turn has pushed the issue of radicalism and violent extremism to the top of the international agenda.

When comparing the new wave of radicalism and violent extremism with the previous waves, there are certain points that are new. First of all, the new wave of radicalism and violent extremism has increasingly used the sharing and connectivity features of online platforms to organize their activities. Transnational networks and activates have become the distinctive characteristic of the new wave. In the new wave, radical and violent extremist movement's activities have also changed significantly. The Guerrilla/civil Warfare (mostly used by Marxist movements) have partially turned to individual actions and suicide bombings.

As explained earlier, the previous radical and violent extremist movements tended to use the ideological and nationalistic motivations, but in the current wave religious narratives became the most important element. This fact affects OIC countries the most and as a result OIC countries became the main theatre of this wave. When talking about or defining current radical and violent extremist waves it is highly important to make a clear distinction between Islam and the misinterpreted versions of Islam that are utilised by radical and violent extremist group.

1.3 Narratives

The role of radical narratives – how radical and violent extremists see the situation – has emerged as an important dimension in explaining radicalisation and violent

extremism. Thus, to understand the current radical and violent extremist movements there is a need to map the key narratives which are particularly articulated or misused by Al-Qaida and DAESH. The rest of this chapter is devoted to this aim.

The analysis of narratives used by the current radical and violent extremist groups shows that socio-economic, political and personal grievances are effectively used to sway public opinion, disseminate messages, gain new recruits, and elicit sympathy. These narratives are mostly combined with distinctive terms rooted in issues of political instability, socio-economic stagnation, civic strife, and, in some cases, war.

Values of solidarity and loyalty are also common in the narratives of current radical and violent extremist groups. Similarly, a narrative of duty and responsibility is clearly visible and is being used to reinforce and maintain a deep seated sense of responsibility toward the cause. DAESH use of images from “*Call of Duty*” video game is just one example.

In the current wave, martyrdom has been presented as the ultimate act of redemptive self-sacrifice. Particularly, in the tactics of Al Qaida and DAESH the concept of martyrdom often carries particularly powerful emotional narratives of self-sacrifice and regeneration, purity and determination, afterlife and redemption. DAESH slogan which appears in its publication “*You only die once, why not make it martyrdom*” exemplifies this tactic

In addition, the abusive interpretations of specific religious terms can be underlined as another source of current radicals and violent extremist’s discourses. Radicals and violent extremist groups misuse Islamic terms to legitimate their action. They do so by weaving together historical symbols, deeply-held beliefs, core grievances, and strategic objectives—to advance their agenda in the wider Islamic world.

Again, a clear distinction between Islam and terrorism must be drawn when talking about and/or defining current radical and violent extremism waves. This is especially true since the analysis of narratives utilised by current radicals and violet extremist organisations demonstrate that Islamic terms have intrumentalised as the fundamental tenets of the discourses. In this regard, current global violent extremist organisations misinterpret Islamic terms such as; Takfir, Jihad and Dar-al Harb. By using the concept of Takfir, they justify killing Muslims and the war against Muslim governments. As seen in the example of DAESH, the group utilizes the concept of Takfir to determine who is a real Muslim and who is not. The concept of Jihad and Dar-al Harb are also misused. “*Fighting the Far Enemy*” and “*Fighting the Enemy at Home*” are articulated by DAESH as the main discourses to legitimize the violence against both Muslims and Non-Muslims.

In order to attract more attention of the Muslim constituency, radical movements also use eye-catching narratives, promoting golden age thinking, re-establishment or restoration of pre-eminence, glory and honour of Muslims. In the case of DAESH, “Glorifying the Caliphate” — depicts current territory held by Islamic State fighters. The so-called ‘Islamic Caliphate’ is seen as an example of their utopia by the members of this organization. This narrative differentiates DAESH from other groups, such as al-Qaeda, which never aimed to establish a caliphate immediately (Lavoy et al., 2014).

Overall, understanding the main concepts, historical trend and the key narratives is critical to effectively combat radicalism. Thus, this report started with the conceptualization of the terms and framed the history of radicalism, extremism and terrorism both in the world and the OIC in particular. As a final point, it should be emphasized that in the case of the current wave of radicalism and violent extremism: it is not Islam that has radicalized Muslims, but rather radicals that have radicalized Islam.

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2. Root Causes of Radicalism & Violent Extremism

Do social and economic realities contribute to radicalism or is radicalism an independent phenomenon that needs to be analysed in isolation from the social and economic realities? The correlation between socioeconomic deprivation and terrorism is strongly rejected by some analysts. Their logic is simple: most terrorists are neither poor nor uneducated. In fact, the majority seem to come from middle class, ordinary backgrounds. Terrorism is therefore perceived almost exclusively as a ‘security threat’ with no discernible socioeconomic roots or links with deprivation. Not surprisingly, this group defines the fight against terrorism with a single-minded focus on state actors, jihadist ideology, counter-intelligence, and coercive action (Taspinar, 2009).

On the other side, there are analysts who believe that socio-economic conditions such as poverty, lack of education and economic inequality are to blame for pushing people down the path of radicalism and terrorism. The underlying logic to their theses is an extension to what is found in mainstream literature on the economics of crime, that point to poverty and the lack of education as driving forces behind illegal and violent activity. In this vein, terrorism is akin to violent crime, on the basis of which the same causal factors contributing to crime are extended to terrorism. What follows, is the obvious conclusion; that social and economic development are the best cure for radicalism and terrorism (Farasin, Battaloglu & Bensaid, 2017). This camp of analysts also claims that the argument presented by those who reject the link between social and economic realities and radicalism is erroneous for a number of reasons. First, the argument is based on a very narrow and exclusive focus on ‘elite’ terrorist leaders. As terrorism expert, Judy Barsalou points out: “Effective terrorist groups rely on a division of labour between young and uneducated ‘foot soldiers’ and logically trained and well-funded elite operatives. The second point with regard to the link between socioeconomic deprivation and radicalism is the fact that terrorist organisations usually seek failing or failed states—which are often poor—in which to set up shop (Taspinar, 2009).

Understanding the root causes of radicalism is essential if the efforts to confront radicalism and violent extremism are to succeed. However, radicalism is not a simple reality, it is multidimensional and its causes are varied and intertwined, thus a reductionist approach fails to account for the complexity of the issue (Farasin et al., 2017). Thus, this chapter will examine the root causes of radicalism in OIC countries


with a focus on socio-economic root causes; demographic stress and the youth bulge; government ineffectiveness and corruption. The hope is that by better understanding the root causes of radicalism in the OIC, better models and policies for countering and preventing it can be devised.

2.1 Youth Bulge

The relation between population growth rates - and specifically the age composition of the population - to political instability is both important and complex (Ehrlich & Liu, 2002). The overwhelming majority of people engaged in radicalism and violent extremism happen to be young adults. So, focusing on this age group can help shed light on some of the driving forces behind radicalisation.

This is of high relevance to the OIC countries since their demographic structure is younger than the rest of the world and future projection shows that this fact will solidify over time. In 2015, the share of youth population (15-24 years old) to the total population was 18.5% in OIC countries; the highest in the world, and it will continue to be the highest in 2030 (Figure 2.1).


Figure 2.1: Share of Youth Population (15-24 years old)



Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on the UN World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision

Meanwhile, the share of OIC countries in total world youth population is in steady increase in contrast to non-OIC developing countries and the developed world. In 1990, 19.9% of the world's youth lived in OIC countries, but this percentage increased to 26.7% in 2015 and is projected to reach 30.9% by 2030 (see Figure 2.2), which means that by 2030 a little less than one third of the world's youth population will be residing in OIC countries.

Figure 2.2: Geographical Distribution of World's Youth (aged 15-24)




Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on the UN World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.

The increase in the youth proportion in the total population is termed by social scientists as the youth bulge. Although, theoretically speaking, the youth bulge should carry a lot of potential to OIC countries in term of economic development it also carries a lot of threats. The youth bulge when associated with widespread unemployment carries the risk of serving as a radicalising element for youth.

According to the latest estimates of the ILO, some 73.4 million young people were unemployed in 2015 in the world, with global youth unemployment rate reaching 13.1%, but reaching even alarming rates in one of the major regions of the OIC which is the Middle East (28.2%). The analysis on youth labour force participation shows that a larger proportion of youth remains inactive in OIC countries compared to other country groups (SESRIC, 2016). Figure 2.3 shows that unemployment of youth in OIC countries is above 16%; a rate which is well above the averages of non-OIC developing and developed countries.

Figure 2.3: Youth unemployment rates



Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on ILO, Key Indicators of Labour Market (KILM), 9th Edition.

A survey of recent scholarly work suggests that a relationship exists between youth unemployment on the one hand and violence and terrorism on the other (Flowers, 2014). Youth who cannot find decent jobs may not be able to get married and may end up excluded from the economy and society alike. This causes tremendous frustration to youth and without the availability of conduits to channel this frustration a portion of those youth end up being driven down the path of radicalism and violent extremism believing that it is the only solution to induce change. Also terrorist organisations use the fact of youth unemployment as part of their narratives in order to attract followers and in some cases utilise the promise of a job as part of their recruitment campaigns.

2.2 Socio Economic Root Causes

Poor socioeconomic conditions such as poverty, lack of education and economic inequality can be radicalising elements. A survey of the literature (Johnson, 2001; Lai, 2007) shows that terrorism:

- is a consequence of poverty and underdevelopment;
- is more prevalent in countries that suffer from inequality than in countries that are egalitarian;
- usually finds a harbour in countries that are economically underdeveloped.


This begs the question of whether OIC countries suffer from socioeconomic deprivation that can be tied to the rise of radicalism and violent extremism. To analyse the

socioeconomic conditions of the OIC countries properly this report uses the following indicators: poverty, inequality, and the level of human development.

Poverty is often defined by one-dimensional measures, such as income. This is contentious as one-dimensional measures fail to capture the dynamic range of factors that constitute poverty. For this reason, this report utilises the multidimensional poverty index developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) which complements traditional income-based poverty measures by capturing the deprivations that each person faces at the same time with respect to education, health and living standards.

Figure 2.4 shows that the level of multidimensional poverty in OIC countries stands at 36.0% which is higher than the 26.6% observed in non-OIC developing countries. However, what is pushing up the level of multidimensional poverty in OIC countries is the OIC –African group where 62% of the total population is multidimensional poor. The level of multidimensional poverty in OIC countries in the OIC –Arab group, a group that suffers tremendously from radicalism and violent extremism, is relatively low where only 17.4% of the total population are relatively poor.

Figure 2.4: Multidimensional poverty



Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on OPHI, 2016


The GINI index is the most commonly used measure of economic equality (distribution of income) where a value of zero reflects perfect equality and a value of 100 expresses maximal inequality. Figure 2.5 shows that the level of inequality in the OIC countries (36.9) is lower than that observed in non-OIC developing countries (41.8) and the world average (38.6). In fact, the level of inequality in the OIC-Arab group is even lower standing at 35.9 which indicates that income in the OIC in general and the OIC Arab

group in particular, is more equally distributed in comparison to other developing countries.

The third and final indicator used in this report to analyse the socioeconomic realities in the OIC countries is the Human Development Index (HDI) of the UNDP. The HDI is a summary measure of average achievements in key dimensions of human development; a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living.

According to the Human Development Index, OIC countries perform poorly with 41% of OIC countries recording low human development levels, 23% recording medium human development levels and only 36% recording very high or high human development levels. The performance of the OIC countries in human development compares poorly to other country groups (Figure 2.6).


Figure 2.5: Equality (income distribution)



Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on World bank WDI database, latest available data since 2005

Here again, the OIC African group is pushing down the OIC performance with 94% of the countries in the OIC African group suffering from low human development levels. When focusing on the OIC Arab group, again a group suffering greatly from radicalism and violent extremism, it can be observed that that the majority of countries in this group (55%) actually enjoy very high or high levels of human development.

Figure 2.6: Human development



Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on the Human Development Index, 2015

The above analysis shows that in the OIC Arab group - a group of high significance for the study of radicalism and violent extremism – the socioeconomic conditions are positive when compared with other country groups. Could there be a disconnect between socio-economic conditions and radicalism in the OIC Arab group thus rendering discussions about socio-economic roots moot? To accept such an argument would fly against what we know about the region. In this region, people frequently express their dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic situation. More critically, radical extremist groups often make reference to the issues of poverty and inequality in their narratives.


