## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Introduction: Context and Background</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Australia: A Brief History</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Islam in Australia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Demographic Profile</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Views on Migration and Integration</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Attitudes on Visibility and Representation of Muslims</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Confidence in Relations among Muslim Communities</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Future Projections for the Muslims in Australia</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Conclusions and Recommendations</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexes</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFIC</td>
<td>Australian Federation of Islamic Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIMA</td>
<td>Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAC</td>
<td>Australian Multicultural Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia-New Zealand-United States Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIMPR</td>
<td>Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Council for Multicultural Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAC</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMA</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMD</td>
<td>Global Muslim Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HREOC</td>
<td>Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICNSW</td>
<td>Islamic Council of NSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICV</td>
<td>Islamic Council of Victoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMA</td>
<td>Lebanese Muslim Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMAC</td>
<td>National Multicultural Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>Net overseas migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Multicultural Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>Special Broadcasting Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSUA</td>
<td>Social Sciences University of Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreword

The SESRIC has launched the Global Muslim Diaspora (GMD) Project - a comprehensive research effort aiming to analyse the challenges, attitudes, experiences and perceptions on a range of issues related to Muslim communities and minorities living in the non-OIC Member States. The main objective of the project is to provide a range of useful comparative statistics and insights, which can help identify issues, initiate cooperation forums and shape future policy.

Islam is not only present in all continents as a religion but also as a cultural and civilizational value. Starting with the Hijrah of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), Muslim migrants have laid the foundations for the spread of Islamic values, ideas and habits in the regions where they are settled, thus contributing to the cultural richness and economic development of these places.

Today, whenever we raise the point concerning Muslims communities and minorities living in non-OIC Member States, we have in mind a context in which Islam is present through more recent migrations. However, we should keep in mind that many of these countries have also been the homeland of Muslims for centuries.

Despite the recent growth of literature on Muslims living in non-OIC Member States, our knowledge regarding this subject remains limited and fragmented. The GMD project intends to fill in this gap by engaging more closely with the representatives of Muslim communities and minorities in different countries.

In the context of the GMD project, it is with great pleasure that I present to you the report on Australia, which affords the political elites, policy makers, analysts and general public the opportunity to understand how the Muslims in Australia view the most pressing issues they face today. The report on Australia is based on two basic pillars: desk research and fieldwork – conducted by travelling to Australia. The results of the survey and workshop undertaken during the field study with representatives of Muslim communities and minorities along with in-depth interviews with Muslim and non-Muslim public opinion leaders are integrated within the report.

I would like to encourage the readers of this report to have a look at the GMD general report titled “Muslim Communities and Minorities in Non-OIC Member States: Diagnostics, Concepts, Scope and Methodology”, which inter alia provides description of methodology and research activities applied when preparing the report on Australia.

The development of this report has involved the dedication, skills and efforts of many individuals, to whom I would like to thank.

Amb. Musa Kulaklikaya
Director General
SESRIC
Acknowledgements

The Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) commissioned this study to the Social Sciences University of Ankara (SSUA). The SSUA core research team comprised of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdal Akdeve, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gürol Baba, Dr. Onur Unutulmaz and Dr. Servet Erdem. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Barca, Rector of SSUA, supervised the preparation of this report.

Amb. Musa Kulaklikaya, Director General of the SESRIC, provided pivotal leadership during the preparation of the report. Several SESRIC members also contributed to the finalization of the report, including Dr. Kenan Bağcı, Acting Director of Economic and Social Research Department, and Dr. Erhan Türbedar, Researcher, who coordinated the report on behalf of SESRIC. Kaan Namli, Researcher, edited the report and Fatma Nur Zengin, Events and Communications Specialist, facilitated the fieldworks.

The SESRIC gratefully acknowledges local field workers and the institutions representing Muslim communities and minorities in Australia for their cooperation and extraordinary support, without which this project would not have been possible.
Executive Summary

This study aims to address the gap in the literature relating to the global Muslim diasporic community by providing a comprehensive outlook on the principle aspects of Australia’s Muslim community. The data and analysis presented in this study were obtained via in-depth interviews and round table meetings in Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra and a detailed research of secondary sources.

Muslim community in Australia is diverse, as they are in other diasporic contexts. The two significant aspects of their diversity are their ethnic background and country of origin. Despite the widely held belief that the majority of Muslims are of Middle-Eastern origin, less than one-fifth of Australian Muslims were born in Middle Eastern or Arabic countries. In fact, a significant number have come from Asia, Europe and Africa. Approximately two-thirds of Muslims residing in Australia are born overseas.

According to the 2016 Australian Census, the total number of self-identified Muslims in Australia, including all denominations of Islam, constituted 604,240 persons, or 2.6% of the total population of Australia. This signifies an increase of around 15% compared to the previous population share of 2.2% reported in the previous census 5 years ago. With followers coming from 183 different countries, Islam is Australia’s third largest religion and second fastest growing religion, surpassed only by Hinduism. 67% of the Muslim population in Australia is under the age of 35 while 47% is under the age of 25. More specifically, 25% is children, 38% is aged 15-35, and 33% is over 35.

Australia’s legal structure does not contain any specific act regarding Muslims. Yet they have always remained a topic of debate within the general policy of multiculturalism. Despite being a focus of much debate in Australia for some time, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent multicultural policies have aided in integrating Muslims into the wider Australian community at the desired pace.

Despite this, the socio-economic profile of Australian Muslims is developing thanks to the increasing educational levels of the younger generation, with the notable exception of those in low-income areas. Previously, Muslim community members tended to be blue-collar workers; there is now a significant increase in white-collar Muslims.

Regarding Muslims political representation, it is important to note that Muslims do not have a desirable level of representation in both the upper and lower houses of the Australian Parliament. The current Muslim-origin representatives do not effectively address Muslim-specific issues. Comparatively speaking, first generation Muslim migrants show more interest in their home country’s politics rather than Australia’s.

A generational difference in the attitudes manifests itself in the level of intra-communal confidence. Accordingly, first generation Muslim migrants had deeper confidence to the other
members of Muslim community living in their suburbs. Younger members who could not afford to live in their parents’ suburbs tend to move to cheaper districts. This makes the Muslim community more dispersed and decreases intra-community interaction. On the other side of the coin, in professional sphere, discrimination Muslims face has been generating solidarity among younger white-collar members of the Muslim community.

Australian Muslims argue over interpretations of Islam, while also facing political and ethnic issues in Australia. The new generation is integrating more effectively into the Australian society while being more socially aware and reactive when confronted by discrimination. Although the younger generation of Australian Muslims is geographically dispersed across the country, due to their common communication patterns through social media, they enjoy a type of virtual unity and solidarity when confronted with hostility and discrimination.

Responses of the participants in the workshop and the interviews conducted during the fieldwork suggest that it is impractical to speak of a Muslim diaspora in Australia; the primary reasons are being the super-diversity of the Muslim community, with followers originating from more than 183 different countries, and the low level of interaction and intercommunal dialogue between different Muslim groups. An important aspect regarding Australian Muslims surfaced during the survey study (2 February-2 March 2019). The respondents have had strong sensitivities regarding Australian government policies and their stance toward these policies, along with questions on their personal finances and religious beliefs/practices and their volunteer work. Almost all questions regarding these aspects, a significant number of respondents refused to answer.
1 Introduction: Context and Background

This chapter discusses the Australia context, both in general terms and specific to Muslim community of Australia. The first part gives a brief account of the major historical, political and economic phases of Australia as a country and the second section provides a concise historical, political, ethnological, cultural, and institutional depiction of Muslim experiences in Australia.

1.1 Australia: A Brief History

Before the European settlement, the records show that Australia’s indigenous populations have lived on the continent for at least 50,000 years.¹ The Dutch sighted Australia in 1606 before Captain James Cook claimed it for Great Britain in 1770. The British government determined on settling New South Wales in 1786, and colonization began early in 1788. The first fleet arrived at Botany Bay in 1788 in order to establish New South Wales. For the establishment of the country, Britain sent convicts until 1848, whose numbers reached 162,000.²

In the development and urbanization of the country, the Gold Rush³ was very significant. It did not only boost Australia’s economy and extremely increase its economic value as a location but also the rebellion during the Eureka Stockade in 1854 set the parameters of Australia’s democracy. It also kick started the Chinese immigration, which totaled 50,000 in a decade or so.⁴ In this era, the European immigration to Australia did not slow down either. Until 1825, the European population was a bit over 50,000; in 1851, it was about 450,000, and by 1861, it had reached 1,150,000.

Britain established six Australian colonies from 1788 to 1859, – though South Australia, was called a province to distinguish it as a place for free immigrants, not convicts. These colonies were not constitutionally connected to each other, but were connected to Britain. From 1837, Queen Victoria was the sovereign of each Colony and in 1901; she became the Head of the Federation of States that

formed the Commonwealth of Australia. The Colonies formed the six States: New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, Western Australia, South Australia, and Queensland. Three weeks after they were united as the Commonwealth of Australia under the new Constitution, King Edward VII became the Head of the Commonwealth of Australia when his mother, Queen Victoria, died on 22 January 1901.  

Figure 1: The map of Australia

Source: worldatlas.com, 2019

Australia was belligerent in both First and Second World Wars, both of which had deep impacts in the nationalism, and politico-social psyche of the country. The First World War created the “ANZAC legend” which laid the basis of Australian nationalism and psycho-political detachment from Britain. The Second World War increased this detachment and moved Australia closer to the United States (US).

During the formation of the United Nations (UN), Australian Foreign Minister, Herbert Evatt was an active figure as the spokesperson of the small and middle powers during the San Francisco Conference (1945), which established the UN. Especially with the Prime Minister Robert Menzies, the US influence

on Australian domestic and foreign policy became more and more visible. Following President Harold Holt, John Grey Gorton focused more on economic development.

By 1976, the Australian population doubled and especially with the wool exports until the 1950s and minerals thereafter, Australian economy kept growing. Australia also focused on domestic manufacturing of iron and steel wares, electric/electronic goods, and cars. Australia was becoming a welfare state by increasing the per-head output and decreasing the working hours.  

Australia’s political closeness to the US spilled over into the realm of culture, especially with the arrival of 100,000 US troops in 1941. Prior to this, the British, including their music and sports, heavily influenced Australian culture. With the 1950s, Australia started to be Americanized. Australian lifestyle became more liberal and expressive. In 1951, Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Pact set up the strategic parameters of Australia-US security relations. After that, Australia followed American policies almost at any global or regional event. Australia supported the US by sending troops to the Korean War (1950-51), became a member of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955, sent military elements to the Vietnam War (1955-75), the Gulf War (1990-91), the conflict in Afghanistan (2001), the Iraq War (2003), and the Syrian conflict (2011).

In 1972, with Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, Australia tried to move away from the US and developed a more independent and Asia-Pacific oriented foreign policy. Whitlam tried to increase Australia’s individual influence in its region with less American and more Asiatic posture. Whitlam’s term ended very early. In 1975, Malcolm Fraser recalibrated Australia back to its pro-American bearing, which continues.

After Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke from the Labor Party became the Prime Minister in 1983, who was replaced by Paul Keating in December 1991 then with John Howard in 1996 of the Liberal-National Coalition. For 11 years, the mainstream parties with a satisfactory economic development dominated Australian politics. There were fluctuations but according to a UN Survey in 2000, Australia was placed fourth in terms of quality of life worldwide. Then, in 2015, the UN Human Development Index shifted Australia’s ranking to the second best.  

An important element in Australia’s regional posture is the Colombo Plan (1951). The plan set up Australia’s foreign aid aims, which brought thousands of Asian students to Australia to study.

Although Australia is a migrant country, it was not a very open one until the mid-1970s. Soon after Australia became a federation in 1901, the Federal Government of Edmund Barton passed the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which was drafted by Australia’s second Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin. This bill initiated the White Australia Policy. The Policy aimed to exclude non-European

---


11 “The Colombo plan and Australia’s role in its international education program : a report of a Type C project”, Morningside Heights, N.Y., 1961
migrants such as Asians (primarily Chinese) and Pacific Islanders (primarily Melanesians) from immigrating to Australia. In other words, it gave British migrants preference over all others through the first four decades of the 20th century. The policy was further strengthened up until the Second World War. After the War, the policy was eased. With the changes in 1949 and 1966, governments under Menzies and Holt encouraged non-British, non-white immigration. The White Australian policy was dismantled with the Racial Discrimination Act passed by the Whitlam government.  

Currently, Worldometers’ estimation of Australia’s population is 24,996,145 with a yearly increase of 1.28% in 2019.

**Figure 2: Population of Australia (1950-2019)**

Source: Worldometers (www.worldometers.info)

Australian population is ageing ‘as a result of sustained low fertility and increasing life expectancy’, which ‘will have a range of implications for Australia, including; health, size of the working-age population, housing and demand for skilled labour’. ‘This has resulted in proportionally fewer children (under 15 years of age) in the population and a proportionally higher increase in those aged 65 and over’.

---


The most widespread ethnic groups are English 25.9%, Australian 25.4%, Irish 7.5%, Scottish 6.4%, Italian 3.3%, German 3.2%, Chinese 3.1%, Indian 1.4%, Greek 1.4%, Dutch 1.2%, other 15.8% (includes Australian aboriginal 0.5%), unspecified 5.4%. 

In 2016-2017, net overseas migration (NOM), which is the net gain or loss of population through immigration to Australia and emigration from Australia, ‘increased from the previous year, recording an end of financial year estimate of 262,500 persons, which was 27.3% (56,300 persons) more than in 2015-2016 and represents the second consecutive increase after three years of decreases’. ‘In 2016-2017, NOM contributed the greatest number of people to the most populous states: New South Wales with a net increase of 104,500 persons, followed by Victoria (90,000 persons), Queensland (35,200 persons) and Western Australia (13,400 persons)’.

‘The 2016 Census of Population and Housing showed that more than a quarter (26%) of Australia’s population (6,163,667 people) were born overseas, up from 25% in 2011. This is a continuation of a trend since the first Census in 1911, which saw an increase in the number of overseas-born people living in Australia (excluding periods during both World Wars where migration to Australia stagnated). Of the overseas-born population, nearly one in five (18%) had arrived in 2012’. The most common birthplace for those born overseas was England (15% of the overseas-born population). There has been an increase between the 2011 and 2016 Censuses in the proportion of people born in China (6.0% to 8.3%) and India (5.6% to 7.4%). The proportion of those born in New Zealand has decreased over the same period, dropping from 9.1% to 8.4% of the overseas-born population’.

**Figure 3: Selected countries of birth as a proportion of the overseas-born population, 1966-2016**


---

14 “Australia Demographics Profile 2018”, Index Mundi, https://www.indexmundi.com/australia/demographics_profile.html, (17.03.2019).
Aborigines’ are the most significant element of Australian history and culture. Not only have they been living in Australia for more than 50,000 years but their knowledge and wisdom about the country is still far above the European settlers or today’s Australian non-Aboriginal population. Aboriginal art, religion, social life, adaptation to a large range of ecological and climatic conditions and land management are still very hot topics of Australian academia and public discussion. A very special element of Aboriginal culture is language. There are more than 200 different Aboriginal languages, which are spread over 500 Aboriginal tribes. With the expansion of the European settlement in Australia, the conflict between the settlers and the Aborigines started and the Aborigines land, sacred sites and property were desecrated. Although the Aborigines tried to resist due their superior knowledge of the land, they could not fight back effectively against the Europeans’ firearms. They were killed, pacified and driven into the bush. With the introduction of diseases many more Aborigines died. In the coming decades, especially in the southwestern, southeastern, and middle-eastern parts of the country, their traditional life ceased to exist. In some parts of the central and northern regions, they continued their traditional life to an extent. Australian government and academia increased its focus on the Aboriginal culture, life style and their role in the fabric of Australia in the last few decades. An important action was the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s “sorry speech” in February 2008, which was a formal apology for the mistreatment of Aboriginal people in the past.

1.2 Islam in Australia

Constituting only 2.5% of Australia’s total population, the impact of Australia’s Muslims on the country’s social structure and transformation is far greater than their proportional makeup of the population. The Australian Muslim community shares the general features of many other Muslim communities as in other non-Muslim majority countries with its heterogeneousness and fragmentation. In short, it is, a small ethnically, linguistically, and historically diverse population of Australian society.

Despite the widely held belief that all Muslims are of Arabic or Middle-Eastern origin, less than 20% of Australian Muslims were born in Middle Eastern or Arabic countries. A significant number come from Asia, Europe and Africa. Almost all Muslims in Australia come from a migrant background. Over one third of Muslims in Australia (approximately 36%) are Australian born. The majority of Australia’s Muslims or their parents or grandparents originate from Lebanon, Turkey, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Bangladesh, Iran, Fiji, Cyprus, Somalia, Egypt and Malaysia.

---


addition to English, they speak a range of languages such as Arabic, Turkish, Persian (Farsi), Bosnian, Bahasa Indonesia, Bengali, Malay, Dari, Albanian, Hindi, Kurdish, and Pashtu.

With the rise of global hostility toward Islam and Muslims, which intensified with the September 11 attacks, Muslims in Australia have undergone societal monitoring. Their “Australian-ness” is constantly questioned and the level of discrimination they face has increased considerably.

In short, there is a great deal of interest in and misunderstanding about Australian Muslims. This report aims to cast a light on their various characteristics. Before stepping into the specific characteristics of the Australian diasporic community (e.g., demography, integration, socio-economic status etc.) two particular contexts should be discussed: historical and legal-political.

A. Historical Context

Since a comprehensive history of Islam in Australia overarches the scope of this report, below is an overview to provide a sense of the breadth of the impact that Muslims have made in Australia and how wider Australian society have perceived them.

The first contact between Muslims and Australian aborigines’ dates back to the 1500s and trade between the two communities in the north of Australia. The Makassans, from the Indonesian island of Sulawesi were the first to arrive in Australia. They traded sea cucumbers with Aborigines from Elcho Island, Gove Island and mainland Darwin. Interactions expanded to marriages and even permanent settlements. The Makkasans’ influence ended with the foundation of the federal structure of Australia. New legislations on commerce eliminated Makassan trade along with their influence.

Another important group of Muslim migrants was Afghani cameleers who came as contracted labourers in the 1880s and were used for outback exploration and supplying materials to outback settlers. The Afghan cameleers hailed from diverse tribes, age ranges and backgrounds. Their major contribution to the establishment of Islam in Australia was the construction of mosques in Marree and in Adelaide, Little Gilbert Street. The Afghans contributed greatly to the development of the Australian outback by providing supplies, and as labourers in the construction of the overland telegraph and the Trans-Australian Railway.

Afghani’s influence gradually eroded when the new Federal Parliament passed the Immigration Restriction Act, which excluded “coloured people” from immigrating to Australia in 1901 and the restrictions on interstate travel on “coloured” residents. These laws prevented the free movement of Afghani Muslims in the interior of the country.

The early years of the 20th century witnessed the first public instances of discrimination and marginalization of Muslims in Australia. In 1903, the editor of the Barrier Truth newspaper in Broken Hill, R.S. Ross, wrote of the “Afghan menace,” claiming that the Afghans were a threat to the morals of the community, that their camels were a danger to horses and that they were living in conditions even worse than those of the Chinese were. He went on to label Muslims as fierce savages, that they held gross superstitions and were no better than thieves were. Ross argued that Afghans and other non-white races should not mix with whites and that they should not be allowed to marry with whites because the “coloured mongrel” is a weakling who tends always to sterility and extinction. Similar media comments could be seen in Coolgardie Miner newspaper, which established the Anti-Afghan League in 1894 with the support of around 2000 miners. Following the Afghan decrease, the first large influx of Muslim migration to Australia began in the mid-1950s through the Snowy Mountains scheme. In order to provide the necessary workers for the country’s construction industry, today’s ex-Yugoslavian (Bosnia, Kosovar and Albania) Muslims were brought in and eventually settled in Melbourne, Adelaide, and Sydney.

Until the mid-1960s, the Australian Muslim community remained relatively small, composed of Turkish-Cypriots, Arab, Bosnian, Albanian, Fijian Indian, Indian and Pakistani as well as some smaller ethnic groups. These communities established a loose federation of the various communities across Australia, known as the Australian Federation of Islamic Societies. Their primary aim was to raise funds to build mosques and schools.

A second significant migratory wave started in 1968 because of the Turkish-Australian bilateral treaty to strengthen the labour force with unskilled migrants. Through the assisted passage program, thousands of Turks settled in Melbourne and Sydney. In 1973, Australia’s Turkish population opened their first mosque, converted from a church, in Erskineville, Sydney. Pakistanis, who opened their first mosque in Surry Hills, followed the 1968 Turkish migratory wave.

B. New Arrivals and Geographical Distribution

(I) New South Wales

One of the largest and most vibrant Muslim community of Australia is the Lebanese population in Sydney, most of whom arrived after the 1975 Civil War. Although the first wave of Lebanese immigrants was largely unskilled labourers with little command of English, the community has managed to establish itself successfully. In Sydney, they settled in Canterbury-Bankstown and built their first mosque in Lakemba in 1976. Their main organisation, the Lebanese Muslim Association (LMA)

---

manages the affairs of the mosque ranging from funeral and burial services to Arabic and Quran lessons.

The Turks are the second largest Muslim migrant group in Sydney. The Turkish community have five mosques in Sydney, the largest one, the Gallipoli Mosque in Auburn, holds a large degree of influence over other mosques. Turkish mosques in New South Wales are owned as a public trustee by the Turkish Diyanet and administered by the local Turkish community. Apart from the Lebanese and the Turkish community, there are other smaller Muslim groups scattered in Southwestern Sydney. These are made up of Bosnians, South Africans, Bangladeshis, Indonesians, and Malaysians. These communities opened mosques in Penshurst and Smithfield, Minto, Sefton, Dee Why, and Tempe.

The Islamic Council of NSW (ICNSW) was incorporated into the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) in 1976. The ICNSW represented a collective of Islamic societies and organisations in NSW and was a member of the AFIC until 1999. In 2000, the AFIC created a new state body, the Supreme Islamic Council of NSW. This was replaced in 2003 when the AFIC Congress elected a new state body, the Islamic Council of NSW. The ICNSW is currently AFIC’s representative body in NSW. The ICNSW is still operating as an independent body from the AFIC and has the support of many societies or associations.

(II) Victoria

In Melbourne, the first emerging Muslim communities were Cypriots, Lebanese, Egyptians and Turks, later followed by Albanians and Bosnians. In the late 1980s, these communities opened their first mosques and Islamic schools. In the past decade, Victoria experienced a new wave of migrants from Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The Islamic Council of Victoria has been the top Muslim body representing an estimated 200,000 Victorian Muslims. The council has a great deal of experience in building meaningful engagements, partnerships and projects with over 70 organizations (Muslim and non-Muslim), including over 20 multi-faith and multicultural groups. In the past decade, a number of women’s organizations, such as The Islamic Women’s Welfare Council of Victoria, have emerged providing urgently needed services for women.

There are also a number of Islamic schools that have produced high achievers with excellent academic results. The Turkish community has established two schools in Melbourne (İşık and İlim Colleges) and currently both King Khalid College and Minaret have developed into large and prestigious institutions.

(III) Western Australia, WA

The community in Perth is far older but smaller than those in Sydney and Melbourne. The early Afghan cameleers settled in Perth and in 1905, built the Perth Mosque, which remains active. Despite the historical presence of the Afghan Muslims, South Africans, Somalis, Turks, Lebanese, and Indonesians have dominated the Western Australian Muslim community. There are four main mosques in Mirabooka, Perth, Thornlie, and Marylands.

The Islamic Council of Western Australia has been the top body for Muslims in Perth. The Australian Muslim Information and Education Service have also been active. The Muslim Women’s Support Centre is a significant Muslim women’s organization in Western Australia.
Muslims in Perth are fairly integrated into mainstream society and Western Australians appear to have readily accepted Muslims, new and old alike. This could be attributed to the long history of relations between Muslims and white settlers, which started with the early Afghan and Indian migrants in the 1800s.

(IV) The Others

Queensland: Brisbane is another important location where Muslims have integrated well into the broader community, although there are less than 30,000 Muslims in the whole state. The Islamic Council of Queensland Incorporated has run religious activities in the state since 1969. The oldest mosque is in Holland Park and was built by the Indian/Afghan community in 1907. Muslims have predominantly resided in Sunshine Coast, Mackay and Rockhampton.

South Australia: In Adelaide, the Muslim community has been far less organized than other states, owing to the wide dispersal of the Muslim community in the city. As a result, Muslims have not organized themselves under one central body. There have been smaller organizations, such as the Islamic Society of South Australia and the Muslim Women’s Association of South Australia, together with some welfare groups conducting educational facilities. The oldest mosque in Australia is situated in Little Gilbert Street, Adelaide, built in 1886.

Australian Capital Territory: The Muslim community in Canberra is a vibrant and professional group. Historically, the Islamic Society of Canberra has been running the community’s religious activities. The Islamic Society has built its own centre, fully equipped with a sports hall/prayer centre, the largest Islamic library in Australia, a radio studio, an art gallery and functions centre. The group has been actively involved with inter-faith media and political lobbying.

Tasmania: Historically the Muslim settlement in Hobart has been very small. The Islamic Society of Hobart has run the community’s duties and activities. The first mosque in Hobart was constructed in 1973.

C. Legal and Political Context

The Department of Home Affairs in Australia, which used to be the Immigration and Border Protection, is responsible for immigration and customs border policy. The Department manages the Migration Programme, the Humanitarian Programme, Australian citizenship, trade and customs, offshore maritime security and revenue collection. Their operational enforcement arm, the Australian Border Force, is responsible for investigations, compliance and immigration detention operations across Australia’s air and seaports and land and maritime domains.