This presents an obvious contradiction, but how can this contradiction be solved. Farasin et al, (2017) in their study of the roots causes of Radicalism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) offer a solution to this apparent contradiction. They state: *“While they may seem to be an initial contradiction between socio-economic realities on the ground and what people feel and believe throughout the MENA region, analysis shows that socio-economic realities in the MENA region are comparatively better off than other developing countries, in spite of feelings throughout the region of socio-economic deprivation. To resolve this apparent contradiction, it is possible to conclude that the issue at hand here is not absolute deprivation but rather relative deprivation, referring to the gap between perceptions of what people believe they deserve and what they actually receive. In the MENA region, there are high expectations while the socio-economic realities fail to satisfy these expectations”*. In a nutshell, the driver of radicalism in the OIC Arab group is not absolute deprivation, but rather relative deprivation.

2.3 Government Ineffectiveness and Corruption

Some of the root causes of radicalism and violent extremism in OIC countries can be traced to the states themselves. One of the root causes related to states is government ineffectiveness in providing public services – such as health and education - to their populations. This leaves a gap that is then filled by radical and violent extremist groups. By filling the gap left by states and by providing services to the population, radical and violent extremist groups gain a footing in society and gain some degree of legitimacy in the eyes of some of the population they serve. This, in turn, provides radical and violent extremist groups with an audience to propagate their radical views and ideology and a pool of potential recruits.

Figure 2.7 shows government effectiveness which is part of the World Wide Governance Indicator. Government effectiveness scores reflects perceptions of the quality of public services; the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures; the quality of policy formulation and implementation; and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimates of government effectiveness range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong governance performance). As the Figure reveals, governments of OIC countries perform rather weakly according to the Government Effectives Indicator. This is especially true for OIC countries in the Arab group and OIC countries in the African group.

Figure 2.7: Government effectiveness




Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on the World Wide Governance Indicator, 2016 Update

A second root cause of radicalism and violent extremism that is related to states is corruption. Perception of state corruption leads to the erosion of state legitimacy in the eye of the population and increases ordinary citizens' opportunity and willingness to engage in radical activities and violence. Also perceptions of state corruption provide radical and violent extremist groups with a line of attack frequently used in their propaganda.

Figure 2.8 shows control of corruption which is part of the World Wide Governance Indicator. Control of corruption scores capture perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Estimates of control of corruption range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong governance performance). As the figure illustrates, perception of corruption is very high in OIC countries greatly exceeding those in other country group. This shows that the perception of corruption in OIC countries is a serious issue that can no longer be ignored.

Figure 2.8: Control of corruption



Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on the World Wide Governance Indicator, 2016 Update

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3. Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism

Economic impacts of terrorist attacks are definitely detrimental, as they create an environment of deep uncertainty and imperfect information. This limits investor and consumer confidence and results in reduced private sector investment and household spending. Investors consider the increasing violence as a worrisome sign of overall deterioration in the business environment and weaker national governments, and may respond with major change in their investment decisions. Some sectors are particularly vulnerable to terrorism, such as finance (particularly insurance), transportation and tourism sectors. Effective functioning of financial operations requires high levels of trust and confidence. However, risks related to terrorism are difficult to price for insurance companies, which leads them to raise premiums and reduce coverage. This in turn reduces the risk-taking behaviour of private investors. Terrorism either directly disrupts the transport systems or limits the ease of movement due to tightening of security controls. This harms the efficient and timely transportation of goods and people and cause disruptions in production processes. Intensified security measures may also increase the costs of trading nationally and internationally. Safety concerns also discourage people from travelling, with significant consequences on the tourism and transportation sector. On the other hand, few other sectors benefit from such threats, including defence, security and information sectors.

Strong policy response to major terror attacks may mitigate the short-term impacts on critical sectors, but longer-term impacts may prevail. The rise in security-related public and private spending is likely to have a permanent negative effect on production and productivity levels. Repeated terrorist attacks exacerbate these trends. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the ability of a country to withstand terrorist attacks without experiencing significant economic effects depends on the development levels of an economy and its institutions. Given the enormous shortcomings in some OIC member countries in terms of economic and institutional capacities, terrorism may turn to a constant source of instability and fragility. In this context, this subsection will review the economic impacts of terrorism in OIC countries. More specifically, the analysis will be under four categories: (i) economic growth, (ii) trade, finance and investment, (iii) tourism and transportation; and (iv) consumption and savings.

Economic impacts differ across countries depending on the intensity of terror attacks they experienced. In order to analyse the economic impacts, OIC countries are classified under four groups with respect to the intensity of terror attacks. The first group is comprised of countries that experienced less than 10 incidents during 2011-2015, the second group is comprised of countries that experienced more than 10 but less than 100 incidents, the third group is comprised of countries that experienced more than 100 but less than 1000 incidents and the fourth group is comprised of countries that experienced more than 1000 incidents. These countries are provided in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Classification of OIC Countries with Respect to the Number of Terror Incidents during 2011-2015

Low Intensity (Less than 10)		Medium Intensity (More than 10, less than 100)	High Intensity (More than 100, less than 1000)	Extreme Intensity (More than 1000)
Benin	Suriname	Tunisia	Cameroon	Syria
Qatar	Oman	Saudi Arabia	Bahrain	Afghanistan
Gambia	Gabon	Malaysia	Bangladesh	Egypt
Tajikistan	Burkina Faso	Mozambique	Palestine	Somalia
Azerbaijan	Mauritania	Niger	Mali	Iraq
Comoros	Guinea-Bissau	Cote d'Ivoire	Turkey	Libya
Sierra Leone	Guinea	Kazakhstan	Lebanon	Pakistan
Djibouti	Jordan	Uganda	Sudan	Yemen
Togo	Guyana	Chad	Indonesia	Nigeria
Brunei	Uzbekistan	Algeria		
UAE	Kuwait	Iran		
Kyrgyz Rep.	Albania	Senegal		
Morocco	Turkmenistan	Maldives		

Source: Global Terrorism Database

3.1 Economic Growth

Depending on the level of exposure and vulnerability of the affected countries, terrorism may put significant pressure on the economies and reduce the prospects for higher growth rates. The magnitude at which countries are affected mainly relies on the frequency, impact and target of terror incidences as well as the capacity of national authorities to respond to these incidences. Researchers found that rich, large, and diversified economies are better able to withstand the effects of terrorist attacks than small, poor, and more specialized economies (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2015). If terrorism disrupts productive activities in one sector in a diversified economy, resources can easily flow to another unaffected sector. Moreover, more developed countries could address the security concerns more effectively to reduce potential macroeconomic consequences of such attacks. Stronger institutions in developed countries also take timely measures to offset adverse economic impacts. In contrast, small developing economies, which are specialized in a few sectors, are less likely to be resilient to terrorist threats and resources will potentially flow from an affected sector to less productive activities (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2015). Consequently, terrorist attacks on less resilient economies, if they persist, are likely to impose larger and more lasting macroeconomic costs.

Terrorism may impair economic activity directly by destroying an economy's human and physical capital stock through destruction and indirectly as a reaction of markets and economic agents. Terrorism typically creates uncertainty, leading to the postponement of long-term investments or an increase in government spending on security at the expense of (more productive) spending on education and infrastructure, which ultimately reduces growth (Bird, Blomberg & Hess, 2008). Globally, it is estimated that the total economic impact of violence reached US\$14.3 trillion based on PPP in 2014, corresponding to 13.4% of world GDP and around 84% of the total GDP of OIC countries. This implies that if global violence were to decrease by 10% uniformly, an additional US\$1.43 trillion would effectively be added to the world economy each year (IEP, 2015).

Empirical studies on the economic impacts of terrorism are generally very modest and of a short-term nature for most economies.¹ Bloomberg et al. (2004) finds the impact of terrorism on economic growth as negative on 177 countries over the period 1968-2000. Empirical studies also show that terrorism results in shifting of resources from investment spending to government spending. Moody's (2015) found that terrorist

¹ Blomberg et al. (2004) found that the incidence of terrorism, on average, may have an economically significant negative effect on growth, but at a considerably smaller and less persistent level compared with wars or conflict.

attacks have long-lasting and significantly negative effects on economic growth. In 2013, the 10 countries most affected by terrorism took an immediate and significant hit to growth, dampening GDP between 0.5 and 0.8 percentage points. According to the report, what is worse is that the negative impact continues for years after the attack, taking up to five years for the effects to die out. Terrorist events in the top ten most terrorism-inflicted countries further deteriorate growth between 0.4 percentage points and 0.6 percentage points after one year.

At regional level, Gaibullov and Sandler (2008, 2009, 2011) investigated the impact of terrorism on economic growth in Western Europe, Asia and Africa, respectively. They found significant growth limiting impact of terrorism in three continents, but the impact is stronger in the developing countries as compared to developed one due to more developed markets and institutions.² In the case of Europe, the authors found that each additional transnational terrorist incident per million persons reduces economic growth by about 0.4 percentage points. In Asia, their estimates suggest that terrorism did not significantly hamper growth in the developed economies, but they show that each additional transnational terrorist incident reduced an affected developing economy's growth rate by about 1.4%. Compared to proactive counterterrorism measures, defensive measures lock economies into a flow of counterterrorism spending and crowds out more productive investments.

In general, the literature identifies four main channels through which terrorism potentially reduces economic growth. These are diversion of foreign direct investment (FDI), destruction of infrastructure, reallocation of public investment funds to security, or lower trade (Sandler and Enders, 2008). Tendency of foreign investors to invest in less-violent and more stable countries may lead a reduction in foreign capital inflows that developing countries need for financing critical investment projects. Defensive counterterrorism measures, including the need for increasing the capacity of security forces against terrorist threats, requires the reallocation of public resources to less productive and growth enhancing sectors.³ Growth is also affected from the increase in the costs of doing business due to, among others, increased uncertainty, rising risk premiums, limited resources for productive investments, destructed physical assets, restricted mobility of people and goods, and disrupted financial markets.

The issues related to trade, investment and finance will be discussed in more detailed later in the chapter. When it comes to the destruction of infrastructure and public

² For example, the bombings of USS Cole and the French tanker Limburg in 2002 significantly increased the risk premiums for sea transportation, which damaged the Yemen's shipping industry and diverted port activities to safer facilities in the neighbouring countries (Sandler and Enders, 2008).

³ Blomberg et al (2004) found that the incidence of terrorism is associated with a diversion of spending from investment towards government expenditures.

facilities, the extent of property damage in OIC countries is substantial. Although data on exact costs of terrorist attacks are not available, at least 1% of all terrorist attacks cause an economic cost between USD 1 million and USD 1 billion, while 75% of the attacks cost less than USD 1 million (Figure 3.1).

Since 2001, the number of terror incidents towards transportation and other infrastructure facilities has continuously increased and exceeded 550 attacks and the share of OIC countries in total terrorist attacks towards infrastructure facilities reached 70% in 2014 (Figure 3.2). This implies that there are increasingly more damages to infrastructure and public facilities in OIC countries due to terror attacks.

Figure 3.1: Terrorists Attacks by Economic Impacts (1996-2015)





Figure 3.2: Terrorists Attacks towards Transport and Other Infrastructure (1996-2015)



Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on Global Terrorism Database.

Terrorist attacks also cause a reallocation of public funds from productive sectors to less growth-enhancing sectors. As reported in SESRIC (2015), compared to non-OIC developing and developed countries, OIC countries as a group allocate the largest share of public resources to defence, where public spending in defence accounts for 17.3% of total public spending in OIC countries. If some of these resources could be allocated to more productive sectors in the absence of terrorist threats, they would better promote long-term development in OIC countries.


However, terrorist threats are now widespread across the region and sustained terrorist campaigns are likely to aggravate the economic consequences. In 2015, economic impact of violence and conflict, including terrorist attacks, reached 54.1% of

total GDP in Syria, 53.5% in Iraq and 45.3% in Afghanistan (Figure 3.3, top). In Libya, Mauritania, Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Oman, the costs exceeded 20% of their GDP. In absolute terms, Saudi Arabia (USD 274 billion), Iraq (USD 206 billion) and Turkey (USD 129 billion) experienced the largest economic impact of violence (Figure 3.3, middle), while in per capita terms, Saudi Arabia (USD 8,886), Qatar (USD 8,397) and Bahrain (USD 7,061) experienced the largest costs (Figure 3.3, bottom).