Since its establishment, the Department has facilitated the permanent entry of more than seven million people from around the globe to form one of the most linguistically, culturally, and religiously diverse nations of the world. This includes more than 800,000 refugees under humanitarian programmes. Today, almost half of Australians have direct or indirect familial links to another country.
The main law governing migration to Australia is the Australian Citizenship Act of 2007. The Act does not specify Muslims or religion under any specific section. Regarding minority rights, Australia does not have a legal regime. Part 3 of the Australian Constitution examines legislative protections of minority rights. Part 4 discusses the rights of Aborigines. In common law, the efforts of Australia minority freedoms are described as “residual” and has provided for their protection only “indirectly.”


The integration of Muslims in Australia is part of wider multiculturalist approach under which several policy statements have been announced. In 1978, following the Galbally Report on the Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services to Migrants, there was a shift in the government policy framework for responding to migrant settlement and the resulting cultural and linguistic diversity, towards multiculturalism. The Fraser Government adopted the recommendations of the Galbally Report, which led to the expansion of existing settlement services, such as English language teaching, on-arrival accommodation and orientation assistance, interpreting and translating services, assistance with overseas qualifications recognition, as well as the establishment of multicultural resource centres to enable ethnic communities and voluntary agencies to cater to the welfare needs of migrants.

In these policies, education was the key element. Fraser committed funding to the development of multicultural and community language education programs in schools.
Government established the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA)\(^{37}\) to engage in and commission research and to advise the Commonwealth on multicultural issues; extended ethnic radio services and grants to ethnic community organisations; and established the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS). State and territory governments followed the Federal government’s policies. They also established the Ethnic Affairs Commissions and Migrant Settlement Councils following the Galbally Report.

The Hawke Labor Government introduced a number of cuts to government programs in the mid-1980s, including the abolition of AIMA in 1986. Hawke, however, also introduced a number of new multicultural policy initiatives such as an Access and Equity Strategy to improve access to government services and programs for people of non-English speaking backgrounds, and the establishment of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC).\(^{38}\) Dr James Jupp chairing Migrant and Multicultural Programs and Services established the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA)\(^{39}\) within the Department of Prime Minister. OMA intended to act as a central coordinating agency for multicultural policy. The Review Committee also advocated the strengthening and expansion of the Access and Equity Strategy, a recommendation, which was in the same year, endorsed in an AIMA report entitled *Future Directions for Multiculturalism*.

By the late 1980s, Australia had a high migrant intake, which included significant numbers of new arrivals from Asian and Middle-Eastern countries. In 1988, the Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies, chaired by Stephen FitzGerald, released its report entitled, *Immigration: a Commitment to Australia*\(^{40}\), warning of a ‘clear and present need for urgent immigration reform’.

Some of the issues raised in the FitzGerald Report manifested themselves in the Hawke Government’s 1989 multicultural policy statement, the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia*\(^ {41}\). The National Agenda defined multiculturalism as “a reality of Australia’s cultural diversity” and expressed a commitment towards economic efficiency, indicated that pluralism was limited by the need for “an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia,” and framed multiculturalism as applying to all Australians.

In addition to the creation of new bodies like the OMA and HREOC, the Hawke and Keating Labor Government period between 1986 and 1996 included the establishment of the Bureau of Immigration,


Multicultural and Population Research (BIMPR). The Bureau aimed to conduct research to inform policy-makers, as well as the establishment of the National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC) in July 1994 to provide advice on multicultural issues. As part of various attempts in the National Agenda to expand multiculturalism beyond its focus on migrant settlement issues and to articulate the relevance of multiculturalism for all Australians, governmental multicultural policies in this period also addressed issues concerning Indigenous Australians and the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians as part of the reconciliation process.

During the Howard government in June 1997, the NMAC, called for leadership in defense of multiculturalism in its May 1999 report, Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: Towards Inclusiveness. The Council’s new emphasis was to ensure that “cultural diversity is a unifying force for Australia.” In response to the NMAC’s report, the Howard Government launched a new multicultural policy statement, A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia, in December 1999. The Agenda, implemented “Australian multiculturalism” in reflection of “Australia’s diverse heritage, history, democracy, culture and identity.” The Howard Government created Council for Multicultural Australia (CMA), supported by The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), to promote community harmony and the benefits of diversity, introduced the Charter for Public Service in a Culturally Diverse Society in June 1998, and shifted to a focus on promoting community harmony through the Living in Harmony Grants Program and Harmony Day.

Following a review of the CMA and the implementation of the New Agenda, in 2003, the Howard Government issued a new policy statement, New Agenda for Multicultural Australia: Strategic directions for 2003-2006. The Agenda was updated to reflect a strategic shift in focus to unity and social cohesion in response to issues arising from the threat of terrorism, and led to the development of community management strategies to “manage existing and potential tensions” surrounding events such as terrorist attacks and the 2003 war in Iraq. The principles underpinning the new policy statement were: the responsibilities of all, respect for all, fairness for all, and benefits for all. The focus on terrorism and Islamic radicalism saw the creation of the Muslim Community Reference Group in September 2005, following the London bombings of 7th July 2005, to “provide advice on how government and the Muslim communities can work together more effectively to address intolerance and achieve a more inclusive society.” Other initiatives included the development of a National Action

---

45 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia, 1999.
48 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Muslim Community Reference Group, Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2005.
Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security\(^{49}\) (National Action Plan) to “address extremism and the promotion of violence and intolerance.”

While the Howard Government did not announce any new multicultural policies for the remainder of its term in office, in January 2007 DIMA was established, later to be known as the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). With this change, the word “multiculturalism” was removed from the departmental title for the first time since 1996.

Early in its term in office the Rudd Labor Government reviewed how best to foster and promote the benefits of cultural diversity in the Australian community, including a review of the Living in Harmony Program\(^{50}\) which had been operating since 1998. The Program intended to develop “a multicultural Australia in which everyone benefits from the diversity in [its] society.” In January 2009, the Diverse Australia Program\(^{51}\) was launched for “an increased focus on addressing issues of intolerance,” and aimed to “empower a local response to issues of racism and intolerance.”

In December 2008, the Rudd Government announced the creation of the Australian Multicultural Advisory Council (AMAC)\(^{52}\), which was tasked with providing advice to the Government on “practical approaches,” promoting social cohesion, and overcoming racism and intolerance through positive engagement with diversity. In 2010, Diverse Australia Program and the National Action Plan were amalgamated to form the Diversity and Social Cohesion Program.\(^{53}\) In April 2010, AMAC presented its advice and recommendations on cultural diversity policy to the government in a statement entitled The People of Australia, which was transformed into a policy plan in February 2011.\(^{54}\) A landmark policy demonstrated the government’s unwavering commitment to a multicultural Australia. As the policy stated, Australia’s multicultural composition is at the heart of Australia’s national identity and intrinsic to the country’s history and character. In October 2016, the Australian parliament released a statement on racial tolerance.\(^{55}\) Australia’s latest multicultural statement, Multicultural Australia – United, Strong, Successful\(^{56}\), was launched in March 2017.

---


\(^{50}\) Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Living in Harmony – An Overview, Canberra, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1998.

\(^{51}\) Diverse Australia Program, Canberra: Dept. of Immigration and Citizenship, 2010.


Muslims constitute 2.5% of the Australian population, which makes Islam Australia’s third largest religion. After Hinduism, Islam is the second-fastest growing religion in Australia. Australia’s Muslim community is extremely diverse; Muslims living in Australia are from, or trace their heritage to, 183 different countries. This variety makes the diasporic Muslim community one of Australia’s most ethnically and nationally heterogeneous one. About two fifths of Australian Muslims are of North African or Middle Eastern origin and about a quarter is from South and Central Asia.57

Australian Muslims are overwhelmingly urban dwellers. Three quarters live in Sydney and Melbourne. The Muslim population’s highest rate of increase is in Adelaide. The Australian Muslim community is by nature diverse. As Mohammad (2018)* emphasized there is ‘super diversity’ within the Australian Muslim community. In Victoria, no ethnic group dominates whereas in New South Wales, ethnic Lebanese constitute the majority. The components of the Muslim community in Australia are five folded: (i) South Asians, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Fiji; (ii) the Horn of Africa, Somalia, Eritrean, Oromo, Ethiopian; (iii) the Middle East many Arab nations; (iv) South East Asians, Singaporean, Malaysian, Indonesian; and (v) the Europeans, Turkish, Albanian, Bosnian.

The most recent Australian national census was carried out in 2016. According to the age distribution of Muslims in the census, Australian Muslims have the highest concentration between the ages 20 and 39. The accumulated total for the age group 20-39 is 233.458 (Table 1).

Table 1: Muslims by Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4 years</td>
<td>67.14</td>
<td>25-29 years</td>
<td>61.126</td>
<td>50-54 years</td>
<td>24.606</td>
<td>75-79 years</td>
<td>3.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 years</td>
<td>62.274</td>
<td>30-34 years</td>
<td>64.714</td>
<td>55-59 years</td>
<td>17.973</td>
<td>80-84 years</td>
<td>1.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 years</td>
<td>48.499</td>
<td>35-39 years</td>
<td>54.296</td>
<td>60-64 years</td>
<td>13.32</td>
<td>85+</td>
<td>1.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>43.889</td>
<td>40-44 years</td>
<td>39.802</td>
<td>65-69 years</td>
<td>9.625</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>53.322</td>
<td>45-49 years</td>
<td>30.772</td>
<td>70-74 years</td>
<td>6.226</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>604.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57 R. Hassan & L. Lester, *Australian Muslims, a Demographic, Social and Economic Profile of Muslims in Australia*, University of South Australia, 2015.

* All interviewees from fieldwork in this study are shown in italics. Please see the Table on the List of Interviewees in Sydney and Melbourne.
Respondents of the GMD survey 2019 show a different profile than Australian 2016 Census data on age distribution. The survey shows that (Figure 6) over 68% of Australian Muslims are in the 18-34 age interval.

**Figure 4: Age Distribution of Respondents, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

A specific feature of Australian Muslims as Table 1 and Figure 4 illustrate is the high percentage of young population. This is not only because of the high fertility rates in Muslim enclaves but also the continuing flow, although not as a great as in the 1960s and 1970s, of skilled Muslim migrants into Australia. More importantly, the older generation members go back to their country of origin after their retirement.

There is also a slight imbalance between male and female members of Australian Muslims. According to the 2016 Census, the population of male members is higher (Table 2). The main reason is that more male Muslims immigrated to Australia than females and not all of them reunited with their families at their country of origin.
Table 2: Muslims by Sex\textsuperscript{58}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>320,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>284,112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2071.0 Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia –Stories from Census, 2016 - Religion

The 2016 census does not provide major countries of birth of Australian Muslims. Therefore, 2001 data was used to present the home countries of Australian Muslims and their citizenship status, which gives different results. Almost half of Australian Muslims were born in Australia, Lebanon and Turkey consecutively. The highest percentage of Muslims (36\%) is Australian born which is even higher than the accumulation of the other major countries taken into consideration. This shows that the second and third generation Muslim Australians’ number is higher than the first generation and the continuing skilled migrants (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Major countries of birth of Muslim Australians

Source: HREOC fact sheet, ABS unpublished 2001 Census data

Regarding the citizenship status of Australian Muslims, although Egyptian, Lebanese and Syrians have the highest percentage, the difference in percentages with the other countries of origin is not substantial. This illustrates two specific results: first, a high percentage of Australian Muslims were granted citizenship, and second, proving the numbers in Figure 5. Many members of these ethnic

\textsuperscript{58} 2071.0 Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia –Stories from Census, 2016 - Religion
groups are second and third generations already born in Australia. Two groups also need extra attention: Somalis and Iraqis. The reason for their low percentage of citizenship is that a big portion of these groups’ members came to Australia under refugee quotas and was only given a residency status (Figure 6).

**Figure 6: Percentages of Ethnic Groups who are Australian Citizens**

![Bar chart showing percentages of various ethnic groups in Australia.](chart.png)


Australian Muslim community is young, vibrant, and populous. The dominant ethnicities of the community are Lebanese, Turkish, Afghanis, and Bosnians, although there are many other nationalities and ethnicities. The percentage of the Australian born second and third generations is much higher than the first generation. This is an important indication that Australian Muslims are becoming an established community of Australian society.
3 Views on Migration and Integration

This chapter focuses on the topics of migration, integration patterns and issues of Australian Muslims. In the scope of these issues, the chapter first discusses the integration patterns and challenges that Australian Muslims have been facing. Secondly, it highlights the findings of the GMD fieldwork and survey.

As stated above, an important portion of Australian Muslims were born overseas or overseas-origin, both from mono-cultural societies like Afghanistan and Pakistan together with multicultural such as Albania, Lebanon and Nigeria. Almost 60% of Australian Muslim citizens are migrants, either first or second generation, and only 14.90% of them are autochthonous. A bit over 10% of them are non-permanent residents, who came to Australia for work. The Australian Muslim community is an immigrant community heavily composed of first and second generations. The third generation is slowly building up (3.7%) (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Status in Australia (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Australian Muslims are not different from the other cases of GMD regarding their diversity. They are from a vast range of ethnic, national and language backgrounds. Within these diverse elements, ethnicity is the most prominent one. There is also a stark diversity regarding legal and theological spheres of Sunnis and Shiites. The literature on the influence of Australian Muslims’ legal and theological traditions’ varieties on their levels of integration is relatively slim. Yet, several researchers agree that the ideological and theological identifications of Australian Muslims affect their immigration and integration significantly.

Regarding Australian Muslims’ patterns of migration and integration there is a generational element. Apart from the Indonesian Muslims and Afghan cameleers, the growth of Australian Muslim population goes back to the 1960s. As the biggest percentage of Australian Muslims, the Lebanese community gives a good depiction of the migration and integration patterns. The first-generation Lebanese migrants perceived themselves as guests but their children developed stronger attachments. The major reason behind this generational difference, which is mostly applicable to the other Muslim migrant communities, is related to the second and third generations’ level of Australian-ness. The second generation has always felt that they are a part of the system. Most of them do not have inferiority complex and know how to deal with bias and prejudice.

GMD survey 2019 with respondents heavily representing the second and third generation Australian Muslims from various backgrounds highlights the newer generations’ integration patterns. The main feature of this pattern is their satisfaction with Australia, which is an indication that most of them have been integrated into the country. 74% of the respondents advised other Muslims to immigrate to Australia (Figure 8).

---

60 A. Saeed, Muslim Australians: Their beliefs, practices and institutions, Melbourne: Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Australian Multicultural Foundation, 2004.


Figure 8: Advising other Muslims to Immigrate to Australia (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

An additional question of the GMD survey enquired Australian Muslims’ sense of belonging, which is a stronger element of their integration. Similar to their advice to immigrate to Australia, over 56% of the respondents have strong or very strong belonging to the country. This again underlines that second and third generation Australians’ integration level is significantly high (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Sense of belonging to Australia, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

In order to understand the reasons behind the respondents’ above-indicated level of integration, the survey asked about the reasons for emigrating from their country of origin. Two main reasons were emphasized: economic (20.90%) and educational (27.85%). These two reasons are directly related to
the economic development level of any country. Thus, the overwhelming reason is the economic development level of Australia. The reason for the high percentage (28.10%) of the respondents’ “don’t know” answer is because they were second and/or third generation migrants who really do not know the reasons for immigrating to Australia since they were already born as a part of the system that their parents have been trying to integrate into (Figure 10).

**Figure 10: Reasons to Emigrate from the country of Origin, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Share of Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political reasons</td>
<td>7.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reasons</td>
<td>20.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious reasons</td>
<td>27.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational reasons</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons concerning the family</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>28.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

The difference in the level of integration creates a growing gap between generations. This gap is aggravated with the acculturative stress. 64 Acculturation hinders or eases migrants’ integration and several factors affect its success. 65 First, not all second and third generation Muslims have the above-mentioned capability and proactivity. Some do not have relevant skills and knowledge required to adapt into Australian society. Others have not developed resilience and personal strengths to motivate their skill development. Secondly, particularly after September 11, the inter-community trust was negatively affected. Non-Muslim Australian communities do not trust all of their Muslim neighbours. This requires a more engaging Muslim community in order to diffuse these misconceptions. Thirdly, Australian integration policies are not very inclusive and do not particularly pay attention to the socially disadvantaged and marginalized members of the Muslim society. 66

---

This outlook divided non-Muslim Australians. A special Fairfax-Ipsos survey in 2018 ‘finds only 14 [%] of voters support an increase in the number of immigrants from Muslim countries while 35 [%] believe the intake should stay the same’. ‘Another 46 [%] believe the intake should be reduced a lot or a little’.67

Another important development on the Muslim integration process is the interest of the media. Both global and local events have contributed to the negative image of Islam and Muslims in general, and while there are many Australian journalists who have provided positive constructions of Islam and Muslims, a significant section of the media (particularly some of the tabloid newspapers and talkback radio) focused on a negative representation of Islam’.68

The GMD in-depth interviews highlighted additional points. First, the fundamental concern regarding the Muslim community’s integration is the transformation of their identity and place of belonging. The events of 11 September 2001 had a clear and unfavorable impact on these two elements. Noah (2018) stated that:

Until 9/11, it did not matter whether you were Muslim or not. People were unconcerned about Muslim’s worshipping. Muslims were just any other migrant community, nothing special–nothing more, nothing less. Everything changed after 9/11. Since then Muslims have been under the spotlight with regards to whether they are Australian enough. Their Australian values and loyalties have been questioned. They have been categorized as the “other”. You are not really Australian; you are the “other”. Right-wing politicians and the right wing tabloid media have contributed to this immensely.

Following September 11, Muslim identity has encountered difficulties in finding a place in the wider Australian character. Muslims living in Australia have found their place in society to become somewhat unstable, particularly those of the low income, unskilled strata.

The impact has also been felt by the Muslim youth in Australia, which comprises 47% of the country’s youth (until age 25) according to the 2016 census. Many young Muslims, born and raised in Australia post-9/11, have begun to question to what extent they will ever be truly accepted as being “Australian”.

According to the GMD survey this seek for refurbishing and consolidating their Muslim identity had a bolstering effect on the importance of religion (Figure 11) and fulfilling religious requirements (Figure 11) of Muslim community in Australia together with developing a stronger awareness on buying halal food (Figure 12 & 13).

The first two figures (11 & 12) highlight another important sensitivity of the respondents. As emphasized in the Executive Summary, Australian Muslim community members are hesitant of talking about/commenting on their personal religious beliefs. Accordingly, on the importance of religion in their lives over 32% of respondents refused to answer. Regarding fulfilling religious requirements,

which is much more of a personal question, this percentage hikes to 57.60. Similarly, Figure 13 underscores the similar sensitivity to the question inquiring the difficulty of practicing Islam and the comparison of religious rights between their home country and Australia. 65% of the respondents refused to answer.

The respondents who did not refuse to answer underlined another significant indicator about first, second, and third generation Australian Muslims, which is the importance of Islam in their life. Almost 65% of them stated that religion is important. In other words, their high degree of integration in Australian society did not necessarily curb the importance they give to Islamic values (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Importance of religion in Your life, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Regarding their fulfillment of religious requirements, almost 40% of them stated that they fulfill them at least on an average level. In other words, it is not only Islamic values they are still affiliated with but also its practices (Figure 12).
When it comes to how Australia treats its Muslim members regarding their Islamic practices, respondents’ answers underline a bit of a discomfort. Over 15% of them stated that practicing Islam is getting more difficult in Australia. A similar percentage (14.30%) stated that there are more religious rights in Australia. Thus, being a Muslim and practicing Islam are two different things. Seemingly, the former is acceptable and the latter is not that much (Figure 13) by the mainstream Australian Non-Muslim society.

**Figure 12: The extent of Fulfilling Religious Requirements, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

**Figure 13: Agree/Disagree with the increasing difficulty of practicing Islam in Australia or more religious rights in Australia than home country Distribution of Respondents, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
Another issue related to Australian Muslims’ integration patterns is their tendencies towards halal food. Over 60% of the respondents check at least frequently if not always halal food labels (Figure 14). Since not all respondents are from Muslim suburbs, it is an indication that halal food is accessible in cosmopolitan cities.

**Figure 14: Checking Halal Food Labels, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

The survey additionally asked whether the respondents buy halal products even if they could be more expensive. Almost 65% of respondents affirmatively answered (Figure 15). This also shows how closely they are affiliated with Islamic values.

**Figure 15: Buying Halal Food Products regardless of their prices, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
With a similar perspective, over half of GMD survey respondents emphasized their connection with their parents’ country of origin. Over 55% of the respondents stated their sense of belonging with their parents’ country of origin (Figure 16). In other words, the second and the third generation Australian Muslims’ high level of integration does not necessarily mean that their connection has been cut off with their countries of origin. It also means that in the enclaves some of their parents are still following very closely the developments in their country of origin, which directly affects the political and cultural agenda in households. In addition to their parents, some of their close relatives who live in the same enclave keep these agendas fresh. In short, although the respondents’, particularly the second and third generations’, integration levels are quite high, if they do not leave their parents’ households they still feel as a part of their parents’ country of origin.

Figure 16: Sense of Belonging to your Parents Country of Origin, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

These two co-habiting identities keep multiculturalism in Australia as a work in progress. Noah (2018) notes that:

Australia is a land of migrants and in a land of migrants, natives develop a way of living alongside one another. This is called social cohesion, which is a bit like peak hour traffic. As long the infrastructure is good with clear signage, with qualified drivers who are certified to drive on the road, not under the influence of alcohol or drug, and as long as they respect every other car on the road, this is how social cohesion works. You find a way to be able to flow with everybody else without affecting one another.
In this sense, multiculturalist policies have been used in an attempt to aid Australia’s social cohesion, which produces a “fruit salad” rather than a “melting pot.” Every component enjoys its own space without sacrificing too great a part of their authentic identity features. In its multiculturalism approach, Australia does not prioritize migrants from any particular country. Amir (2018) confirmed that ‘social engineering in Australia encourages people with different backgrounds to share the same space’.

Regardless of multiculturalism, the diversity in Australian Muslims has affected their ability to integrate effectively. For cultural reasons some ethnicities find it easier to integrate than the others. John (2018) claims that:

> It is an issue of cultural difference: how far have you got to go between where you came from and where Australia is. And I suspect that if you come from Bosnia or Turkey, which are much more Westernised, developed countries, then the step is easier than if you come from Somalia or Pakistan, somewhere like that. Although, for example if you come from Pakistan [or India], you know, a former British colony, English is often spoken, there’s some understanding of British-Anglo culture, so that make that step easier.

Australian decision-makers may find it difficult to reduce the number of Muslim migrants due to their continual contribution to the economy. Yet, what the policy makers need to do is refurbish their multiculturalism rhetoric in order to make it more inclusive for lower level Muslim communities.

Wider Australian society’s perception of Muslim immigrant’s integration is characterized as problematic. The problem is also caused by the ‘the general confusion about meanings of integration and a number of the different interpretations of the meaning of integration offered by Muslims are revealed’. There is also a clash between two conflicting paradigms, which ‘influence the meanings of integration adopted by the Muslims’. One is civic integration reaffirming and preserving the ‘dominant Western’s society’s culture and values’. Second is the resurgent Islam, which is suspicious of Western colonial powers.

Although the above graphs highlighted the level of integration of Australian Muslims, particularly the second and third generation, it is not completely issue-free. GMD survey brought up four main problems of Muslim migrants, which has a strong influence on integration. These are cultural, lifestyle, language and financial. The first three show the continuing divergence of daily life patterns of Australian Muslims from mainstream Australian culture. This is particularly visible in Muslim enclave suburbs which are partly alienated from the more cosmopolitan and central suburbs. The enclaves are not only physically apart from the center but also socio-culturally. Muslims in those suburbs could carry out their daily lives without interacting with the center or the cosmopolitan. This alienation affects their language development as well. In their own suburbs, Muslims usually use the language of their country of origin with their “fellows”. Yet, this pattern is mostly valid for the first and to extent second-

---


generation Muslim immigrants. The third generation is not really affected by it, but is impacted by several other issues. That is why the “other problems” bar is almost 28% (Figure 17).

**Figure 17: Problems as an Immigrant in Australia, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

The GMD survey also tried to specify the “other” problems. The foremost issue is Islamophobia (23.43%), which is followed by cultural differences (17.73%). These again reflect the divergence between Australian Muslims lifestyle and the mainstream society. The next problem is the lack of solidarity among the members of the Muslim community (12.10%). In other words, the divergence is not only between the mainstream Australian society and Australian Muslims but also within various Muslim communities. Again, another 10.03% of the respondents underlined their discrimination by the society. It is followed by economic problems, such as unemployment and general economic situation. As explained in socio-economic status section, Australian Muslims have been suffering from discrimination not only in the workspace but also during the application processes (Figure 18).
Australian Muslims migration and integration is related to several intermingling facts and arguments. A great majority of Australian Muslims are immigrants or immigrant-backgrounded, either from multicultural and monoculture upbringings, which creates a vast range of variety in ethnicity, language, and culture, together with theology. Since some of these ethnicities/nationalities have been in Australia for more than five decades, today they have their third and even fourth generation, which widens the gap amongst them. Particularly, the third and following generations have shown a deeper and smoother integration. Although the second and third generations digested their Australian identity and suggest migrating to Australia to others, their interactions with the mainstream non-Muslim white Anglo-Saxon Australian culture is not completely issue-free. Their cultural background is still hindering their integration with the mainstream culture. As a heavy immigrant community, Australian Muslims integration patterns have been suffering from various other issues. Especially after September 11, Muslims image has been targeted by Australian media, which created difficulties for Muslim identity to find a place in the wider Australian identity. Religion and its practice have a great value in their life even if it generates uneasiness with the mainstream society both in daily and business spheres. Australian Muslims are also facing Islamophobia in the socio-economic realm, which is not an exception for Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries.