When the average growth rates of OIC countries under four categories are investigated, it is observed that the countries with extreme intensity of terror attacks experienced an average annual growth rate of 3.3%, which is lower than the growth rates observed in countries with low and high intensity of terror, but higher than those with medium intensity (see Figure 3.4). Despite all the potential and economic instabilities caused by frequent violence, extremely affected countries appear to achieve good economic performance over the period 2011-2015. Perhaps more strikingly, countries with medium level of terror intensity could grow at a slower rate than those with extreme level of intensity. Differences in growth rates cannot be solely attributed to the intensity of terrorism, but one would characteristically expect a falling average growth rates with the increase in violence and associated increase in uncertainty and instability. One explanation could be the level of vulnerabilities of countries. When a relatively more stable country is hit by a terrorist attack, confidence of investors and consumers in that country may fall more sharply compared to those with more frequent violence. However, long term impact would probably be much higher in countries with more frequent attacks.

While terrorism negatively affects economic growth, relative economic deprivation may be one of the root causes of radicalism and violent extremism. If this argument is true, then radicalism and violent extremism may be reduced by stimulating the economy and providing enhanced opportunities for economic participation for (potential) radicals and violent extremists and their supporters. In this regard improving growth rates, per capita income, and reducing levels of economic discrimination should be among economic priorities.

Figure 3.3: Economic Impact of Violence and Conflict in OIC Countries (2015)




Source: IEP (2016).

By using a large country sample, Meierrieks and Gries (2012) found that African and Islamic countries with low levels of institutional development, major economic and political instability, and persistent terrorist activity, are more vulnerable to terrorism than those in other parts of the world.

One explanation is that institutional quality in African and Islamic countries is particularly poor. In this fashion, it is argued that democratic countries suffer less damage from terrorism, potentially because of strongly decentralized economic and political power, which reduces the probability of terrorism to produce distorting effects (Tavares, 2004). Therefore, it can be argued that a country's robustness to terrorism depends on a variety of country-specific factors such as its level of politico-institutional development and political stability, and its culture.

Figure 3.4: GDP Growth in OIC Countries (2011-2015)



Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World Bank WDI database.

At the individual country level, there are some empirical studies investigating the impacts of terrorism on economic performance of individual countries. Bilgel and Karahasan (2013) investigate the economic costs of PKK terrorism, particularly in the Eastern and South-eastern provinces of Turkey. They find that after the emergence of terrorism, the per capita real GDP in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia declined by about 6.6% relative to the case without terrorism. Hyder et al. (2015) find that 1% increase in terrorist incidents results in reducing the per capita GDP growth by 0.39% in Pakistan, which excludes indirect effects on trade and investment due to fear of terrorism. Moody's (2015) investigates the impact of terrorism on the economic activity and borrowing costs in two most affected country, Iraq and Pakistan. According to the report, in the absence of any terrorist attacks in Iraq from 2008 to 2013, GDP could have been 8.2% higher, and the cost of borrowing could be 150 basis points lower by the end of that period. Similarly, in the case of Pakistan, GDP growth could have been 5.1% higher, and the cost of borrowing, 100 basis points lower.

3.2 Trade, Finance & Investment

As previously highlighted, terrorism may negatively affect trade, financial and investment flows, mainly by increasing uncertainty and weakening investor confidence. Trading with a nation affected by recurring terrorism incidents involves several risks. One is the rise in trade costs due to higher risk premiums driven by security concerns while transporting goods. If specific sectors are particularly hit by terror attacks, firms operating in those sectors may find it difficult to conduct profitable businesses and timely fulfil their financial obligations. Moreover, financial institutions may also exhibit some shakiness in their operations due to potential economic and political instabilities, particularly in less developed country settings. At a time when supply chain mechanisms in the world trade require timely delivery and minimum uncertainty, such weaknesses potentially cause delay in trade operations and negatively affect a nation's trade capacity. Additional costs for transactions and increasing uncertainty will imply a negative association between terrorist activity and the volume of trade.


Rise in the costs of doing business, change in consumer and production patterns and lack of predictability of business operations due to terrorism-induced insecurity may all reduce the attractiveness of a country for international producers and traders. In addition to these indirect channels, terrorists may directly target a country's trade by disrupting supply chains or destructing particular modes of transportation that are critical for conducting trade. Moreover, terrorism not only affects transaction costs for a trading nation, but also can deplete a nation's supply of scarce productive factors.

Empirical studies investigating the impact of terrorism on trade find evidence that terrorism indeed tends to depress a nation's trade. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) find that countries that are plagued by a larger number of terrorist attacks trade significantly less with each other than otherwise similar countries that do not suffer from terrorism. Quantitatively, a doubling in the number of terrorist incidents is associated with a decrease in bilateral trade by about 4%. Blomberg and Hess (2006) also find evidence that terrorism indeed tends to depress a nation's trade. More recently, Egger and Gassebner (2015) find that there is little or no immediate or short-run effect of transnational terrorism on international trade when monthly data are used. However, it impacts bilateral and unilateral trade, if at all, in the medium term, about one and a half years after incidents. More provokingly, Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2014) argue that some forms of terrorism may augment trade under certain conditions. They find that a nation's adjustment of its counterterrorism level in response to a greater terrorist threat may moderate the impact of terrorism on trade.

In the case of OIC countries, it is observed that there is a negative association between trade openness and terrorism (Figure 3.5). Countries that have higher values of

terrorism index, as provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace, tend to have lower rates of trade openness, measured as the ratio of total trade to GDP.


Figure 3.5: Trade Openness and Terrorism in OIC Countries (2011-2015)



Source: World Bank WDI database and Terrorism Index of Economics & Peace.

The annual export growth rates in four groups of OIC countries and cumulative change in the share of exports in GDP during the period 2011-2015 are provided in Figure 3.6. There was a worldwide fall in trade flows (around 2.3% average annual fall) during the period under consideration. However, compared to other groups, OIC countries with extreme exposure to terrorist attacks experienced the largest fall in their exports. As in

Figure 3.6: Export Growth in OIC Countries (2011-2015)



Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World Bank WDI database and IMF DOT database.

the case of the GDP growth rates, countries with medium level of intensity of terror experienced a fall in export flows at levels similar to those with extreme level of intensity. Accordingly, share of exports in countries with extreme intensity of terror has fallen by 13 percentage points (PPS), while the decrease was as low as 1.3 PPS in countries with high intensity during the period 2011-2015 (Figure 7, right).

With respect to capital and investment flows, the immediate impacts of terrorism are largely predictable in that they lead to greater risk aversion of investors. In the longer term, it is possible to see declining confidence of investors to national markets, lower investment, a fall in capital flows and a rise in the costs of capital. Investors will shift from high risk, high return long term investment to low risk, low return and short term projects. Violence also causes reductions in investment in capital intensive sectors, lowering productivity and reducing returns (IEP, 2016). This reduces the stock of productive capital and the flow of productivity-enhancing technology to the affected nation (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2015). All these will consequently lead to an economic slowdown in the economy.

Empirical literature provides supporting evidence to the above arguments. Terrorism may lead to the diversion of capital flows due to great uncertainties and lower expected returns to investments (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). The resulting withdrawal of international capital may hurt economic development, in particular when foreign finance and investment are important engines of growth (Meierrieks and Gries, 2012). There are several other studies that show that greater incidence of terrorism tends to reduce foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing and developed nations and induces large movements of capital across countries. Specifically, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) found that a one standard deviation increase in the intensity of terrorism produces a 5% fall in the net FDI position of the country, while Enders and Sandler (1996) estimated a negative 13.5% effect of terrorism on FDI for Spain and a negative 11.9% effect for Greece during the period 1968-1991. Analyzing 78 developing economies over the period 1984–2008, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2015) find that a relatively small increase in a country's domestic terrorist incidents sharply reduced net foreign direct investment. In general, while the impacts of a large-scale singular event in a comparatively well diversified capital and stock market may be relatively short lived and small, the impact of protracted terror events (and changes in terror risk due to changes in the political landscape), even if smaller in scale, in relatively less diversified markets may create lasting negative impacts (Schneider et al. 2011).


Mnasri & Nechi (2016) investigate the impact of terrorist attacks on stock market volatility in eleven emerging countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

region, which are all OIC member countries.⁴ Results show that the impact of terrorist attacks on the volatility of financial markets lasts about 20 trading days, which is considered to be long compared to the term effect of similar events in developed markets. One explanation is that the frequency of terrorist attacks is already quite high in the MENA region, which may heighten the fear of investors and affects long-run investment decisions at greater levels. As argued by the authors, the risk of terrorism is a threat not only to the stability of local economies but also cross-border economies in the region. This may require taking collective actions towards increasing security and minimizing terrorist threats in order to lessen the further social and economic tensions in a region that is already subject to widespread unrest in many aspects.

According to Moody's (2015), terrorist events reduce investment growth on the year of the terrorism event, by between 1.3 percentage points and 2.1 percentage points, for the top ten most affected countries. It also estimates that in the absence of any terrorist attacks from 2008 to 2013, the level of investment in Pakistan could have been 9.3% higher, and in Iraq, 15.1% higher. According to the report, terrorism has a long-lasting negative impact on government borrowing costs. In the most terrorist-inflicted countries, the cost of borrowing jumps between 41 and 65 basis points within one year and by 51-81 basis points after one year of the event.

When change in FDI inflows to four groups of OIC countries during the period 2011-2015 is considered, quite interesting outcomes are observed. While FDI inflows to extremely affected countries increased at an average annual rate of 8.6%, it decreased in other country groups at rates reaching up to 12% (Figure 3.7). Again, countries that are affected with medium intensity experienced the largest negative impact. It should be noted that the total FDI inflows to extremely affected countries were already low in 2011, which increased sharply during 2012-2013, but then started to decline during 2013-2015. However, the average

Figure 3.7: Change in FDI Inflows in OIC Countries (2011-2015)



Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World Bank WDI database.

⁴ These are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.

annual growth rate turns out to be positive due to rapid increase earlier in the period under consideration.


3.3 Tourism & Transportation

Certain sectors are particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks and sometimes they are deliberately targeted by terrorists to cause more specific damages. Tourism and transportation sectors are generally the most heavily affected sectors in an economy by terrorist attacks. Attacks against tourist venues or tourist mode of transportation drive tourist to consider the risks involved with their vacation plans and can cause tourists to alter their plans by either postponing the vacation or opting for a safer destination. For example, 9/11 attacks in New York and Madrid Train Bombings in 2004 have caused major concerns over the air and rail transport security. Disruption of transportation networks can significantly impact the mobility of people and goods in the country and retard the production processes.

The tourism sector can be affected from terror acts through several channels. The loss of tourism revenue is the first one. This is due to reduced number of tourist arrivals as well as reduction in prices to attract more tourists and additional expenses related to advertising aimed at restoring the image of the travel destination. The sectors can also be affected from the destruction of infrastructure, which will require additional resources to recover. Also, reduced capital and investment flows from outside and increased borrowing costs may deter the reconstruction works in the affected areas. Given the considerable impacts of terrorism in the tourism sector, governments will need to allocate a larger share of resources for new security measures.

Quite a number of OIC countries with large tourism industries have suffered from frequent terrorist attacks. In the case of Turkey, which experienced increased number of terror attacks during the recent years due to mainly the conflict in neighbouring countries and some terrorist groups within the country, Afonso-Rodríguez (2016) obtains significant and consistent evidence on the negative impact of terrorist activity on economic growth

Figure 3.8: Tourism Arrivals in OIC Countries (2011-2015)



Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World Bank WDI database.

for Turkey through the deterioration of the long-run relationship between tourism and economic growth. He estimates a negative impact on the contribution of tourism demand on economic growth of around 10% of real GDP for periods where the number of terrorist attacks exceeds a certain level. The negative impact seems to be concentrated between three and six months after the event and thereafter it vanished, reflecting the resilience of the tourism sector in Turkey. However, increasing violence in Turkey requires effective policy measures to increase safety and eliminate the negative perceptions about the country to attract more tourists.

Basu and Marg (2011) investigated the impact of political instability and terrorism in the tourism industry of three middle-east countries, namely Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, and found that individual terror events led to a loss of 8% of foreign tourism receipts in Egypt, 7% in Jordan and 7.2% in Lebanon. Overall, countries with extreme intensity of terror attacks experienced a cumulative amount of 3.5% fall in tourist arrivals, while other country groups on average experienced an increase in the number of tourist arrivals (Figure 3.8).