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
4. Perceptions on Socio-Economic Status

According to the accessible primary and secondary data, two main issues are considered while examining Australian Muslims’ role and place in the Australian socio-economic realm. The first determinant is their educational attainment. The second one is their employment and finance related issues such as employment patterns, hindrances to their employment, main occupations that tend to be favored by Muslim individuals and communities in the workplace, their satisfaction with their financial situation, and the estimation of their socio-economic positions.

Even though the Australian government has been running support services and passing regulations to improve the social inclusion of ethnic communities, Muslim communities’ marginalization in the socio-economic realm has persisted for decades. Regarding education as the first aspect, according to the 2011 census the total number of post-graduate candidates in Australia was 631,122 and within this number Muslims constitute 25,386, which is 5%. However, Muslims report lower levels of educational attainment at the bachelor degree level with 11%, and 5% in the advanced diploma and diploma levels, as compared to the non-Muslim figure of 2% and 7%, respectively.

The data concerning Muslims educational attainment in school years 10 and 12 is of particular interest. As Table 3 shows, Muslims do poorly in completing year 10 of high school and report about 6% completion in comparison with the figure of 11% reported by the non-Muslim groups. A reasonable explanation for this phenomenon could be the higher levels of Muslims’ completion of schooling in the year reported above. This could be an explanation as to why the numbers of Muslims completing year 10 is so low. Baqar (2018) stated that the drop-out rates in years 9 and 10, i.e., the first two grades in high school, in these low-income neighborhoods is higher than the national average.

Table 3: Muslims’ Educational Attainments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of highest educational attainment</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate degree level</td>
<td>25,386</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>583,025</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>608,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate diploma level</td>
<td>3052</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>283,944</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>286,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree level</td>
<td>51,073</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2,209,119</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,260,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced diploma and diploma level</td>
<td>24,726</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,321,648</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,346,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate level</td>
<td>26,694</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,533,949</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,560,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 12</td>
<td>83,207</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2,686,562</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,769,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 11</td>
<td>16,637</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>955,607</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>972,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 10</td>
<td>29,024</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,150,943</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2,179,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 9</td>
<td>11,653</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>775,463</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>787,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 8 or below</td>
<td>23,355</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>802,992</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>826,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequately described</td>
<td>5,131</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>231,209</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>236,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No educational attainment</td>
<td>14,671</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>109,194</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>123,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>22,761</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>908,344</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>931,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>138,919</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,639,781</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3,778,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>476,289</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19,191,780</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19,668,069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2011 Australia Bureau of Statistics Census

71 A. Hersi, Conceptualisation of Integration An Australian Muslim Counter-Narrative, Cham: Palgrave, 2018, 27.
Although second and third generation Muslims are relatively well integrated into Australian society, their employment situation is not promising. After their graduation, they are mostly employed in low and medium skilled jobs. As Amir (2018) underlined that, the Muslim population in Australia is still quite young and more positions that are prestigious tend to opt for more mature candidates.

Another education related aspect, which has been improving, is related to Australian governments’ education support funds. The Muslim community in Australia does benefit greatly from these funds. There are around 50 Islamic colleges in Australia, of which the government provides two thirds of their budgets.

GMD survey underlines the fact that the respondents are heavily satisfied with the quality of education in Australia. More than 70% of them stated that they are completely or mostly satisfied (Figure 19). One important realm that Australian Muslims do not face discrimination in is education. In Australia, for every citizen public education including undergraduate university degrees are free. For graduate degrees, the candidates could take Research Training Program Fee-Offset Scholarships. This is one major reason behind the respondents' high level of satisfaction with the education system.

**Figure 19: Satisfaction with Education in Australia, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

This satisfaction with the education system does not necessarily transform into successful employment patterns. Compared to the other religious communities, such as Christians, Buddhists, or other spiritual believers, the ratio of Muslims not in labor force is the highest (Figure 20). One particular reason, as seen in other sections, is the discrimination Muslims face in employment. Their image, dented by many socio-cultural factors listed above and below, is steadily affecting them.

---

Figure 20: Workforce Participation Rate by Religion (age 15-64)


GMD survey almost coincides with the Figure 22’s estimations. 66% of the respondents are in the Australian workforce (Figure 20). If it is considered that 6.3% of them are casually employed, almost 40% of them are unemployed, which is not an inconsiderable ratio (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Current Working Status, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
The difference in Australian labor force between Muslims and non-Muslims is even greater for females. Second generation Muslim women from Turkish or Lebanese background were only half as likely to be employed as the non-Muslim Australian female population. The main reason for this difference is the continuing traditional attitudes of Australian Muslim families, especially the ones in heavily Muslim-populated suburbs. Women look after the children and elder members of the extended family, rather than being in the workforce. Since some second-generation male members of the community marry women from their parents’ country of origin, these women face language barrier in their employment. This is in many cases hardened by the divergences in socio-cultural elements and the biased against “Muslim women”. Under the influence of these aspects, Muslim women members of the community stay home and act as a family caretaker.

Figure 22: Female Workforce Participation Rate by religion (age 15-64)


---

Employment outcomes of Muslims rely on four major categories: ‘personal and household characteristics; human capital; area-based factors; and employer attitudes. The literature identifies barriers to employment that relate to family and personal attributes that can be broadly categorized as either malleable or indelible’. These categories ‘are identified as employment barriers due to custom or discrimination it is necessary to attempt to address these issues at a wider social level through education or legislation such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, the Racial Discrimination Act 1974, the Disability Discrimination Act 1992, and the Age Discrimination Act 2004.’

Age is the foremost factor in this respect: ‘older workers encounter greater difficulty in obtaining employment than prime-age counterparts with similar qualifications and experience’. Australian Muslims’ labor market disadvantage increases over time, including younger generations especially during their transition from school to work. In addition, when they have an illness or workplace injuries their chance to find a second job becomes even more difficult. This is specifically applied to the first-generation Muslim employees while they were working at the heavy industries.


---

Religion or more specifically carrying out daily religious practices or strong attachment to the Islamic ethics has been an important aspect hindering Muslims' employment. For example, Muslim employees say that ‘they were not prepared to work in some or all of the following situations: places where alcohol is sold, gambling establishments or places where the accrual of interest was promoted, where they are required to handle non-halal meat, or where there was no time or a suitable place to pray’. For the women, there are additional restrictions regarding hijab, ‘wanting to work in an exclusively female workplace, not being prepared to work at night or in jobs that involved meeting the public’. Some employers would not tolerate Islamic rituals including daily and Friday prayers, ‘ablution, fasting, observing Muslim holidays, and restrictions on shaking hands’.  

Muslim cultural elements also hinder their employment. For example, young women ‘were expected to care for elderly relatives and women with young children frequently chose not to work or did not work because they did not have family members to look after their children and were not prepared to use formal childcare services’.  

Another aspect is the language proficiency. In Australia Muslims with very little or no English proficiency ‘resulted in social isolation and difficulties accessing services and employment’. Their background bolsters this. Many Muslims migrate to Australia from war-torn zones, like Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia under refugee and humanitarian programs with almost no language or technical skills. Some of them could never achieve proper employment.  

GMD survey underlined unfavorable treatment, which theoretically covers the above-stated factors all together regarding Australian Muslims’ discrimination at the workplace. The percentages firstly show that there is a difference of treatment towards Muslims at the workplace and during their recruitment. At the workplace regarding company facilities, compensation and benefits, promotions, and salaries, approximately 70% of respondents underlined their equality with non-Muslim employees. In each case, 20% of them took it personal and refused to answer. During their job search and application, which presumably includes being shortlisted and interviewed, the above-stated percentage goes down to 58% (Figure 24). This shows that Muslim members of Australian society face discrimination more than their counterparts during employment/recruitment processes.  

4. PERCEPTIONS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

Figure 24: Aspects of discrimination against at the workplace, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

On the employer side of the coin, one third of Australian employers ‘would prefer to hire Australians rather than migrants and a similar proportion of the workforce were similarly prejudiced. Australian research suggests that employers may be loath to employ Muslims due to fear of offending customers or co-workers or the fear that religious observance may impinge on productivity’. 81 Within Australian Muslims’ socio-economic life, the discrimination ‘is mostly to overt or visible characteristics’ such as ‘the wearing of the hijab by women, Muslim names, skin colour and accents’. 82

Due to the diversity of their employment status, Australian Muslims work in various industries and occupations. The heaviest concentration is professionals, which are mostly in the service sectors including federal and local government officials, together with legal and medical sectors. Administrative workers carrying out private sector mid-level administrative positions follow the previous mentioned sectors. The next group is tradesmen and technicians, which do not usually have university education but quite valuable and requested group of employees. A significant number of them are managers, which are executive level employees.

Table 4: Count of Persons (excluding overseas visitors) by religious affiliation, by occupation, by industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>13,883</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,236,423</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,250,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>30,439</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2,042,118</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2,072,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and trade workers</td>
<td>21,834</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,345,527</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,367,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and personal service workers</td>
<td>14,317</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>921,635</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>935,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and administrative workers</td>
<td>17,073</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,416,024</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,433,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>14,747</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>891,992</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>906,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>112,293</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,853,719</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,966,012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABS, Australian Standard Classification of Countries, 2011

The most significant socio-economic gaps in the Muslim community occur between generations. The first major wave of Turks and Cypriots were blue-collar workers who worked in labor-intensive sectors in the 1960s and 1970s. Back then, 53% of the Australian economy was based on manufacturing and Muslim communities tended to be concentrated in the suburbs where the manufacturing industry was located. Many second and third generation families, by finding success in trade, business or education emerged in the middle and upper classes of Australian society. As Ali (2018) stated ‘English is no longer a barrier’ for many second and third generations, who through better financial and educational resources gain access to better paying jobs. Yet, this has not yet improved the overall imbalance between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Although within the education system, Muslim and non-Muslim students have almost equal opportunities, within the general dynamics of the society they do not. GMD survey tried to reveal the reasons behind this inequality. The respondents underlined two main reasons bearing similar percentages: cultural differences (27.07%), discrimination, and prejudice (29%). The discomfort of the Australian mainstream culture against the Muslims underlined earlier exists here as well. This is followed by the informal hijab ban (15.87%) (Figure 25). Once again, difference in outlook and background diverges the Muslim community from mainstream society.
When looking at statistics it is evident that the differences in household and personal income between Muslim and non-Muslim Australians is significant. Muslim households are seen to be overrepresented in lower income categories and significantly underrepresented in high-income categories. Income inequalities become even more pronounced when looking at individual weekly income. Almost 12% of Muslim individuals are shown to have no personal income and another 26% indicated a weekly income of less than $400. The corresponding figure for all Australians was 22%. The gap was highest for individuals earning over $1000 per week: 10.7% for Muslim Australians and 21.1% for the total population.  

Table 5: Weekly Household Income 2011 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative/nil income</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$599 and less</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$600 to $1249</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1250 to $2999</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3000 or more</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABS Remote Access Data Laboratory 2011 (RADL 1% sample).

---

83 R. Hassan, Laurence Lester, *Australian Muslims, a Demographic, Social and Economic Profile of Muslims in Australia*, University of South Australia, 2015.

84 Since 2016, the Australian national census has not released socio-economic data concerning its citizens to the general public. As a result, the most updated data concerning socio-economic profile of Australian Muslims is provided by 2011 census. The following components of the Australian Muslim diasporic community’s socio-economic status were taken from Australian National Census, 2016 (see Appendix 2): Ancestry by State and Territory of Usual Residence, Country of Birth by Religious Affiliation.
GMD Survey also tried to explain the respondents’ household financial situation satisfaction. 41.7% of respondents took it private and refused to answer. Since the wages in Australia are usually quite satisfying and the Federal government also funds the unemployed via official initiatives and programs, 40% of respondents said they are satisfied and only 7.3% are mostly unsatisfied (Figure 26). The main reason for Muslim immigration to Australia is economic. Most Muslim immigrants came and continue to come to Australia for boosting their financial situation, which is clearly seen in the respondents’ answers.

Figure 26: Satisfaction with the Financial Situation of the Household, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

More specifically, the GMD survey tried to estimate the general outlook of Australian Muslims socio-economic status. Similar to the satisfaction with the financial situation, over 35% of the respondents stated that their situation is average/above-average. A great percentage (61.3%) took the question as personal and refused to answer (Figure 27).
Although the second and third generation Australian Muslims’ education level has been rising, their socio-economic status is not boosting. 8, 9, and 10th year Australian Muslim students have the highest rate of drop out. Yet, when they come to the university a considerable percentage of them continue their graduate studies. The most important finding is that a significant percentage of the respondents underlined their satisfaction with their household’s financial situation and their education. Discrimination against them is sharper during employment than after. This creates an imbalance between employed and unemployed Muslims. In the general picture, there is more unemployed Muslims than employed. The situation is worse when it comes to Muslim women. Muslim members’ cultural background, age, language proficiencies continue to diverge them from the mainstream culture’s members in socio-economic realm.
5 Attitudes on Visibility and Representation of Muslims

This chapter investigates the visibility and representation of Australian Muslims with a specific focus on their political and social involvement, as well as their participation.