3.4 Consumption & Savings

Households are one of the three major economic agents, along with private sector and public sector, whose collective reaction to violent strikes determines the economic consequences of these attacks. While private and public sectors have a general capacity to postpone decisions towards any major shift in their economic activities, economic behaviour of households is likely to be an immediate but short-term response due to psychological fear of terrorism. Households typically revise their consumption and saving behaviours due to increased uncertainties and change in their risk perceptions, which may then influence the economy. This may include reduction of spending in leisure, rise in food expenditure and increase in savings. Their spending on education and health will be influenced by government policies. Household behaviours can also be affected from terrorist attacks if their capabilities to productively participate in economic life deteriorate through physical injuries or mental sickness. In such cases, they may need to allocate some of their resources to recover and be productive again.


It is difficult to estimate the economic costs experienced by households, particularly when they are not directly affected. Reduced investments by private sector may reduce new job creation and lead to higher unemployment rates. Reallocation of public resources from more productive and welfare-improving sectors, such as education and health, to security sectors also may deteriorate the human capital and reduce the

quality of life. This may require households to increase their spending on these sectors to mitigate the damage in their standards of livings.

Impacts of terrorism on households are mainly observed in the form of job losses, destruction of properties and increased expenditures needed to cope with the consequences of terrorism. Literature investigating the households' economic behaviour is not quite rich. Christelis and Georgarakos (2009) find that anxiety of terrorism discourages households from investing in stocks. Insecurity due to terrorism also makes them less likely to own a business. They also find evidence of expenditure shifting away from recreational activities that can potentially leave one exposed to a terrorist attack and towards goods that might help one cope with the consequences of terrorism materially or psychologically. Due to considerable heterogeneity of perceptions about terrorism in the population, different studies find conflicting results. While one study finds marked decrease in consumption of non-durables (Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004), another study finds an increase in consumer confidence particularly reflected in the consumer demand for durables (Enders and Sandler, 2005). However, studies commonly find a negative impact of terrorism on consumption (Schneider et al., 2011).

The change in the consumption and saving behaviours of households in OIC countries during the period 2011-2015 is provided in Figure 3.9 in terms of current prices.

Figure 3.9: Change in Household Consumption and Savings in OIC Countries (2011-2015)



Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World Bank WDI database.

Once again, it is not possible to directly attribute the change in consumption and saving to terrorism, but it is possible to roughly observe the differences in economic behaviours of households in different country groups that are affected from terrorism at various intensities. In general, there is a trend in OIC countries towards higher consumption and lower savings, but it is difficult to identify the changes due to terrorism by looking only at raw data. However, compared to other groups, those that are affected extremely appear, on average, to increase their consumption (32%) and reduce their savings (25%) more significantly. This implies that households are likely to react by increasing their consumption and reduce their savings as the level of terror intensity increases. On the other hand, those that are affected at high intensity appear to be neutral, but it cannot be argued that the household in these countries do not react to terrorism. It is possible that they would save at even greater amounts if there would be no terrorism in the group of these countries.

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4. Social Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism

Since the turn of the Millennium, terrorism has brought severe costs to societies and individuals virtually in every corner of the globe. A growing number of scholars, accordingly, have addressed the need to consider the fight against terror as a necessary component of sustainable growth and development (see for example, Oladeji and Folorunso, 2007; Bamidele 2012; Omadjohwoefe 2013). However, discussions on effects of terrorism on societies have so far been confined mainly to measuring terror's cost in economic and structural terms, neglecting social losses caused by terrorism and conflict across spheres of society, from health to cultural and political outcomes (Boscarino et al., 2003).

Against this back drop, this chapter hopes to shed some light on the social impacts of terrorism in OIC countries. The section categorizes these effects into three main areas, in which terrorism induces the most pronounced effects: socio-psychological impacts, political impacts, and cultural impacts. These categories by no means exhaust the spectrum of social effects of terrorism; yet, they provide policymakers a starting point and a benchmark to make further projections.

4.1 Socio-Psychological Impacts of Terrorism

Exposure to any devastating event or disaster will have profound effects on communities and individuals as well as organisations. However, acts of terrorism and their effects on society are distinguished from other disasters by a combination of factors. As Table 1 maps, acts of terrorism differ both from natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes and from "human-made disasters" (Silverman & La Greca, 2002). Unlike natural disasters, terror is not inevitable, and differs from human-made disasters caused by error or malfunction (e.g., airplane crashes or toxic waste accidents). Terrorism is marked by malicious intent to deliberately harm and destroy. Differing from other conflict-driven human-made disasters, such as wars, acts of terror are not preceded by a warning period and are unpredictable. Moreover, at least theoretically and ideally, rules of war are codified by international protocols and conventions and civilians are not the main target of violence. In addition, given the unpredictability, terrorism can uniquely disrupt societal functioning and national security.

Given these unique characteristics, terrorism carries with it a potentially greater impact than other disasters on individuals’ mental health (Becker and Rubinstein, 2004). In fact, a growing body of research on children and youth have highlighted that distress responses, behavioural change, and psychiatric illness caused by terrorism are greater than that of other disasters (Somasundaram, 2007). Similarly, terrorism has a potential to create a more chronic environment than other disasters at the supra-individual social and produce systemic changes in social dynamics, processes, structures and functioning (Somasundaram, 2007). In the following, the chapter will examine both individual, especially among children and the youth and collective psychological traumas induced by terrorism.

Table 1 Characteristics of disasters

	Human made disasters			
	Natural disasters	Error and Neglect	Terrorism	War
Malicious Intent	Not present	Not present	Present	Present, but subject to codifications under conventions and protocols, at least ideally
Inevitability	Not present	Present	Present	Present
Warning period and predictability	Maybe present	Maybe present	Not present	Present
Violence	Not present	Not present	Present and is used as the main tool and directed to civilians	Present but ideally not directed at civilians
Availability of coping tools	Religious belief or Science	Forgiveness and technological advancement	Face the fact that fellow humans indiscriminately intend to harm civilians	Patriotism and protection of civilians

Psychological Impacts on Children & Youth

Research has found a strong relationship between exposure to terrorism and poor mental health outcomes (Schuster et al., 2001; Schlenger et al., 2002; Grieger 2003), documenting that contact with terrorism is associated particularly with increased rates of psychological distress, traumatic stress-related symptoms, and posttraumatic stress disorder (Comer and Kendall 2007).

A study in Swat Valley, a region of Pakistan especially stricken by terrorist violence, found, for example, severe post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms in a majority of its participants (Khalily, 2011). Another study in Pakistan found a significant association between terrorism and psychiatric morbidity (Nasim et al., 2014). In fact, ranked as third on the Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace (2015), Pakistan, from 2001 to 2011, witnessed an almost 100% increase in mental illnesses incidence (Chaudhry 2016).

In the wake of rapidly increasing acts of violence and terrorism, tremendous concern has developed among scholars regarding the impact of terrorism on children and youth. The most visible effect of terrorism is that it leaves behind a large number of bereaved youth and children as well as children and youth with severe injuries. Yet, effects of terrorism on children and youth go well beyond what meets the eye and those latent impacts of terror threaten children's and the youth's well-being in rather complex ways. In fact, studies conducted in various national contexts stricken by terrorism have in common demonstrated that children indeed are the segment of the population at greatest risk for psychological trauma, behavioural changes, and impairment as a result of exposure to violence (Goldfrank et al., 2003).

All in all, these findings demonstrate that terrorism results in severe health outcomes for adolescents and children, and as such, impacts public and population health in a substantial way. Terrorism becoming an important determinant of public mental health puts forward a pressing need to precisely identify the channels through which terrorism affects adolescents and children and to develop preventive and rehabilitative strategies accordingly.

A study on child development and terror (Comer and Kendall, 2007) reveal that children and adolescents come in contact with terrorism through three main paths:

1. Proximal contact, where children directly come in contact with terror by ,for example, being in a city under attack or losing a loved one
2. Media-based contact, where children indirectly experience the attack by viewing a terrorist attack or its results on media and social media
3. Exposition to an extended climate of threat, expectation, and alert.

The considerable body of research on youth and children who come into proximal contact with a terrorist attack indicates increased rates of psychopathology — regardless of whether attack is an isolated case in country not at war or in a region exposed to continual conflict. The most frequent psychopathological findings on proximal contact include increased rates of re-experiencing, emotional numbing, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and importantly these symptoms can be identified as long as one year after the attack (Solberg et al., 2015). Another stream of research that focuses on functional impairment has shown that adolescent victims exposed to proximal contact with terror lack sense of security and majority of them report difficulty functioning at home, with peers, and/or at school, even one-year post-attack (Pfefferbaum, Nixon, Krug, et al., 1999).

Interestingly, studies have shown that when it comes to media-based contact (e.g., viewing a terrorist attack on television, reading about an attack in the newspaper) adverse implications are no less serious than that of proximal contact. In fact, empirical

studies have documented equally significant functional impairment and PTSD between direct and indirect expositions (Pfefferbaum, Nixon, Krug, et al., 1999)

Exposure of youth to terrorism through media and proximal constitutes only one part of a broader picture. The youth and children adaptation to terrorism is also determined by the broader social and political context generated by terrorism. Research has found that in the aftermath of terrorist attacks “sense of security, stress reactions, character strengths, attitudes toward immigration and ethnic group and leadership rhetoric” (Comer and Kendall, 2007: 42) changes, while media starts to capitalise greater levels of aggressive content and references to hardship (Bligh et al., 2004). These post-attack changes in the broader political and social context lead to heightened vigilance and a sense of omnipresent threat and insecurity, keeping children and youth in a state of pervasive anxiety.

Collective trauma and Social deterioration

While individual trauma in itself is substantial, given the rapid and wide dissemination of trauma through media-based contact and changes in the broader political and social environment, terrorism also traumatizes society as a whole and is experienced collectively. Scholars have conceptualized the supra-individual level trauma, either experienced by a certain group or by the entire society, as *collective* or *cultural trauma*. More specifically, collective trauma refers to “systemic changes in social dynamics, processes, structures and functioning” (Somasundaram, 2007) as well as changes in mass action and cultural patterns that occur in reaction to devastating effects of disasters, including terrorism. According to, Erikson, a prominent American sociologist, collective trauma is a “blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of community” (Erikson, 1995: 233)

Empirical research on various communities exposed to prolonged acts of conflict and terror have reported in common that terrorism leads to collective trauma most prominently by

- Creating a chronic climate of insecurity and uncertainty.
- Abolishing vital resources of society. Acts of terror not only destructs such tangible assets of a society as roads or neighbourhoods, but it also degrades and debilitates social capital of society, which indeed is harder to recover and rebuild. Terror destroys the nexus of vibrant relationships, essential networks, leadership, and talented human resources from the community (Somasundaram, 2007). This grave loss collapses community’s working relationships and leadership and organizations, opening up a vacuum for the rise of aberrant ideologies, authoritarian control, and propaganda. On the

other hand, terrorism and the chronic environment of insecurity created by it lead to impairment of members of community, both in terms of social and professional functions and roles (Michael, 2007)

- Weakening a society's capacity to rebuild itself and weakening social trust. One of the gravest societal consequences of terror is its destruction of a society's capacity to rebuild and recover itself, especially in contexts exposed to prolonged terror. Under prolonged stress, and to sustain survival, individuals and communities tend to develop submission, withdrawal, distancing, and avoidance of any behaviour that carry a risk. Equally importantly, terrorism cause a serious loss in interpersonal trust (family, kin, community) as well as trust in social institutions, police and justice, law, values and cultural beliefs. The loss of trust further makes it difficult for communities to recover from terror and conflict.

All of these adverse changes induced by terrorism subtly become part of a socialisation process and get passed down to children and newcomers, as such destabilising future generation and future advancement of society. Acts of terror and the collective trauma created by it poses a direct assault on the continuity and integrity of the cultural system (de Young, 1998), just like individual trauma poses a threat to individual integrity and wellbeing.

4.2 Political Impacts of Terrorism

Acts of terror also have substantial political implications. In the following the focus will be on political consequences of terrorism: the rise of a vicious circle of violence and insecurity, increasing social polarisation and xenophobia, and disturbance of the balance between security and civil liberties. All in all, in OIC member states, acts of terror disturb the political environment; in transitioning democracies, it hinders and delays consolidation of democracy, while in established democracies, terrorism undermines democratic achievements and processes.