In general, Australians tend to be not very politically engaged. Noah (2018) notes that ‘politics in this country is a bit boring. There is no spark’. Australia is a traditional middle power that rarely attempts to effect changes in the dynamics of its internal structure or the international system.

The country has a law that requires compulsory voting among its citizens, and if it had not, Noah (2018) argues that ‘more than half the population would not bother about voting. They only vote to avoid being fined’. With its essentially well-functioning system of government, the population pays little attention to politics. The Muslim community is not an exception.

Yet, some Muslim individuals do engage in politics but they do not specifically represent Muslim interests. According to the nature of partisan politics, party interests come first. Therefore, Muslim MPs represent the interests of their party and themselves. ‘We have got 3 Turkish MPs in the Victorian parliament. Do they represent Muslim interests? Do they advocate for Muslim concerns?’ asked Noah (2018), and answered himself: ‘Absolutely not. At the surface level they represent Turkish interests, but they are more party orientated, career orientated’. GMD survey proves this point. 57.1% of respondents believe that Australian Muslims are not well represented. Only 6.7% of them stated that they are well-represented. The great difference in between shows that the representation of Muslims is quite weak (Figure 28).

Figure 28: Muslims are Well-represented in the Politics, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
Apart from the parliament, Muslims in Australia tend not to be organized in strong structured bodies. Muslims do have a number of organizations, but, as Almir (2018) emphasized, it is ‘not about how many bodies you have, it is about how much you know and make’. Usman (2018) claimed that these organizations bolster the Muslim enclaves in certain suburbs and the financial relief assistance and services provided by them are often limited and ephemeral. He further added:

These are not government associations; they need assistance because they do not have enough resources. These organizations retain contacts inside that enclave, which becomes a melting pot. It keeps mixing. There is no integration, there is no cross integration.

The psychology of the enclave is also important. Enclaves occur because of people wishing to mix with their own ethnic or religious groups. This may be due to a rejection from the mainstream society, in which case it could be argued that they have little choice but to interact with those of their own religious or ethnic groups. According to the interviewees, it seems that first generation Muslims find themselves better represented by the Australian Labor Party. As Mohammad (2018) indicated, ‘the majority of Muslim people aligns themselves with the Labor party simply because the area they [used to] live in was where the factories were located’. Usman (2018) confirmed this, adding that the ‘Liberal Party finds it very difficult to penetrate into Muslim majority suburbs’.

Although not all the respondents live in enclaves, the GMD survey underlined the strength in their sense of belonging to an ethnic group. Even though the 43.20% of the respondents refused to answer, presumably taking the question as personal, only a bit over 10% of the respondents stated that their sense of belonging is weak or very weak (Figure 29).

**Figure 29: Sense of Belonging to your Ethnic Group, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
Additionally, GMD survey shows definite vigor in the interaction frequency within the members of the Muslim community. As a proof for their sense of belonging, almost 57% of the respondents see their community’s members few times a week if not every day (Figure 30). An important reason for this is the physical proximity. In Muslim suburbs, the members of the same ethnicities see each other at the mosque, or the fast food restaurants, family visits, or other social congregations.

Figure 30: The Frequency of the Interaction between the Other Members of the Muslim Community, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

![Graph showing interaction frequency](image)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Similarly, the respondents’ social gathering attendance with the members of the Muslim community is quite high (Figure 31). Due to the reason that they are sharing the same neighborhood, almost 44% of the respondents gather at community events at least sometimes.

![Graph showing social gathering attendance](image)
At the same time, first generation Australian Muslims is generally far more interested in the politics of their home country. *Usman* (2018) said that:

> If they are Turkish, they support Erdogan. They constantly talk about Erdogan. That’s their politics. Their president is Erdogan not Malcolm Turnbull or Scott Morrison. Same thing with the Lebanese. If our Prime Minister is Hariri they say our prime minister is Hariri. They vote at the elections from here. They do not care about local politics.

*Baahir* (2018) confirmed that Muslims ‘are still mostly connected to the politics in their home country as opposed to here’. A further reason given by interviewees for not engaging in politics is that they are not interested in the level of commitment and work that politics entails. In support of this view, *Raffed* (2018) stated that this sort of involvement requires a lot of commitment and work. ‘And you are constantly in the limelight; you cannot protect your and your family’s privacy. Therefore, the stakes are too high. With a single wrongdoing you are under attack and criticism. I think the general Muslim reluctance to go into politics is due to this danger’.

In order to increase Muslim’s visibility as *Mohammad* (2018) claimed, a better-educated and politically active Muslim youth is required. The focus should not solely be on the issues of the Muslim community but the issues and problems of the wider Australian society too.

Intra-communal active interaction does not transform into local or federal level political engagement, or does not produce active spokespersons to engage with local or federal politics. GMD survey underlined this. Australian Muslim community requires a more active engagement and participation.
at local and national level. 74.8% of respondents said that Muslims would benefit from Muslims’ local and national political participation (Figure 32).

**Figure 32: Benefits of Muslims’ Active Political Engagement and Participation at Local and National Level, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Circumstances in their home country can also play a part in determining Muslim migrants’ political participation. Those who had lived in Australia for an extended period or had come from countries with a robust democratic culture were far more ready to participate in politics than recent arrivals, or those who had experienced repression in their home country. Women from backgrounds that emphasized traditional gender roles found it much harder to engage in politics than women born in Australia or those whose cultural traditions encouraged female participation. Growing up in an environment where politics was regularly discussed can also be an important factor. Several migrant women who are politically active cited their mothers’ and other female relatives’ examples as inspiration for their own activism.

Some Muslims are active in a number of forums, such as advisory bodies and community consultation panels, writing and publishing opinion pieces, employment in the public service and a number of roles relating to politics. Some, such as participants in the Commonwealth Government’s Muslim Community Reference Group, have been specifically sought out by the government to bring a Muslim perspective into mainstream politics. Others, such as the various state Islamic Councils, the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils, the Australian Muslim Civil Rights Advocacy Network and the Muslim Women’s National Network, have arisen from Muslim communities and convey their communities’ concerns to the wider public. Service organizations such as certain Migrant Resource Centres and the Victorian Arab Social Services are also effective, particularly in leadership training and advocacy around
welfare issues. Often, leadership roles in community organizations provide a pathway to consultations and influence policies that affect the Muslim community.

The highly networked, coalition-based actions are also present in youth-focused programs and organizations, and, in some instances open pathways for direct political influence. These programs are not without their barriers and challenges, but the interlocking networks in this biography indicate the opportunities for political voices to emerge when organizations work together through multi-ethnic alliances.

At this point, Muslim NGOs need to be mentioned. The largest umbrella organization is the AFIC, also known as Muslims Australia. The United Muslims of Australia are another major Muslim NGO. There are also state-based organizations, such as the Islamic Council of Victoria, the Islamic Council of New South Wales. Muslim organizations also operate on both business and gender issues, such as the Muslim Professionals Association and the Australian Muslim Women’s Association.

Table 6: Significant Muslim Organizations in Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian Federation of Islamic Councils</td>
<td>Provides service to the community in a manner that is in accordance with the teachings of Islam and within the framework of Australian law, and to advocate for the Sunni Muslim community on matters that will affect the community’s relevance, settlement and integration within Australian society.</td>
<td><a href="http://muslimsaustralia.com.au">http://muslimsaustralia.com.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Muslims of Australia</td>
<td>Brings together communities under shared values, with a focus on serving the community in Australia. It is a professional community-centric organisation dedicated to creating safe and welcoming environments for the Community all over Australia. The organization invests in development and leadership programs that serve the Australian Muslim community.</td>
<td><a href="https://www.uma.org.au">https://www.uma.org.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Islamic Council of Victoria</td>
<td>Represents an estimated 200,000 Victoria Muslims. ICV offer advocacy and social welfare services while leading state and national initiatives on cohesion and harmony through community consultations and advice to Government.</td>
<td><a href="https://www.icv.org.au">https://www.icv.org.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Islamic Council of New South Wales</td>
<td>Advocates, supports, assists and develops the Muslim communities of NSW; promote unity and solidarity among all Muslims; organise, and coordinate humanitarian relief efforts; foster and promote cooperation between Muslims and others; and promote peace, understanding and good relations amongst all people.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.icnsw.org.au">http://www.icnsw.org.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Muslim Professionals Association</td>
<td>Aims to facilitate a network of professionals from a diverse range of industries who will build up the capability to mentor, support, and network within the Muslim and wider communities. The MPA will focus its attention on building a community of professionals from several industries. This will</td>
<td><a href="http://muslimprofessionals.com.au">http://muslimprofessionals.com.au</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
work to assist the community in not only creating a network of professionals, but also to develop emerging professionals (students / post-schooling) and providing opportunities for personal and professional development.

| Australian Muslim Women’s Association | Offers advice and mentors on a range of contemporary issues, including learning about Islam, marriage, divorce and other important life events in Islam, the Prophet (PBUH), and the Quran, how critical is the hijab and what is really halal and haram in Islam, Islamic history and Islamic philosophy, and ethics in Islam. | http://www.australianmuslimwomen.org.au |

In terms of visibility, the most significant concern faced by Australian Muslims is again discrimination. Discrimination toward Muslims can be traced back to the above-explained White Australia policy. Although this policy was eliminated by the Whitlam government in the 1970s, with the introduction of policies like the Racial Discrimination Act in 1975, subsequent governments have actively opposed discrimination, many Muslims and other minority groups still face discrimination in some form or other.

Many Muslim Australians frequently experience discrimination, racial vilification, threats of violence, and actual violence. They have also commented on insensitivity toward Muslim cultural practices, such as a refusal to allow prayer breaks or insensitive comments toward Muslim names or dress. Muslim Australians are likely to experience discrimination via three main themes: (i) that Muslim Australians are potential terrorists, (ii) that there is no place in Australia for Muslims or (iii) that Muslims should abandon their cultural practices and assimilate.

According to a survey carried out by Western Sydney and Charles Sturt Universities with 600 Muslims in 2015, 97% of respondents agreed that it was a positive point for society to be made up of people from different cultures, compared to the average of all Australians of 87%. According to the survey 57% of Muslims had experienced racism, 62% had experienced racism in the workplace or when seeking employment, 1 in 10 Sydney Muslims had “very high” rates of exposure to racism, 86% believed relations between Australian Muslims and non-Muslims were friendly, while unemployment was higher among those surveyed (8.5%) than the general Sydney population (3.7%).

It could be argued that Muslim women face more challenges in Australia than their male counterparts do. As the number of media accounts above show, many women find themselves facing obstacles and discrimination from both their own communities and non-Muslims as they struggle to find a place in Australian society. Yet, GMD survey tells us the opposite. Over 80% of respondents said no to discrimination regarding gender. A main reason for this could be that the high ratio of respondents was second and third generation and at least 12th year graduates and were asked whether they have felt discriminated in the last 12 months. The new generations face less discrimination in general, and gender in particular. Various Australian communities have been taking initiatives to balance the gender roles of new generations, particularly in terms of professionals and graduates, which affect Muslim second and third generations. In Muslim suburbs, the women at home, as repeatedly stated above, face such alienation and discrimination. It can be said that the 6.1% presumably covers some of those women (Figure 33).

Even if its level has been slowly recessing with the third generation, there is a continuous discrimination against Australian Muslims. To clarify its causes, the survey specified the foremost factors. The highest percentage is the language (79.8%), which is not acceptable but to an extent understandable (Figure 34). The lack of fluency in English not only hinders understanding the rest of the society but also alienates the individual. This is pretty much the case of first generation Muslim immigrants in enclaves. The second important cause is ethnicity (61.7%) (Figure 34). This is mostly illustrated by physical outlook, name, surname, or family background. Although you do not see the discrimination of this kind in cosmopolitan Australian cities, during employment/recruitment or official interactions/applications it is there. The third important cause is religion (59.9%). Practicing religion during the day and fasting during Ramadan again diverges Australian Muslims from non-Muslims especially at public and workspaces, which results in discrimination.
As examined above, discrimination also occurs in the professional/business sector. As Amir (2018) underlined, ‘if you have a Muslim name and apply for jobs, you will face a number of disadvantages compared with someone with the name of John’. According to the Diversity Council Australia’s survey in 2017, being Muslim or Chinese significantly reduces the chances of obtaining a job interview. If you have an Arabic sounding name or a Muslim name, you are required to submit approximately 13% more applications, with a Chinese name the percentage increases to 20%.

According to the interviewees, the dominant white culture in Australia has been the reason behind discrimination against Muslims. Murad (2018) emphasizes that ‘the aim is to maintain a dominant

---

culture that was already established. They have worked hard to establish it. They are already there. Now how to account for the other cultures. That’s when the conflict comes in’.

The dominant culture constructed a “glass ceiling” in Australia, which makes it very difficult for a great number of Muslims to pass through and become determining elements of wider Australian society. The term glass ceiling is often used to refer to invisible barriers or restrictions that prevent certain groups of people from advancing, as they are usually not formal written rules. Murad (2018) commented on this element, by saying that, ‘You can only hit the upper levels of society if you are non-white dark-skinned Muslim. The glass ceiling is not overt it is hidden’.