A Vicious Circle of Violence

A growing body of research on terrorism and political outcomes has been studying such questions as how exposure to terrorism affects people's evaluation of their political leaders' performances, the effects of civil terror fatalities on voting turn out, and effects of acts of terror on the electoral choice and voter preference (Davis and Silver 2004; Kibris, 2011). This research and literature have established the awareness that the electorate is highly sensitive to acts of terror and that terror attacks and fatalities influence political behaviour and values in a substantial way.

Qualitative case studies in Turkey (Kibris, 2011), Madrid (Bali, 2007), and USA (Hetherington and Nelson 2003), and a panel study of 115 countries (Gassabner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau, 2008), which traced the relationship between voting behaviour and terrorism (1968-2002), have reported remarkably parallel findings. According to these studies:

- Terror attacks and fatalities increase voting turn out
- Terror attacks and fatalities decrease the legitimacy of the incumbent party; the electorate blames the government for the loss and casualties
- Terror attacks and fatalities lead people to vote for parties that are more authoritarian and intransigent

More specifically, the case study in Turkey, examining PKK's terror activities and voting behaviour, has found that:

- In the 1995 general elections, the number of security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters negatively affected the percentage of votes the governing party/coalition received (Kibris, 2011),
- The governing party lost around 0.5 percentage points for each additional casualty per hundred thousand voters in the two years before the election,
- In the 1995 general election, the vote share of the right-wing parties was increased by around 2.5 percentage points on the average at the district level due to the PKK attacks that took place within the two years before the election (Kibris, 2011).

This public political reaction to terrorism can be in part explained through “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where both the public and the oppositional leaders may mute criticism of the government in exchange of elimination of the terror threat. In USA, for example, in the aftermath of 9/11, the approval rate of the president Bush increased from 51% on September-10 to 86% on September-15. On September-22, President's approval achieved a remarkable 90%, representing the highest rating ever recorded for a president (Hetherington and Nelson 2003).

The rally-round-the-flag” effect reinforces the argument that terrorism leads the population to tolerate any uncompromising and hawkish political action. While in the short term intransigent policies and action may provide a sense of security and unity, in the long term such counter-terror measures may create greater security issues. Political theorists argue that hawkish response may alienate the broader group (religious, ethnic, or racial) terrorists come from and as such as may turn moderates into radicals (De Mesquita 2008). English (2003: 17), for instance, observed in the case Northern Ireland that “the British response to republican subversion frequently

involved punishing the wider population for IRA activities: this had the unintended, counterproductive effect of strengthening the IRA that it was intended to undermine.”

On the other hand, hawkish counter-response is likely to lead to greater violent retaliation by the terrorist group; in fact this may precisely be the tactic used by terrorists to create more chaos while gaining sympathy from the group it claims to represent (Siqueira and Sandler 2007)

These findings and discussions overall suggest that terrorism, or even the mere threat of terrorism; can trigger social and political responses with wide ramifications (Comer et al. 2007). Most prominently, this threat can be exploited both by government and terrorists themselves. Terrorists can exploit this threat by using violence to aggravate governments into indiscriminate responses to radicalise and mobilize a population the terrorists claim to belong. While, on the other hand, governments may wish to seize democratic processes, frighten the public to accept the “protection” of a dictatorship and pursue draconian and authoritarian agenda (De Mesquita 2008). All in all, terrorism comes with severe political costs, both in non-authoritarian political contexts and in contexts of democratic transition by impairing democratic processes and triggering a spiral of violence.

Discrimination and Xenophobia

Research in social psychology has pointed to the powerful effect of major events in transforming people’s values, beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes (Comer et al. 2007). This effect is indicated to be larger when a major event is a negative and threatening one (Canetti-Nisim 2009). Being a major event with highly abrupt, negative, and threatening content, terror is expected to lead to substantial belief and attitude change. In a context of inter-group conflict, one such substantial change occurs in how people view ‘the out-group’, the group to which terrorist perpetrators claim to belong or represent.

Empirical and panel studies have found that following exposure to an attack, targeted community and individuals display more altruistic behaviour towards and show greater support to the in-group. On the contrary, support for the out-group decreases (Voors et al. 2012) along with an increase in negative beliefs about and negative stereotyping of the out-group (Sherif et al., 1961). This change in attitude and perception can largely be accounted by the rise of a sense of victimhood among the targeted group, being the subject of random and malicious harm entirely unjustified by virtue of it addressing innocent civilians.

Importantly, by victimizing the target group, terrorism in turn leads to target group’s generalizing its negative beliefs beyond the perpetrator and towards the broader group, who shares the same ethnic, religious, racial, national, or ideological

background with the terrorist group. The target group fully de-legitimizes the broader out-group and become fully uncompromising towards its grievances. More broadly, by increasing negative stereotyping of the out-group, terrorism leads to ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Since the 9/11 for example, there have been numerous instances of the rise of “Islamophobia” in the United States as well as anti-Arab and anti-immigrant sentiments across Europe following attacks in France, Brussels, and Madrid, leading to the rise of violent and xenophobic groups such as Pegida.

Ethnocentrism and xenophobia generates serious malaises in a society to an extent where violence and discrimination exerted on the out-group may be seen as legitimate or are unquestioned. Terrorist acts are often perceived to be perpetrated by a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group. As such institutional discrimination or profiling of the identified racial, ethnic, or religious group, as potential terrorists or threats is a common practice that threatens community cohesion, social trust, and social tolerance (Goldfrank 2003). For instance, in the last few years, media has reported numerous cases of hijab wearing women or ‘Muslim looking men’ or Arabic speaking youth being forcefully taken out of airplanes due to profiling done by flight attendants or complaint by civilians, demonstrating the extent to which the in-group civilians may approve random discrimination and violation of civil liberties.

Even worse, by rising ethnocentrism and xenophobia, terrorism may lead civilians to accept the worst views as unproblematic, especially when these relate to retaliation through violence. In fact, in addition to academic studies, inquiries by Human Rights Watch (Acebes and Collins 2002) as well as by FBI (2002) reported, for instance, a sharp rise in the number of hate crimes, from physical assaults to vandalism of places of worship to murder, against Arabs, Muslims, and those perceived to be Arab or Muslim in the aftermath of 9\11 attacks. In fact, the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes rose from 28 in 2000 to 481 in 2001 (FBI, 2002). These numbers show that terrorism fuels significant social division, social segregation and polarisation, which not only affects the out-group but the society as a whole by damaging the social fabric and unity adversely.

The dilemma: Security versus Civil Liberties

“Each newly discovered mode of a terrorist attack creates a new mode of control” (Kreissl 2015: 2) Scanning of shoes at the airport, limiting the amount of liquid that can be taken into the planes, and scanning of laptops and electronic devices emerged as reaction to actual attempts of terrorist attacks (Kreissl 2015). Today, passenger screening has become quite rigorous, and it involves intrusions such as searches of people and their personal belongings, including intruding people’s social media and email accounts.

These developments generated a serious and necessary debate on the effects of terrorism on the balance between civil rights and security. Civil liberties are given symbolic commitment toward the highest level. Many would argue that civil liberties are guaranteed rights, rights that cannot be compromised (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2003). Yet, in much the same way security, or the absence of terrorism, is also a fundamental public good (Frey et al. 2009) and advocates of security typically argue that rights can be restricted to ensure true safety. Fundamental public good in modern governance and citizenship, in a context of constant threat or possibility of terrorism, causes security and civil rights to compete with one another to a troubling extent (Frey et al. 2009), where less security means more rights, and less rights mean more security.

The fear of terrorism, in sum, has implications such as diminishing public confidence, an increase in social polarisation, and more broadly a public acceptance of moving away from morally binding measures of social relations and categories regarding equality and basic civil rights. In sum terrorism has the costly effect of curbing democratic measures as well as moral rules and codes that keep various segments of society together.

4.3 Cultural Impacts of Terrorism

Another grave social consequence of terrorism is the loss of cultural property, heritage, and history (Bren 2016) as well as destruction of institutions of society that are pivotal to a nation's future development and survival, most notably educational institutions.

Cultural property can be defined as a "movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people..." (UNESCO, 2010:9). Destruction, targeting, and plunder of cultural property reveal the particular vulnerability and great symbolic value of such property (Milligan, 2008). Protection of cultural property is necessary because a community's social sense of identity and collective memory are embedded in its cultural properties. Destruction of cultural property is equal to destruction individuals' and communities' cultural past (Bern 2016). Furthermore, respecting cultural property speaks to multiculturalism and therefore has the practical implication of fostering a cooperative international environment and peace (Bern 2016). It should also be noted that any given community's cultural property is part of human civilisation's collective history.

Despite the importance of cultural property both for local communities and human civilisation and despite the recognition of this importance by international organizations, studies and policymaking regarding acts of terror and cultural property have so far remained limited. This neglect comes with great costs, in fact, since the


2000s; terrorist attacks on cultural property have increased substantially and have become more complex and systematic (Milligan, 2008). Destruction and looting of cultural property is being used by terrorists as tools to, on the one hand, to further their ideological cause and on the other to continue financing their various operations. More specifically:

- Terrorists aim to instil fear into the heart of society and to cause chaos and collective trauma. Destruction of cultural property is one way to demoralise communities; it is a means of eradicating the 'other' (Herscher & Riedlmayer, 2000) and dominate over them by eliminating any psychical and symbolic record of their history and cultural identity (Bern 2016)
- Looting of cultural property also provides terrorist groups with a substantial financial resource for gain and profit. DAESH, for instance, benefits both from the tax it levies from the civilian looting and from the sale of antiquities in the black market (al-Taie 2014).

In the same vein, attacks on key institutions of society, most notably educational institutions, have also become part and parcel of terrorist activity. Since the 2000s, a growing number of educational institutions, schools and universities, from Nigeria to Pakistan and Afghanistan, have been targeted in terrorist attacks. According to The University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database (GTD); since 2004 there has been a sharp rise in terror attacks on schools as illustrated in Figure 4.1.

The Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) Report (GCPEA, 2014) identified the countries that were most heavily affected by terror attacks on schools or universities— where 1,000 or more attacks on schools, universities, staff and students took place during 2009-2012. The top 5 countries among the most affected category include Afghanistan, Colombia, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and Syria. As can be clearly seen this list is dominated by OIC member state.

Figure 4.1: The Rise in Terrorist Attacks on Schools, Global



Adopted from: GTD, reported in Gilsinan (2014).

As the above mentioned data reveals, OIC member states are particularly vulnerable to school attacks by terrorists. Both in OIC countries and elsewhere, terrorists target schools for various reasons. Schools constitute practical, symbolic, and ideological targets. Schools, where large number of people congregates, are practical for attacks because they constitute soft-targets in the sense that they are relatively unguarded. Schools are also symbolic-targets because schools and children are powerful symbols and an attack on them evoke particularly strong and explosive emotional response (Bradford and Wilson, 2013), enabling the perpetrator to cause considerable harm at the collective level. Moreover, schools are ideological targets given that educational institutions are the main channels of a nation to transfer their common norms and social identity to the new generation and cultivate citizens committed to social and political norms.

Systematic destruction of schools by acts of terror bears severe implications upon society. Empirical studies on Nigeria have pointed to a connection between acts of terror perpetrated by Boko Haram, an extremist movement that reject modern science and modern education, and school attendance in Northern Nigeria (Patrick and Felix, 2013). These studies have shown that compared to South Nigeria, Northern Nigeria has suffered lower enrolment rates especially at the primary education sector and a lower rate of educational attainment. This difference is accounted in large part by constant attacks of Boko Haram on educational institutions and the perpetual fear such attacks

have created. In fact, the areas with the lowest number of children in school are in the Northern region of Nigeria as they are worst hit by the attack (Patrick and Felix, 2013).

To conclude, it seems that policy makers in OIC member state should pay equal attention to economic and social costs of terrorism; while social costs may not be as easily measurable and recognizable in the short term, they have longer and more complex implications and replacement of social costs are in most cases impossible. It should also be noted that the direct and media-based contact with terrorism as well as the broader context created by terrorism have serious impacts on mental health of youth and children, demonstrating that terrorism has become a determinant to public mental health. In the political arena, terrorism leads to a vicious circle of violence, triggering xenophobia, discrimination, and social polarization. Terrorism has also adverse effects on the sensitive balance between civil rights and security. Finally, acts of terror could have other negative social impacts such as cultural looting and destruction of educational institutions.

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5. De-radicalisation Models & Approaches

De-radicalization as a holistic program encompasses reversing violent extremist perspectives and countering the causes that engendered them in the first place. De-radicalization programs usually include motivating active violent extremist individuals to give up arms or defect, or targeting the group by means of effective counter-narrative campaigns that eliminate the impetus for organized violent action through reconciliation, dialogue and disillusionment campaigns. In the light of this understanding, this chapter underscores the vital role played by de-radicalisation programs in countering the spectre of violent extremism in OIC member countries. A distinction is made between superficial disengagement and changes in outward behaviour, and thorough de-radicalisation with its resulting shift in ideology and worldview. The chapter also highlights the necessary role of de-radicalisation as a component within a larger strategy geared towards countering violent extremism, and one that is ideally inclusive of hard and soft security approaches and the effective use of political signalling and counter-narratives.

5.1. De-radicalisation and Disengagement: Differences

In the field of countering violent extremism, the approaches of de-radicalisation and disengagement are often confused with one another. De-radicalisation differs from disengagement in that it seeks to alter patterns of thinking and held ideologies while disengagement affects its external behavioural manifestation. Defined broadly, de-radicalisation refers to the socio-psychological shaping or change of the target's sympathy and commitment to violent extremism, to a point where the possibility of violence is extremely mitigated or made unlikely. Disengagement on the other hand, may choose to focus on the action of violent extremism as a target that reflects visible change, without necessarily touching on the root ideologies or sympathies that generate it.

Given that both approaches are often implemented together, it should be noted that a basic form of disengagement is necessary for a more comprehensive de-radicalisation process to occur. In the absence of healthy religious beliefs for instance, or functional nationalism; it may still be possible to appeal to the emotional side of an individual through disengagement using a case based on the harm caused to one's own family by

carrying out violent acts for instance. Hard security practitioners are often inclined to disengagement due to its lower overhead costs and easier measurability; however, this may not reflect a sustainable solution (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2008). This is particularly critical given that disengagement relies on perceived costs and gains, where emotional appeals or provided employment may suffice for a time, but as counter-terrorism campaigns progress the subject may choose to alter their mental equation suddenly in favour of resorting to violent extremism again. In this sense, it is crucial for any counter-radicalization strategy to include both approaches (Rabasa et al., 2008).

With regards to de-radicalisation, it has become evidently clear that the battle is primarily one of ideas. In this respect, while violent extremism is often alleged to grow in power vacuums or brought about through unmet socio-economic demands for instance, the reality often remains that bridging the gap between disillusionment and disenfranchisement requires a bridging idea to generate sympathy and increase recruitment to violent extremist groups. Such an idea is often contextual and rooted deeply in existing worldviews and grievances, adapting intelligently to its circumstances (Storer, 2012). More critically perhaps, such ideas, whether rooted in ideology or economic reasons, often provide the enduring power of violent extremists to survive hard security responses.

The pathway to violent extremism is characterized by a number of reflective phases, during which the individual may assess root causes in light of their faith, emotions or personal pragmatism, following which a decision to engage further or step away from the process is made. Radicalisation recruitment succeed in part through strategically progressive incremental commitments designed with low entry-costs, beginning with emotional sympathy and continuing on to ideological support, and eventually violent action.

In such a context, de-radicalisation seeks to generate a counter-narrative to undermine and educate against radicalizing agents, while simultaneously providing alternative streams of thought and engagement. This is done by either reclaiming subverted narratives, generating new ones, or providing legal means of engagement, socio-political change and participatory citizenship. This does not constitute the suppression of radical opinions per se, but rather provides more acceptable means of channelling it while attempting to instil alternative worldviews in subjects. That said, while radicalisation recruitment often relies on overwhelming group-thinking, ideological isolationism and mirroring of similar ideas as proof of the intrinsic validity of the idea, this may at times necessitate separation from instigating and radicalizing environments in cases of rehabilitation, and specifically in the case of minors (Qureshi, 2015).

A distinction should be made, however, between the prioritization of disengagement versus de-radicalisation programs. In the West for instance, disengagement is often given more weight over its counterpart due to a disinterest or lack of capability to engage in effective ideological or theological reversals. In OIC countries, however, given the relative prevalence of counter-ideological capacity, the focus is on de-radicalisation. There remains, however, the lack of scientifically-supported models unique to OIC countries, and the absence of sharing of good practices in this domain.

5.2. Approaches and Models of De-radicalisation

Violent extremism has its roots in radicalism; however, it is worth to note that the large majority of radicals do not opt to engage in violent extremism. Taking this into consideration, radicalization is therefore a process ranging from the non-violent to the violent. By the same token, de-radicalisation is a process that reverses the radicalisation process. The appeal of this reversal is to specifically roll-back violent extremism in individuals that have already acted violently, which is a more difficult achievement when compared to the de-radicalisation of individuals that have only reached a level of sympathy or emotional support for violent extremist groups. All approaches to de-radicalisation share the target of bringing a cognitive and behavioural change in target subjects, and in doing so, a reversal of the root causes that originally led to violent extremism in the first place. More critically, de-radicalisation programs target the specific use of violence as a means to social change, either through undermining the assumptions towards the effectiveness of violence; reinforcing a moral, religious, theological or ideological perspective inimical to violence; or altering subjective perceptions towards root causes of radicalism in and of themselves.

De-radicalisation nonetheless remains a relatively nascent approach, with consensus only being found in the necessity for the inclusion of soft approaches in counter-terrorism. Bringing about behavioural change through disengagement, even if temporary, is usually easier and more quantifiable for the purpose of public policy. As a result, it is often favoured over fully-fledged de-radicalization, which is challenged by the inability to measure ideological changes in the individual. Equally critical to the development of de-radicalisation programs is the complexity of the radicalisation process itself, requiring policy and programs to be specific, adaptive and dynamic in a way that prevents standardization. This presents challenges to large-scale de-radicalisation or disengagement programs, given the focal emphasis usually made on the practitioner's expertise, innovativeness and emotional intelligence.

In this context, de-radicalisation may often benefit from complementing streams of parallel public policy. For instance, de-radicalisation programs may opt to offer

economic aid and assistance to the families of program subjects; as practiced in Saudi Arabia for individuals convicted of violent extremism. To say that such efforts complement de-radicalisation progress would be a severe understatement, as such public policy initiatives often form the base of interventions.

For radicalisation catalysts originating from perceptions of economic hardship, de-radicalization programs can provide financial support or subsidies to families of the subject. In cases of ideologically-based or theologically-motivated extremism, de-radicalisation programs often make use of selective re-education, ideological counter-narratives, delegitimizing subject's figures of authority and the use of violence as a means to change. In the specific case of radicalised juvenile youths, programs target peer and family networks, and supplement mentorship programs with resiliency counselling, engaged public service programs and narratives reinforcing self-worth and civic engagement. With regards to the often-encountered perception held by de-radicalisation subjects of the lack of effectiveness of non-violent pathways to socio-political change, counter-narratives and re-education are used in emphasizing the ineffectiveness of violence and terrorism to bring about changes, combined with serious political signalling and public policy encouraging inclusive development and participatory politics.


Significant to the approach of generating effective de-radicalisation programs is the strength of constructive narratives, arguments, therapy and catalysts over deconstructive alternatives. Counter-intuitively, violent extremism often seeks out creation of a specific ideal for the perceived good of others. Undermining this narrative by pointing out ideological flaws will at best promote indifference. On the other hand, generating new constructive narratives that address root causes of the radicalized which positively attracts them to civic life and public participation will ultimately prove an effective strategy. In this sense, violence and repression will be the less effective of the two approaches.

Constructive approaches would utilize de-radicalization programs that fulfil the innate wish to live a normal life, get married, pursue education, find employment, and find meaning and purpose in public service, or through the provision of ideologies or beliefs more attractive than those offered by violent extremism. On the other hand, deconstructive approaches include legal prosecution and severe legal charges, disillusionment with violence, individual loss of stature within the group, exhaustion from fear, or having to make a choice between violent extremism while engaged in increased political participation.

The progressive pathway an individual takes towards violent extremism starts with disillusionment and culminates in carrying out acts of violence as illustrated in Figure

5.1. For the purpose of maximum effectiveness in de-radicalisation approaches, models should identify stages of radicalisation where de-radicalisation programs have the most potential to succeed. More critically, programs should differentiate between different roles and distinct identities within radical extremist groups, given the vast intellectual and psychological difference between leadership cadres, and other segments of the organization (Victoroff , 2005).

Figure 5.1: Radicalization Pathway to Violent Extremism



Amidst the variation between approaches to de-radicalisation, an established guiding principle is the significance of social relations in reinforcing or defining held values. In this context, re-education or theological reinterpretation find more success when directed towards families, as opposed to individuals (Hegghammer, 2006). This is perhaps even more relevant to OIC member countries where the socializing and guiding role of the family unit is more significant than in the West. As such, any approach to de-radicalisation that does not account for the potential inherent in co-

opting family structures would be limited severely in effectiveness and sustainability (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2008).

Moreover, a core element of all de-radicalisation programs is public knowledge surrounding available initiatives. This has the benefit of engaging former violent extremists in such programs, and providing significant value and insight into program design and development. This often takes the form of volunteer de-radicalisation organizations that provide a sense of community and purpose. In specific cases as found in Germany, the majority of engaged former extremists working in de-radicalisation programs made individual decisions to contact such organizations and offer their services (Grunenberg & Donselaar, 2006).

Finally, de-radicalisation program efforts are time-sensitive and relative to surrounding events. For most criminal or politically motivated violent extremists, the turning point of de-radicalisation comes in a moment of disillusion or disenfranchisement usually as a result of excessive violence or actions not in line with their alleged ideals. This has critical implications for the necessary adaptive nature of de-radicalisation programs for targeted subjects and in outreach interventions.

5.3. Examples of De-radicalisation Programs in some OIC Member Countries

Throughout the course of intense struggles against violent extremism, a significant number of extremists had been arrested. This led to the necessity for a diverse range of reform programs with the specific intent of rehabilitation to avoid or prevent recidivism and return to extremism. Such efforts are also positioned in a growing understanding within the security community that soft approaches to countering violent extremism are necessary, given the theological, ideological and psychological dimensions of the struggle (Cordesman, 2006).

While de-radicalisation programs may not necessarily provide a one-stop solution to the problem of violent extremism, they hold the potential to allow for reintegration of extremists into society. The base premise to all such programs is that extremists have been misinformed or misled by their handlers and hold to misperceptions and flawed understandings of Islam. Prisons therefore represent ideal settings for such programs given the high level of control they offer.

Taken broadly, de-radicalisation programs take a range of approaches, beginning with targeting the understanding of the meaning of Jihad and Takfir. Others may focus on distancing the subject emotionally, physically and ideologically from extremist groups. Yet others choose to focus on healthy, monitored integration into society. A large majority of the programs not only seek to undermine held extreme ideologies, but also

provide some measure of social and economic support to subjects' families. It remains to be said that the impact of such programs cannot be conclusively stated given limits to data collection and the relative novelty of such approaches.

While hard security approaches may have led to high rates of capture of violent extremist offenders, in most cases, not enough evidence exists to detain these individuals for life, or the judgements they receive are based on crimes that do not require life-sentences. In one study on violent extremist prison sentences, only 15% of offenders receive death or life sentences, where the rest receive 20 to 10 years or less. A large majority of offenders often acquire release through pardons or good behaviour. More critically, unlawful detainment of suspects will often do more harm than good to the moral high ground of narratives pertaining to government legitimacy and authority. In this case, the release of inmates is a foregone truth that requires necessary action, especially given high rates of reoffending and recidivism by extremists after release. If necessary action is not taken, a significant number of former militants or extremists will reintegrate with old extremist networks, and in the case of a number of countries including Morocco, Yemen, Egypt and Algeria; a significant number of former inmates returned to the same lifestyles of direct involvement or support of violent extremism as before.

It is also essential to bear in mind that prisons often prove fertile grounds for radicalisation. Numerous cases exist of inmates who had not held extremist ideas prior to entering prison, yet through the prison environment eventually came to be proponents of extreme ideologies. Harsh treatment is often a stimulus for increased radicalisation; as with cases of torture, deprivation and hostility. This naturally necessitates a conscious prison environment and rehabilitation program design inclusive of a broad range of aspects affecting prisoner psychology. In this respect, state funding and program design are two pillars critical to the success of such programs.