This is reflected on the GMD survey as over 40% of respondent agreed that they were “looked down” in the business sphere (Figure 39).

**Figure 37: Being Looked Down Because of the Religious Identity, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

![Pie Chart](chart.png)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

A significant point is that Australian politics has been “lightly” following the populist right wing, and, to a certain extent, the racist trends in the world today. Noah (2018) believes that:

Australia is becoming a bit more intolerant, with racist tendencies towards certain cultures. The white supremacy of Anglo-Saxon western civilization in Australia feels like it is under threat therefore they take measures to “defend” themselves. As an example, in recent weeks, we have numerous cases of extreme, unacceptable racist comments in Australia. In other words, pro-white supremacists are given a lot of space in the media.

Even if the right wing does not represent the majority of Australians, they, arguably, possess the necessary influence to highjack the national agenda against Muslims. Australia may not be completely locked in the direction of ultra-nationalism and xenophobia; it is, however, flirting with them.

The events of September 11 greatly contributed to this by generating two tiers of racism: one is racial, the other religious. This has been bolstered with xenophobia in the right-wing segments of Australian
politics. Racism in Australia centers on a sense of belonging and civic participation and is not peculiar to Muslims. Africans, Aboriginals, and Asians are all subjected to racism.

At this point, Muslim representation in Australian media needs to be highlighted. Especially after September 11, some news in Australian media ‘has reinforced stereotypical representations of Islam and has portrayed Muslims as different, strange, threatening and inferior’. 87 This news framed ‘the political and social discourse that has tended to conflate Islam with terrorism’ 88 by using images of hijab, mosques and Mecca to present Muslims in a specific way. The media reports also focus on sending messages that Islam as being at odds with Western values. 89 The news is not only negative and stereotypical but also increases tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. 90

GMD survey findings also emphasize that Australian Muslims are not well represented in the media. 57.3% of the respondents were either totally or tend to disagree with the statement that Muslim community is well-represented in Australian media (Figure 38). Although multiculturalism has been a very dominant idea in Australia, the Australian media constantly emphasizes negative aspects of being an Australian Muslim. Similar to many other Anglo-Saxon white culture’s media tendencies, Australian media harvests global biases against Muslims. Any globally attention-taking event related to Muslims, occupies significant space in Australian media usually with a misrepresented and biased outlook.

Figure 38: Australian Muslims are Well represented in the Australian Media, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

89 A. Saeed, “Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media”, Sociology Compass, 1:2, 443–462
The issue here is the absence of Muslim voices against these reports. Since Muslims are heavily de-politicized and have a very little political representation a political answer usually does not come from the Muslims. Moreover, they do not have a weight in mainstream media, which is also a big hindrance for them to amplify their voice. As a result, Muslims who do not trust mainstream media are becoming more de-politicized.

Despite their qualitative and quantitative significance, Australian Muslims’ visibility and representation is not particularly positive and strong. This generates several issues about their image and representation. Although Australian Muslims have strong structured organizations, they are not very efficiently representative. Muslims suburbs’ enclave-like structures strengthen their members’ sense of belonging to their own ethnicities and increase intra-community interaction but also alienate their members from the rest of the society. Another issue is the general a-politicization of Australian Muslims and Muslim politicians’ party-focused tendencies. Especially the former issue continues with most third generation Muslims. Regarding visibility, Australian Muslims’ socio-cultural divergence from mainstream society creates discrimination especially in the post September 11 era. Important factors for this discrimination are language, ethnicity, and religion. In the workspace, this discrimination is experienced in terms of being looked down upon. In the media, it is experienced as being linked to the violent/terror events of “Islamic fundamentalists”.

6 Confidence in Relations among Muslim Communities

Since it is a big community generating many challenges, it has been easy to develop confidence within Australian Muslim community. There are several divisions between generations, organizations, and even ethnicities. Even if they live in big “Muslim suburb”, their inter-community or inter-jamaat relations are not particularly developed.

In the span of history, Australian Muslim community and their organizations are divided along ethnic, nationalist, sectarian, and political lines. The division has been deepened due to the variety of topics these organizations separately deal with depending on their communities’ needs. Some focused on refugees, some on women and students, and others on the media. This fragmentation curbed the possibility of a unified voice of Australian Muslims.

There are several challenges affecting inter-Muslim communities’ interactions. These are the generational gap, the employment of imams, above stated diversity issues, and Muslim organizations’ staff, funding and governance issues. 92

The generational gaps affected intra, inter community dialogue because the second-generation members of different Muslim communities see themselves as “Australians” and challenge their cultural background. This affects Muslim organizations’ connections with their youth. The generational gap has a particular influence on women’s role in organizations. The first-generation men rule most Muslim representative organizations. This even includes mosque committees and boards. Only Muslim student associations have a bit of a gender diversity. For male second and third generations this gap operates in the leadership realm. Young leaders of Muslims complain about not having a chance to represent themselves. In other words, the non-transition of leadership in Muslim organizations decreases the confidence amongst members. The gap also affects the comprehensiveness of the leaders. Due to the generational diversities of Muslim communities, it is difficult for the first-generation leaders to understand and represent the issues or the demands of the later generations. 93

GMD survey proves this by illustrating that almost 60% of the respondents do not trust Muslim community leaders in Australia (Figure 39). The strength of the community organizations’ structure or their previous achievements does not change this tendency. The leaders are seen almost detached from these organizational features. Being a leader of a strong organization does not necessarily create a reliable leader label.

92 R. Edwards, Muslim Community Organisations and Leadership in Australia, PhD Thesis, University of Melbourne, Faculty of Arts, August 2018, 149-223.
93 R. Edwards, Muslim Community Organisations and Leadership in Australia, PhD Thesis, University of Melbourne, Faculty of Arts, August 2018, 153-161.
3.30%

16.20%

8.30%

18.20%

32.80%

21.20%

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

GMD survey also highlighted Australian Muslims’ low level of satisfaction with Muslim NGOs. Over 54% of the respondents are not satisfied with Muslim civil society organizations in Australia (Figure 40). In addition to the low level of trust to the leaders, the organizations are not seen as very promising either. Satisfaction here relies on several elements, such as the low level of youth and women representation, the organization’s, particularly their executive committees’ deficiencies in adapting to the changes in society, not showing effective counter-arguments against media’s and mainstream society’s discrimination, and not providing effectual support for Muslim youth’s employment needs.

Figure 40: Level of Satisfaction with Muslim Civil Society Organizations, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
Yet, this dissatisfaction does not curb Muslim community’s enthusiasm to collaborate with the Muslim NGOs. Approximately 50% of the respondents are active in Muslim associations and charities (Figure 41). One main reason for this high percentage is that a certain portion of Muslim youth’s efforts to establish and develop their own organizations and bringing their peers on board. These new organizations not only attract younger members of Australian Muslims but also more second generation Muslims detach from age-old organizations and join or cooperate with these new ones. In other words, this high percentage is not necessarily related to the established Muslim NGOs.

**Figure 41: Engagement and Activity within Muslim Associations and Charities, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Similarly, approximately 25% of the GMD survey respondents stated that they support Muslim NGOs either full-time or part-time through volunteering or via providing financial support. More than half of the respondents (53.63%) took this question as personal, since it requires talking about financial support, and refused to answer (Figure 42). Australian Muslims are not indifferent to their representative organizations. They provide support either voluntarily or via donations even if they do not necessarily believe in the efficiency of their efforts. This has been a continuing pattern of inter-communal Muslim solidarity.
Employment of imams is another significant challenge affecting inter-Muslim relations. In today’s Australia, Imams need to carry out wide variety of duties including maintaining the confidence within the community. In the mosques of big Muslim suburbs, comprised of communities with great diversities, these duties are even more important. Employing imams who are proactive enough to embrace these diversities is only one part of the issue. There is also a lack of Australian-born imams. Most imams are “imported” from overseas who are almost alien to the peculiarities of Australia and its Muslim community. Moreover, Australia does not have institutions to train imams. 94

Imams’ successes to congregate the Muslim community do not seem very satisfactory according to the GMD survey. More than 41% of the respondents stated that they go to mosque less than once a week (Figure 43). Friday prayers bring the most significant number of Muslims to mosques. That “once a week” presumably implies Fridays. In addition to the difficulties of finding engagement and embracing imams, going to mosque every day is not very achievable for Australian Muslims in cosmopolitans. Two major reasons could be; there are not too many active mosques with full-time imams in cosmopolitan cities, and Australian daily work schedule could hinder such practice.

The above-mentioned diversity is a general issue of almost all Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries. The diversity in Australia is mostly caused by migrant Muslim communities’ unwillingness to abandon their customs. First generation Muslim migrants brought their cultural elements and tried to apply them to Australian cultural fabric.

The fragmentation within Australian Muslim community reflected on the findings via the inquiry on the level of cooperation between different jamaats. Over 55% of the respondents answered that this cooperation requires improvement (Figure 44). In Muslim suburbs or in cosmopolitan cities Muslims usually congregate with their own jamaat members. In other words, intra-jamaat interactions and solidarity is stronger that inter-jamaat.
Figure 44: Level of Cooperation Between Different Jamaats, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Another finding of the GMD survey underscores the same fact from another dimension. 46.8% of the respondents stated that they either never or very rarely attend political events with the other members of Muslim community (Figure 45). These other members are usually the other ethnicities or nationalities. Because normally Lebanese interact with Lebanese, Turks interact with Turks. Moreover, most Australian Muslims are apolitical. In other words, attending political events for them is not very common.

Figure 45: Frequency of Attending Political Events with the Members of Muslim Community, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

The last issue affecting inter-Muslim community dialogue is the organizational and operational structure of Muslim organizations. The organizations’ main issue is the deficiency of their resources,
terms of not only funds but also staff, most of whom has to work voluntarily. More importantly, most of Australian Muslim organizations, for example AFIC, suffered from mismanagement and corruption. There is also very little efficiency in the inter-organizational cooperation and collaboration.

Yet, some Australian Muslim organizations have been studying this issue. One of them is the Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV). ICV tried to develop relations with the conservative Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamma’h Association of Australia (ASWJA) that has been progressing productively. On the other hand, these communications firstly are not widespread amongst the other Muslim organizations and secondly they mostly deal with communication issues rather than settling disagreements over the interpretations of Islam.

Communication issues were exposed at the GMD survey as well. Almost 45% of respondents were not informed or slightly informed about the developments in the Muslim community. Over 17% of the respondents do not know about the general community (Figure 46). Since Australian Muslim community is big and scattered, it is understandable that its members do not or cannot follow its developments.

Figure 46: The Extent of Information about the Muslim Community, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Muslim organizations in Australia in the last decade developed a very important commonality on the representation of Muslims. Almost all of them are aware of the hard work needed to keep provocative and controversial Muslim commentaries off the public scene. Coordination among the Muslim organizations is particularly significant on this effort.

---

95 R. Edwards, Muslim Community Organisations and Leadership in Australia, PhD Thesis, University of Melbourne, Faculty of Arts, August 2018, 216.
GMD interviews underlined more grassroots level issues. One of them is the lifestyle in Muslim suburbs, some of which operate as the above-mentioned enclaves, heavily determine the interaction amongst Muslim communities. Some of the first, and to a certain extent second generation Muslims, live in their “own” suburbs, such as Lakemba, Auburn, Fairfield, Blacktown, Campbelltown. These operate in much the same way as enclaves. Muslims there block channels of interaction with the non-Muslim community, and their home media enables them to do so. The only form of interaction is with neighbors and relatives living in the same suburb. Usman (2018) clarified this by claiming that:

They do not watch [Australian] TV anymore, they do not listen to the radio; it is a different language. There is so much trauma outside. They have just focused on drama on TV from their countries. If they are Turkish, they watch Turkish drama; if they are Lebanese, they watch subtitled Turkish and subtitled Mexican dramas. They have only been exposed to satellite dish now. You will notice lot of the properties have massive satellite dishes, they are picking up movies and dramas from outside Australia.

The suburb way of life, however, is greatly reducing itself since the youth of Muslim community cannot afford to live in their parent’s suburbs unless they inherit their parents’ properties. This has led to Muslim communities becoming more and more dispersed. Usman (2018) clarified that:

Auburn used to be Turkish and Lebanese now it is very strongly Asian –Chinese. Iraqi immigrants came through Auburn and then they left. Why? Because it is too expensive. They came here because there were support services here; there was a mosque, identified as an Iraqi mosque so they came here with their families. Then they realized that the property market is very expensive. ‘We can’t afford the rent. Let’s move somewhere else’. They moved to places like Blacktown, Ernmitngton, Liverpool, Campbelltown. Places where they can afford to rent.

In the professional sector, racial and religious discrimination against the Muslim youth often triggers a sense of solidarity amongst them on both micro and macro levels. This solidarity generates youth-oriented organizations in the Muslim community. One of these youth organizations being the Muslim Professionals Association, an initiative formed by four young professional Muslims that assists Muslims in various fields of employment. During the roundtable meeting in Melbourne, it was emphasized that ‘people started to see themselves reflected in an organization which is about them, which is very different from an old uncles’ or old aunties’ organizations’. The youth say ‘I have got nothing to offer to these people’. ‘They are not making a difference’. There is a breath of fresh air with MPA type organizations. They target the discrimination many people have felt for years and provide means to care for them.