Historically speaking, de-radicalisation models and programs are not new; having been used in Egypt and Algeria; but with emphasis on a larger group rather than a specific individual. These efforts were made less effective by crackdowns and overwhelming hard security approaches as opposed to any conscious studied effort to reform ideas and perceptions. Moreover, while de-radicalisation programs targeting religious extremism may exist from country to country, they usually differ significantly on the basis of each country's capacity, and their unique approaches to the problem. The remaining of this chapter is devoted to examining two such programs in OIC countries (Saudi Arabia and Indonesia) which differ significantly from each other in their approach.

Saudi Arabian Model

Violent extremism in Saudi Arabia has traditionally been linked to extreme anti-Westernism (Hegghammer, 2006). This is usually invariably due to perceived close ties between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and discontent with alleged policy contentions. Religious extremism is also served to a significant extent by the return of Saudi nationals from Jihad in Afghanistan in 2002 (Hafez, 2009). Issues with this specific strain of radicalism include their interpretation of Islam, and the specific rationalizations for violence against the state to fulfil ideological goals. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has developed a multi-faceted approach, specifically targeting understandings of Jihad, and the conception of *Takfir*. Moreover, other programs operate in parallel to counter internet radicalization, alongside a social reintegration program.

The Saudi Arabian de-radicalisation model remains the most comprehensive and funded program of all current approaches (Boucek, 2008b). It consists of targeted Islamic re-education, psychological therapy and integration following pardon or release. Moreover, it is built on the base premise that violent extremists' views and ideologies have their root in misinformed or misperceived conceptions of Islam (Fink & Hearne, 2008). In this context, the inmate is seen as a victim of deviation and manipulation by extremist ideologues and influencers (Boucek, 2007a). Consequently, the subject-victim is seen as deserving of education and guidance as would a misguided individual. To increase the impact of programs, the Saudi model places a significant emphasis on culture and tradition through the utilization of family networks and social relations to adopt responsibility for the participants' progress and well-being, with more stakeholders often reflecting greater sustainability of rehabilitation (Fink & Hearne, 2008). This is not to say however, that all violent extremists are entered into de-radicalisation programs. Rather, nearly 10% of violent extremists are identified as dangerous extremists, of whom a significant amount refuse any form of engagement altogether with de-radicalisation programs (Ansary, 2008). Extremists who have taken part in violence against the Saudi Arabian government are disqualified from entry by default. Others who have carried out terrorism may take part, yet are not provided with release (Ansary, 2008). The core of the de-radicalisation program is found in its ideological approach to *Takfir* thought, by means of intensive dialogue and psychological therapy (Boucek, 2007b). The de-radicalisation program is administered by a committee within the Ministry of Interior, consisting of four sub-committees; the religious; security; media; psychological and social committees, respectively (Boucek, 2007a).

The religious committee arranges direct religious debate and dialogue with prisoners, from a pool of approximately 150 scholars and imams. This approach is no doubt

supported by the high numbers of religious scholars within Saudi Arabia, which permits for filtering based on methods of communication (Boucek, 2008b). In this regard, selection of scholars is based on their ability to generate engaging dialogue (Boucek, 2007a). The psychological and social committee consists of a nearly 50 psychologists and social scientists with the mandate of assessment and diagnosis of progress, mental dysfunction and disorder and study of behaviour (Boucek, 2008b). The group is also charged with ascertaining whether the participant is genuine and sincere in their wish for reform, alongside assessment of the families of the inmates to determine the level or nature of support they require. The security committee assesses security risks, and is charged with recommending discharge, in addition to serving as parole officers following discharge and being responsible for monitoring them after their exit. The final committee pertaining to media designs and produces educational content for use in counselling, therapy and religious re-education sessions, as well as producing content for use in public mosques and schools. In parallel to its internal de-radicalisation, the committee also provides outreach to youth cross-sections that may have been exposed to radical views (Boucek, 2007a).

Counselling is conducted through individual meetings between the program subject and the appointed scholar, where initially the scholar or cleric will begin by establishing their independence from the state security apparatus. In the remainder of the first session, attempts are made to engage the subject in discussion regarding actions that caused them to be imprisoned and to identify the religious rationale for their actions. This is followed by further dialogue of why these justifications were flawed, followed by the beginning of re-education (Boucek, 2007a). It is critical to note here that knowledge is not enough to generate effective de-radicalisation rather the cleric or scholar must earn the respect of the subject in some manner or form. Therefore, simple declarations of religious law are often not enough, but rather there is a need for persuasive, engaging theological and juristic interpretations of specific religious issues (Hassan, 2006). Following the individual session phase, programs shift into formal and informal dialogue sessions (Boucek, 2007a). With the end of short sessions, longer six-week courses are provided in subjects such as *Takfir*, terrorism and Jihad, with examinations that determine whether the subject must retake the course.

With the end of counselling and dialogue, release evaluation occurs where subjects are placed in a rehabilitation centre in a domestic suburb for a period of 8 to 12 weeks for further counselling and integration. During this period, they cannot leave the facility unless their family provides custody. With official discharge, parole is instituted where the subjects are observed and required to check in regularly with program officials. The challenge of radicalisation necessitated the separation of extremists from other criminals by building a total of five prisons for the specific purpose and needs of its de-

radicalisation programs, with an individual capacity of 1200 subjects. Traditionally prisoners were kept in a large shared cell; unlike the de-radicalisation-specific facilities which ensure individual segregation. De-radicalisation prisons contain televisions for dedicated lecture broadcast. Additionally, the facility design minimizes contact between security personnel and inmates, and prevents contact between prisoners altogether. Furthermore, all cells are digitally monitored to prevent abuse or mistreatment. The prison design accommodates for family visit, given the vital role of family in reform, with specific accommodating areas. Conjugal visits for married prisoners are also permitted (Boucek, 2008a).

Internet De-radicalisation

The Saudi Arabian de-radicalisation model is not limited to inmate rehabilitation, but is rather more expansive, with passive online dissemination, particularly on websites that support extremist thought. This is done from the base premise that the internet presents one of the most important fronts for extremist groups to spread their ideology to youth (Ansary, 2008). More critically, aside from its potential for radicalization, internet havens allow for the easy transfer of methods and coordination of planning with other extremists (Hafez, 2008). In this light, the Saudi government launched the al-Sakinah Campaign, to provide counter-narratives to online extremist dialogue through volunteer scholars and imams by engaging with radical members of extremist domains. The al-Sakinah campaign makes use of over 60 academics, scholars, psychologists and social science experts who engage with extremists through the internet by means of infiltration, targeting individuals who are sympathetic to or support extremist beliefs, yet have not committed terrorist acts. In one presented case, over nearly 54,000 hours of interaction, a total of 972 online subjects were alleged to have reverted from their extremist ideologies (Ansary, 2008).

Disengagement

The multifaceted model of de-radicalisation found in Saudi Arabia reflects a number of variables that play a significant role in the process of disengagement and ultimately, the possible de-radicalisation of subjects. On a physical level, this includes anxiety, isolation and segregation from other radicalised ideologues. In the specific context of transitioning from a predisposing to violent extremism to peaceful behaviour, the role of a mentor or positive influence that reinforces the former is crucial. According to state statistics, rates of recidivism range from 1% to 2% (Horgan, 2009b).

The role of family in reaffirming and sustaining the process of reform and behavioural engagement was integral in providing external support. Additionally, the Saudi model was designed to take advantage of its emphasis on family bonds, with extensive support for families of de-radicalisation program subjects to generate goodwill to state

authority. This was conducted from the base premise that by increasing loyalty and bonds with the family, bonds to extremist thought were weakened. Therefore, Saudi de-radicalisation programs often include programs to facilitate marriage, education and monetary support in certain cases. Moreover, the family of the de-radicalisation is also held accountable for recurring extremist behaviour on the part of the subject. Financial support is provided in the way of payments to assist the family while the main earner is jailed (Horgan, 2009b). This support also extends to education and health coverage, taking into context that the wife and family are one of the largest variables in sustained change of behaviour (Fink & Hearne, 2008). This invariably results in critiques levelled against the model, where any changes are ascribed to basic disengagement due to monetary support, and not an actual change in ideology.

Conclusion

While a measure of success is reported in the use of the Saudi Arabian model, certain fall-backs can be identified. The model targets improper understandings of Islam; however, educational streams reflect a thorough immersion in religious knowledge, which may point to a different root to the problem than misconceptions per se; calling for a review of religious education in its own right. Moreover, while high success rates are reported, returns to extremism still occur. For instance, with citizens who underwent the program after return from Guantanamo, nearly 11 returned to violent extremism (Worth, 2009). This calls for better post-program monitoring and tracking methods.

That said, the relative success of the model is positive in that if it continues to exhibit success, the model or its methods may be effectively transplanted into other OIC member countries. Note should be made however, that the Saudi model is based on the prevalence of significant resources set aside for the program, which other member states may find difficult to dedicate. Additionally, scholars and imams in the program may benefit from referent authority and legitimacy given the religious establishment to Makkah and Madinah, which would be difficult to reproduce elsewhere.

Indonesian Model

Indonesia is the largest OIC and Muslim country in the world in terms of population, with a total of approximately 260 million people. Nearly 87% of its population is Muslim, with minor variations in terms of practice and the country has contended with violent extremist groups since the mid 90's.

Following significant violence, and with a relatively slow response to the problem of violent extremism the state sought to directly engage with the issue. This was something of a contention as a strong opinion within the country exists that the war on

terrorism is a war on Islam itself, and where religious extremism is not perceived as a threat per se. Moreover, the government also presented hesitance in isolating the support of mainstream citizens who may view such radical groups as part of the Indonesian community (Smith, 2005).

This changed with the Bali bombings in 2002. With significant arrests in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, the Indonesian government altered their approach in the manner of engaging with militants. This included aggressive crackdowns seeking to capture violent extremists, while simultaneously changing their ideologies through a de-radicalization model, and also to a significant extent by replacing Imams and public speakers with moderates.

Indonesia's attempt at de-radicalisation consisted of a model geared towards changing the ideologies of extremists, through a collection of individuals and groups that were required to make do with limited resources. In spite of relative low levels of staff and funding, Indonesia presents a model that has exhibited a good measure of success.

Efforts to counter violent extremism began through scholars in 2005, following an executive decision to bring together groups of scholars to counter the narrative of violent extremist teachings. However, this effort was soon abandoned due to scholars not feeling the necessity of the project, while others were yet not familiar with extremist teachings (International Crisis Group, 2007).

In the years to come, the judiciary and police would come to implement their own program within the scope of counterterrorism. An ad hoc de-radicalisation program targeting inmates was launched with the aim of picking out and targeting prisoners who had intelligence value to police against other violent extremists (International Crisis Group, 2007). Police also sought to recruit violent extremists principally against the use of violence towards civilians to counter the influence of other violent jihadists.

In Indonesia, extremists hold significant distrust of police due to heavy crackdowns in the past (Schulze, 2008). Indonesia's current approach is to provide humane treatment and respect religious practices. In this context, it is worthy to note that most police are Muslim. Maintaining Islamic values within the police force has aided the reputation of police who manage rehabilitation programs. Moreover, former violent extremists who assist with rehabilitation program are often allocated one week with new inmate police interrogators. More relevantly, the majority of Indonesia's police counterterrorism self-identify as practicing Muslims who will end interrogation sessions to pray. These demonstrations of piety aid in building trust (Abuza, 2009).

The Indonesian model approaches each inmate on an individual level. In addition to counselling, it offers educational opportunities to the subjects and provides financial

assistance to families of imprisoned subjects (Sheridan, 2008). Police provide financial assistance to families for the purpose of food, clothing and education, as well as additional opportunities to visit with the subject.

The program is built on two assumptions, namely that extremists only listen to other extremists and that perception of the police can be changed through kind treatment (Schulze, 2008). Indonesia does not make use of religious scholars to provide counselling or religious re-education, as they believe the inmates do not find the scholars credible. The program instead relies on reformed violent extremists to talk to prisoners, believing that extremists are able to relate to these former extremists (Waterman, 2008). Commonly, reformed violent extremists used in the program were once senior leaders in extremist groups, which is helpful given the hierarchical culture of the region which tends to exhibit deference to authority figures (Abuza, 2009).

Disengagement

A number of variables provide the basis for both violent extremists to disengage and de-radicalise. This includes the removal of the inmate from the influence of extremist networks, and applying immediate engagement upon being detained, as well as positive treatment from police.

The most notable factors seen within Indonesia's de-radicalisation model are the physical factors of shock arrest and imprisonment by security forces. Upon arrest, the extremist is cut off from the former group. Extremist group leaders are often kept at police headquarters to prevent contact with other prisoners (Schulze, 2008). Moreover, inmates receive humane treatment from police, which invalidates the argument that security forces are hostile towards Muslims.

A psychological factor often seen in disengagement is disillusionment or ideological dissonance. Disillusionment can have a critical role in an individual's change in an organization during the period of their shift from an active participant to a far less active role (Horgan, 2009b). Loss of belief in the ideology of a group or the pervasive feeling that violence has gone too far can be a force causing an individual to disengage. Prior to interrogations, police allow reformed extremists to spend several days with inmates debating ideologies, which they find allows for easier interrogations once ideological contentions have been resolved. One strength of the Indonesian model is the ability of the police to identify and secure assistance of former extremist leadership. As seen in the case of Algeria and Egypt, leadership can play a significant role in encouraging others to disengage and de-radicalize. Indonesian police make use of this in the hopes that if a leader changes their ideology, others will follow.

Model Weaknesses

A number of weaknesses exist in the Indonesian model. While former leadership may be presented as credible to extremist inmates, they are easily undermined due to their documented and often publicized cooperation with security forces. Public identification of former leaders with public police officials and their lifestyles have been pointed out by Indonesian media, which contributes to a critical loss of credibility in the eyes of many extremists (Abuza, 2009).

Yet another criticism is that the prison system undermines rehabilitation efforts by nature. In Indonesia, prisons struggle with corruption and overcrowding, with their own internal hierarchy and extortion. Prisoners must therefore engage with this internal system to access basic necessities, while also contending with gangs. Usually, this will cause extremists to group together for protection. While efforts are made to separate extremists from the rest of the prison; no attempts are made to separate hardened violent extremists or terrorists from extremists that are more likely to achieve success in the de-radicalisation program (International Crisis Group, 2007). Indonesia's de-radicalisation model is often undermined as soon as the jihadist enters prison. It is worthy of note that Indonesian police are aware of this, and therefore, try to keep many prisoners at police headquarters rather than place them in the prison system (Schulze, 2008).

The program is, moreover, only directed towards some violent extremists in custody, with no clear structured rehabilitation program once they are released from holding (Schulze, 2008). Also, after release, a number of "rehabilitated" violent extremists are allowed to return to their former environments and networks, making the risk of recidivism more likely. Furthermore, while police attempt to address subjects' needs, aid is not evenly distributed among the prisoners; with some benefiting more than others. One senior program official stressed that he felt the socio-economic approach was far more effective in rehabilitating violent extremists than the religious-ideological approach. Yet, only a small number of inmates receive financial assistance while others are ignored altogether (International Crisis Group, 2007).

As a whole, Indonesian police perceive the model as a successful one and root this in the assessment of a decrease in bombings since 2005, which may not constitute an effective metric to assessing the spread of radicalism throughout the country, but may point to the success of other operations in the hard security sector designed to limit violent extremist capacity. The program has nonetheless led to better intelligence information, and enabled the arrest of high ranking extremist group leadership (International Crisis Group, 2007). The program however, remains critically underfunded. Additionally, due to short prison sentences in Indonesia, little motivation

exists to participate in the program (Abuza, 2009). Without increased funding and support, the program is likely to only exhibit limited success.

Conclusion

The Indonesian de-radicalisation model points to some measure of success through its unique approach to the challenges of radicalism. In this respect, to ensure continued viability of the Indonesian approach, a number of items require attention; including the need for effective prison reform, greater public funding for de-radicalisation programs, social welfare to program subjects' families, and the need for effective follow-up parole mechanisms.

As the number of program subjects' increase, resources available to deal with them in the prison environment are further strained, leading to overall less focus and results (Hannah et al., 2008). Moreover, separating extremists from the general population is essential to preventing radicalization. Caution should be taken with regards to prison corruption, which can severely undermine de-radicalisation efforts. Therefore, Indonesian model's success is closely linked to the need for broader prison reform.

It is also worthy to note that local research has shown the critical role to be played by wives and families in initial disengagement from violent extremism (Fink & Hearne, 2008). Unfortunately, increasing focus on the role of family has yet to materialize. Of 400 violent extremists and family members offered counselling, only 20 participated. This is partly because while support is slowly phased in for families, extremist groups still extend financial and social support to these families (Abuza, 2009).

Finally, program subjects need a means of effective re-integration into normal society, with effective monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to prevent recidivism. Indonesia has no parole system and is strained for resources to allow for effective monitoring of former program subjects. Therefore, it is difficult to ensure actual reform or whether they simply apply the tool of *Taqiyya* where disinformation and deception are permitted if their safety or faith is threatened (Pluchinsky, 2008). Also, prisoners are able to secure early releases through the program, which encourages some measure of duplicity. Nonetheless, Indonesia has been able to initiate a relatively successful model despite shortages of funding and crowded prison establishments. This is perhaps best reflected in public rejection of violence extremist ideology by a number of former leaders. In addition, the growing aid given to the program by Indonesia's executive branch is helpful in strengthening the program. Indonesia's de-radicalisation program may not be viable in the long run however, due to the above identified faults in the program. Unless Indonesia is prepared to tackle prison reform, it is likely that the de-radicalisation model will only be able to be effectively implemented towards a small minority of extremists.

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6. Challenges & the Way Forward

The rise of Al-Qaeda and DAESH and the atrocities committed by them has had a devastating effect on many OIC countries thus pushing the issues of radicalism and violent extremism to the top of the Agenda of the OIC. Nonetheless, OIC countries cannot confront radicalism and violent extremism without understanding these phenomena. This is not an easy task since radicalism and violent extremism are very complex sets of phenomena, covering a great diversity of issue with different causes and consequences.

The current wave of radicalism and violent extremism differs fundamentally from previous waves. Radical and violent extremist groups have utilised gross misinterpretation of Islamic concepts to develop religious narratives. These religious narratives are at the heart of this current wave of radicalism and violent extremism. This fact affects OIC countries the most and, as a result, OIC countries have become the main theatre of this wave.

Hard security measure will not suffice. Radicalism and violent extremism have roots such as: relative deprivation, government ineffectiveness in providing services to the population and perceptions of state corruption. Understanding the root causes of radicalism and violent extremism and reducing - or even better - eliminating these root causes is essential if the efforts to counter radicalism and terrorism are to succeed. In addition, the economic and social impacts have to be fully understood by OIC countries in order to develop capacities and resilience in the face of violent extremism.

An effective mean to countering violent extremism is the availability of channels for citizen engagement, if only to develop public engagement and civic responsibility. In the absence of this, violence and extremism become more attractive as a medium for change.

Similarly, comprehensive counter-radicalization must begin with critical social institutions including the family and educational curricula. In this context, no stone must be left unturned. Possible targets in need of focus include fostering increasingly participatory politics. Educational curriculum require thorough vetting and review to ensure healthy educational and to identify ideological narratives that may serve as base points for radicalization in the future. A healthy emphasis is also needed on

instilling curricula with the spirit of critical thinking and independent inquiry, so as to counteract the demagogic, simplified appeals to emotion and group-thinking often used by radicalising agents. This may be instilled through the study of critical and creative thinking, rhetoric and logic and the healthy and balanced inclusion of competitive sports in educational streams among other mediums for self-expression.

With regards to examining educational curricula and practices, the pertinent question of the role of religious re-education in de-radicalisation programs arises, where it may perhaps be more strategic to not only target those affected by radical teachings but to also identify sources of such teachings within mainstream society. More often than not, radical teachings hijack existing socio-religious narratives that have not been protected through additional steps that ensure, distinguish or safeguard them on a doctrinal and ideological level from extremist perversions and manipulation. This may require a renewed perspective on concepts of Jihad, Takfir, social injustice, just war, political and religious legitimacy, and violence.

Moreover, when taking the challenge into a broader context, there is a definite need for dynamic disengagement and de-radicalisation models that adapt not only to targeted ideologies, but to individuals themselves. This in turn necessitates comprehensive studied counterterrorism approaches that balance psychometric, security and socio-cultural considerations. Ultimately however, multi-level approaches are limited by the existing level of political will and available resources OIC member states may direct towards the problem of violent extremism. Given the myriad consequences posed by violent extremism not only to public safety and national security but to development efforts, education, public health and infrastructure deterioration, there is a need to give greater weight to the threat of violent extremism in policy. Moreover, given the role of violent extremism in undermining state legitimacy and in drawing essential resources away from other fields of necessary investment, a half-hearted effort at eliminating violent extremism and radicalism only risks a prolonged, more cost-intensive effort given longer counter-terrorism campaign times.

In this manner, there is a need for clear political signalling to crystallise public opinion on the necessity of countering violent extremism, and the specific harm this phenomenon poses to society. Aside from the crystallisation of public opinion, there is a parallel need to study and engage with factors and attributes unique to specific public audiences and cultures, specifically for the purpose of informing the disengagement targets of comprehensive de-radicalisation programs. This should take into context the unique role of family vis-à-vis a specific culture, concepts of shame and social pressure, honour and so on. Additionally, de-radicalisation models need to

internalize the potential effectiveness of providing social welfare or assistance to inmates while they undergo de-radicalisation programs. This may serve as an effective measure by developing some measure of rapport, cognitive dissonance or sympathy towards the state; and effectively serve as an initial disengagement factor that may lead to de-radicalisation. One other critical aspect includes the effective legitimacy and perceived authority of religious scholars involved in de-radicalisation programs, given the role of Takfiri rhetoric that ensures ideological immunity against interventions by mainstream scholars.

De-radicalisation programs should also look to make use of former radical extremists, and seek to engage with civil society networks sharing the program's ideals if only to multiply efforts on a larger scale. Elements critical to the success of de-radicalisation programs however, include prison reform. This in turn necessitates ensuring the separation of radicalized inmates from normal criminals, and treating de-radicalisation subjects humanely; given the historical role prison abuse has had in producing strains of hardened, increasingly extremist ideology. Aside from the previously noted role of family welfare and support for the purpose of disengagement, the effectiveness of de-radicalisation models must utilise the family as a stakeholder in robust follow-up mechanisms for those program subjects that are given parole or pardon.

Taking a step back, and examining the role of radicalisation in fostering violent extremism per se, it is worthy to note that all effective radicalisation processes invest in developing initially easy commitment to a violent extremist group. This is followed by progressively stronger commitments. In this context, de-radicalization as an approach should target stages of radicalisation where the model's intervention can still provide an effective or feasible alternative to the material, emotional, psychological and social benefits of belonging to a terrorist group. In this context, a dynamic strategy is necessary where distinction is made between radicals that have reached the end of the line for ideological and emotional rewards in return for commitment to the group. There is moreover a need to ensure de-radicalisation models' dynamic adaptability towards distinctions such as education levels, varying levels of exposure, and the critical difference between regular operatives and senior leadership, given the variations between their respective roles and functions. In this regard, differences in commitment, interest, ideology, justification and perhaps goals may be observed.

Challenges & the Way Forward

The spectre of violent extremism requires effort on a variety of fronts to eliminate it. In this domain the role of adaptive de-radicalisation programs cannot be understated. If designed with effective adaptive review mechanisms coupled with the sharing of good practices and individual member state experiences, de-radicalisation could gain much in the way of established effective practice, and collective experience. Along this parallel, there are a number of areas of interest to de-radicalisation programs that could potentially be solved through bilateral or multilateral OIC member country cooperation. This includes identifying the effects of cease-fires or ends to hostility on group moral and cohesion, identifying and mapping triggers for regret or disengagement across different radical leadership levels, as well as combining theological and scholarly approaches with applied psychometrics and unified psychological models or theories. Other points of interest include the differences and similarities in de-radicalisation pathways between imprisoned de-radicalisation subjects and the independent disengagement by former violent extremists.

Finally, through a methodical, critical approach engaged in a broader multilateral effort to address the challenges of violent extremism, an OIC framework towards countering violent extremism may be of use in establishing linkages for concerted efforts towards uncovering a workable praxis for interoperable and replicable methods to not only reverse radicalisation, but project and produce internal fragmentation within extremist groups and dismantle their bases of support.