The prospect is the flourishing of these organizations. New Muslim youth-oriented organizations will come under different names and fill in different gaps. Moreover, they may have a magnet effect. A new organization appears under the issue of X, and the youth will leave the old organizations and move into these new ones. This will likely end up with better and more relevant organizations for the unity and welfare of Muslim communities in Australia.
Due to several issues, confidence within Australian Muslim community is still underdeveloped. Divergence between different generations’ expectations, Muslim organizations’ inefficiency to attract younger members’ attention and support, leadership and representational deficiencies, problems with the employment of imams prevent the development of the intra-community trust. The continuation of detachment amongst various ethnic components of the community makes it even more difficult.
Despite the on-going issues stated above, the future for Muslim communities in Australia is insignificantly unfavorable. As Noah (2018) says, ‘it is going to get worse before it gets better’. Abdul (2018) partly confirmed this statement

The dynamism in the community is based on the components that push the dynamism. The community only goes where you pull. Social funds, projects and social engineering projects are practically and naturally obvious. The Australian government does not want citizens to fight each other. They want Muslim individuals to integrate fully. There will be a good future for Muslims in Australia. We will look to the Muslim community for values and heritage.

Mohammad (2018) stated that the future for Muslim communities in Australia ‘is going to be a positive one’ and continued:

There are going to be challenges but the Muslim community is making good progress and is adopting the good qualities of Australian society. The next step for us is to develop the right infrastructure; non-mosque related ones, to meet the needs of our community. One of them is elderly care; the other is mental health care. Another need is for programs, good religious schools and departments to train homegrown imams. So I think that mind shift that the community does not only require mosques is happening, we need to raise funds for more schools, training programs, mental health institutions, and the like. If we overcome the issues that divide us, we might get to this next level.

The future of Muslims in Australia is not independent of world events either. Baqar (2018) stated that:

What happens overseas does have impact on events here. It could be positive or negative. The way I see it the right wing is gaining momentum in Europe, North America, and Australia. 20 years ago the language that politicians use, you would not think that they could use that kind of a language but these days it has become a norm.

Musa (2018) reiterated that Muslims to increase their level of influence need to form a strong and unified body. Ali (2018) accepted this and added that with an increase in Islamic schools there is a bigger potential to achieve this unity. Another reason to be optimistic about the future of Australian Muslims is that the new generation Muslims in Australia are becoming more unified against pressure and criticisms from the right wing. Murad (2018) stated:

I am optimistic that the younger generation will be more resilient than previous generations. And they will better cope and deal with it than their fathers and grandfathers. The extreme right numbers are minority as well. This is probably their last attempt at holding on to power
completely and absolutely. This will change in time. Australia is changing and the Muslim community is going to change with it.

Australian Muslims feel under serious scrutiny not only because of being accused of the acts of violence committed by Islamist extremists but also being a constant focus of Western nations’ threat perceptions. Australian right-wing media has been the biggest contributor in the construction of negative stereotypes about Muslims. The lack of a unified voice in the representation of common issues of various Muslim communities either led the youth to disengage themselves from Islam or marginalized themselves by refusing the mainstream Australian society.

Another important aspect that raises the hope for the future of Australian Muslims is their outlook towards the official mindset and elements of Australian state. They mostly have confidence (41-44%) to Australian security forces and judiciary (Figures 47 & 48). In other words, Australian Muslims are not detached from or developed enmities towards Australian authorities. This indicates that they see themselves as a part of Australian state, not necessarily an alien or a foreigner. In the future, it will continue to curb Australian Muslims’ potential discomfort with Australian authorities.

**Figure 47: Confidence in Security Forces of Australia, (All respondents - N=405, share of total,%)**

![Confidence in Security Forces of Australia](image)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
Figure 48: Confidence in Australian Judiciary, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

GMD survey also highlights that almost half of the respondents believe that the future will be promising (Figure 49). This is a clearer question to understand the outlook of Australian Muslims for their future prospects. As stated above, they have discrimination issues in broader society and in workplace and lack of confidence to their fellows but most of them are happy with their financial situation and the Australian Muslim youth is happy with education. These develop essential, even though not necessarily enough, prospects for their future.

Figure 49: Expectations for the Future, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
An additional reason for Australian Muslims’ future prospects is their hope for the improvement in their employment status. Only 7.30% of respondents stated that everyone in their family is unemployed. Almost 15% of the respondents’ stated that four people in their family are employed (Figure 50). As the famous English aphorism says, there is at least one bread earner in a Muslim Australian family. With the developing integration and education patterns of third and the following Muslim Australian youth, this has a great potential to develop.

**Figure 50: Number of People in the Household Working and Employed, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

GMD survey also highlighted that almost 40% of respondents stated that Muslim community in Australia are accepted and treated as full-fledged citizens (Figure 51). As happening in workplace, when it comes to rules and regulations everyone is equal before law in Australia. Thus regardless of the discrimination by Australian mainstream Anglo-Saxon culture’s members, Australian Muslims have to treated as full-fledged citizens by official authorities. 21% of the respondents’ disagreement might refer to this mainstream culture’s continuing discrimination in daily interactions. In other words, what is happening on legislations and in practice for treating Muslims is different. Unfortunately, none of these two divergent treatments towards Australian Muslim may seem to change in the near future.
As another prospect for Australian Muslims’ future is the improvement of their engagement with public life. Over the half of the respondents described Muslims’ engagement with public life either good, very good, or excellent (Figure 52). This is certainly related to the development in their integration patterns. Better educated and sophisticated and aware members of Australian society, the third generation Muslim youth, increases this engagement. They aren’t only vibrant individuals in business life but also in NGO sphere as well.

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
Regarding religio-cultural freedom and the education system in Australia, GMD survey respondents are quite optimistic. They see these two aspects as the main advantages of living in Australia as a Muslim (Figure 53). In other words, Australian Muslims’ problems aren’t with the “Australian system or governance”, which has been providing what they didn’t achieve adequately in their countries of origin. They are more about the general society’s outlook.

**Figure 53: Main Advantages of Living in Australia as a Muslim, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Due to several reasons listed above Australian Muslims are optimistic about their future. They are not particularly discarded by Australian governance authorities. They enjoy the same rights and entitlements with the non-Muslim members of the society. With the better-educated younger generations, Australian Muslims role and voice have been amplifying. Even if the discrimination they have been facing by the mainstream society does not seem to curtail sometime soon, it is in Australian Muslims’ hands to be less affected by it by increasing their personal capabilities and inter-community solidarity.
8 Conclusions and Recommendations

The continuing issue that the Australian Muslim diaspora has been facing is discrimination. Muslim NGOs’ first priority should be addressing discrimination by emphasizing it in both formal and informal educational settings. They also need to raise greater public awareness on human rights and the freedom of religion. In addition, the violation of Muslim rights needs to be documented and then acted upon by the Islamic community.

It is not easy to refer to a Muslim diaspora in Australia along the lines of the Jewish, Armenian, or African diaspora. The primary reason is both the fact that Australian Muslim community is composed of individuals from more than 60 different countries and the level of disconnection among Australia’s Muslim groups. Indeed, the decreasing unity within the diasporic community in Australia is a pressing issue. Future policies should focus on increasing intra-communication between generations as well as a focus on communal Islamic values potential risk of losing these values. It is also apparent that even the Muslim groups in Australia are often unaware of the large number of Muslims living in places such as the Philippines, South Africa and Canada.

The puzzled stance of the respondents of the GMD survey shows that Muslim diaspora in Australia is not completely well-recognized. 46% of the respondents thought that there is a Muslim diaspora in Australia and almost 45% didn’t know about it (Figure 54).

Figure 54: Believing in the Muslim Diaspora in Australia, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
A similar distribution of percentage is seen regarding the respondents’ feeling of bonding with the other Muslims around the world. A bit over 48% of the respondents feel a strong bond with all other Muslims around the world, and almost 45% don’t know about it (Figure 55).

**Figure 55: Bonding with the other Muslims around the World, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Another related issue in this sense is the low level of confidence of the Australian Muslims towards the Muslim country leaders. Almost 70% of the respondents don’t trust Muslim leaders (Figure 56). Mistrusting their origin countries’ politics and political system is also one of the reasons of their immigration to Australia. Thus, such a high percentage is not surprising.

**Figure 56: Confidence towards Muslim Leaders, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)**

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.
The inter-generation tension should also be addressed. Third generation Muslims’ level of content in being simply defined as Australian is a primary reason behind such tension. As Abdul notes “they don’t mention their ethnic background and the language they speak at home.” Younger Australian Muslims see themselves as Australian rather attributing to themselves their parents’ ethnicity. Younger Muslims are assimilating into mainstream Australian society far easier than previous generations.

Another reason for this tension is the change from blue collar workers to white collar. Mohammad gave a clear illustration of this generational gap and its potential to generate intergenerational tension, arguing that for Muslim workers of first generation the main goal was survival, or “finding their feet” as he put it. For the second and third generation, however, it became integration. “In that context, there were many challenges first generations faced, in trying to merge the gap between their culture, the culture that they pass to their children, and the Australian culture.” This, naturally, brought about some intergenerational tensions between first generations who wanted to raise their children with their own culture and values and their children who wanted to integrate, thus rebelled their parents to relieve this intergenerational tension.

The tendency for Muslim youth to assimilate with ease is not necessarily a reason for concern. The issue could be if they young Muslims believe that they must disregard their Muslim identity completely in order to better settle in Australian wider society. This would be solid assimilation, which should be looked out for by Muslim NGOs.

Ghettoization has been another issue. Old Muslim suburbs are like enclaves which prevent the Muslim community from interacting with wider Australian society and vice-versa. In order to curb it, local politicians should try to unblock the channels of interaction. More positive media coverage is required when discussing the Muslim communities. Via these methods perhaps the Muslim community may be more willing to better integrate with wider Australian society.

Another issue is that some segments of the Muslim youth in Australia are undergoing radicalization. These segments are far more unified than the secular or moderate segments. Baqar underlined that sheikhs overseas play a significant role in the radicalization of Australian Muslim youth. Muslims do need to effectively address general issues within their community. Usman emphasized the main issues that will continue to dominate Muslim enclaves are drugs, gang life, and domestic violence.

These issues have a serious detrimental effect on Muslims image in Australia, which requires substantial rectification. Almost 59% GMD survey respondents also emphasized the need to improve the public image of Muslims in Australia (Figure 57).
Figure 57: Need to Improve the Public Image of Muslims in Australia, (All respondents - N=405, share of total, %)

Source: SESRIC survey with members of the Muslim community of Australia, 2019.

Australian Muslims have been trying hard to establish a long-term established settlement for the future of their children. Both Muslim and non-Muslim mainstreams need to focus on and invest in social cohesion and harmony in order to contribute to the efficiency of Australian multiculturalism.
I. List of Interviewees in Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad</td>
<td>The director of LMA Board, Operation Director of LMA Board, and also on the Board of Man Age Care, Sydney</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raffed</td>
<td>Police Officer, Sydney</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Islamic Council of Victoria, Melbourne</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa</td>
<td>Ex-president of AFIC, Sydney</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul</td>
<td>The Gallipoli Mosque’s director, Sydney</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>An Auburn resident for over 30 years, Sydney</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usman</td>
<td>Muslim Politician, Auburn Council, Sydney</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noah</td>
<td>Director, Islamic Council of Victoria, Melbourne</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baahir</td>
<td>NGO Worker, Melbourne</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aasif</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Islamic Council of Victoria, Melbourne</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>Researcher, PhD, Social Research ANU, Melbourne</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murad</td>
<td>Muslim NGO leader, Sydney</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqar</td>
<td>Police Officer, NSW Police Department, Sydney</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to the references, this study used a variety of academic (peer-reviewed) sources on Muslims in Australia, which can be categorized under the following headings according to their contents.

Australian Muslims’ general cultural, historical, psychological, physiological, economic features and transformations:

Islamophobia and its effects

Australian Muslim women


Australian Muslim Ethnic Diasporas


**Australian Muslim students**


**Australian Muslims’ representation in media**


### Appendices

**Appendix 1:**

- Religious Affiliation, Count of persons, 2071.0 Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census, 2016 – Religion
- Religious Affiliation by State and Territory, Count of persons, 2071.0 Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census, 2016 – Religion
- Religious Affiliation by Birth of Person, Count of persons, 2071.0 Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census, 2016 – Religion
- Religious Affiliation by Year of Arrival, Count of persons, 2071.0 Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census, 2016 – Religion
- Religious Affiliation by Indigenous Status, Count of persons, 2071.0 Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census, 2016 – Religion

**Appendix 2:**

- Ancestry by State and Territory of Usual Residence, Count of persons – 2016, 2071.0 Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census, 2016 – Cultural Diversity