GLOBAL MUSLIM DIASPORA:
MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND MINORITIES IN NON-OIC MEMBER STATES

FINAL REPORT

Organization of Islamic Cooperation
Statistical, Economic and Social Research and
Training Centre for Islamic Countries
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Foreword

The SESRIC has launched the Global Muslim Diaspora (GMD) Project - a comprehensive research effort trying to analyse challenges, attitudes, experiences and perceptions on a range of issues related to Muslim communities and minorities living in the non-OIC Member States. The main objective of the project is to provide a range of useful comparative statistics and insights, which can help identify issues, initiate cooperation forums and shape future policy.

Islam is not only present in all continents as a religion but also as a cultural and civilizational value. Starting with the Hijrah of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), Muslim migrants have laid the foundations for the spread of Islamic values, ideas and habits in the regions where they are settled, thus contributed to the cultural richness and economic development of these places.

Today, whenever we raise the point concerning Muslims communities and minorities living in non-OIC Member States, we have in mind a context in which Islam is present through more recent migrations. However, we should keep in mind that many of these countries have also been the homeland of its Muslims for centuries.

Despite the recent growth of literature on Muslims living in non-OIC Member States, our knowledge regarding this subject remains limited and fragmented. The GMD project intends to fill this gap through engaging more closely with the representatives of Muslim communities and minorities in different countries.

In context of GMD project, it is with great pleasure that I present to you the Final Report, which affords the political elites, policy makers, analysts and general public the opportunity to understand how the Muslims in various non-OIC countries view the most pressing issues they face today. The Final Report is based on two basic pillars: desk research and fieldwork – conducted by travelling to 10 non-OIC countries. Survey and workshop with representatives of Muslim communities and minorities and in-depth interviews with Muslim and non-Muslim public opinion leaders are the main components of this fieldwork study, whose results are integrated within the report.

I would like to encourage the readers of this report to have a look on the GMD general report titled “Muslim Communities and Minorities in Non-OIC Member States: Diagnostics, Concepts, Scope and Methodology”, which inter alia provides description of methodology and research activities applied when preparing the report on Canada.

The development of this report has involved the dedication, skills and efforts of many individuals, to whom I would like express my sincere appreciation and thanks.

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Servet Erdem prepared the Final Report, with the contributions of Erđal Akdeve, Gürol Baba, Onur Unutulmaz, Sohrab Rahmaty, Prof. Dr. Mehmet Barca, Rector of SSUA, supervised and contributed to the preparation of this report.

Ambassador Musa Kulaklıkaya, Director General of the SESRIC, provided pivotal leadership during the preparation of the report. Several SESRIC members also contributed to the finalization of the report, including Kenan Bağcı, Kaan Namli, Tazeen Qureshi and Fatma Nur Zengin.

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Executive Summary

This report aims to address a critical gap in the literature regarding the global Muslim diasporic community by providing a comprehensive outlook on the principal aspects of the diasporic Muslim communities of non-OIC member states. The data and information presented in this study were collected via surveys, in-depth interviews, and workshops conducted in selected countries and a detailed investigation of secondary sources. Ten countries were selected for primary data collection through field studies. In choosing these countries, the aim was to have a proper representation of different politico-historical, socioeconomic, religious and cultural, as well as geographic, contexts. Thus, Germany, France, Spain, the United Kingdom (Europe), Argentina, Canada, the United States (the Americas), Japan (Asia), South Africa (Africa), and Australia (Oceania) were selected. The fieldworks were conducted in at least one city in each country, which, in most cases, were the capital city of the respective country. In addition, the following criteria were considered in the selection of the cities where the GMD field studies have been conducted: (i) the size and distribution in the national and communal scales, (ii) the diversity, reflecting true plurality of ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds of the Muslim groups, (iii) the variations: reflecting significant differences in the migratory histories of the selected countries, particularly in relation to the migration of Muslim communities, e.g., colonial migration, labour migration, asylum-seeking, etc.

Following three pilot studies conducted in the United Kingdom (London; 4-9 May, 2017), France (Paris; 19-23 September, 2017), and Germany (Berlin; 10-15 October 2017.), the GMD project expanded its scope and conducted seven more field studies in Australia (Sydney and Melbourne; 27-31 August 2018), Argentina (Buenos Aires and Cordoba; 12-16 November, 2018), Canada (Toronto and Guelph; 11-15 February, 2019), Japan (Tokyo; 10-15 September, 2018), South Africa (Johannesburg and Cape Town; 8-13 October 2018), Spain (Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia; 10-14 December, 2018), and the USA (New York; 15-19 January, 2019).

A large part of the existing studies; whether official statistics, policy reports or academic works, consider Muslim communities and minorities as rather passive subjects of analysis. This project, in comparison, aims to give a voice to Muslims and reflect their experiences, attitudes, and perspectives. The fieldworks are comprised of following components: (i) surveys with ordinary members of the Muslim communities (ii) in-depth interviews with Muslim and non-Muslim public opinion leaders and (iii) workshops in which representatives from a wide range of Muslim CSOs participated. In addition, fieldwork activities were designed to include on-site visits and observations of various mosques, and cultural centres, Muslim CSOs, as well as a large number of conversations with members of the Muslim communities.
Three pilot surveys with 150 respondents were conducted in the United Kingdom (London, May-April 2017), France (Paris, September-October 2017), and Germany (Berlin, October 2017.). The remaining seven surveys were conducted among 400 respondents in Australia (Sydney and Melbourne, February-March 2019), Argentina (Buenos Aires and Cordoba, November 2018-August 2019), Canada (Toronto and Guelph, February-March 2019), Japan (Tokyo, September-October 2018), South Africa (Johannesburg, October-November 2018), Spain (Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia, April-May 2019), and the USA (New York; January-February 2019) by trained interviewers from local public opinion research companies. The questionnaire has been prepared by the SESRIC, originally written in English, and subsequently translated into local languages. All interviewers were given written instructions containing a general description of the questionnaire and the method of selecting respondents. In addition to the written instructions, all interviewers were trained to understand research goals and interviewing methods.

In addition to the surveys, a vast number of interviews have been conducted with Muslim and non-Muslim representatives, activists, experts, and policy-makers. The primary purpose of the in-depth interviews was to provide a general overview of each framework and to highlight the main issues of concern and attention. In total 128 individuals participated in 115 interviews throughout the GMD field studies that were conducted in 10 countries.

While the surveys and interviews have been primarily oriented towards gathering more specific information concerning each contextual framework; including the legal and political structure, the dominant perception of Muslims, and the current discussions in the country concerning the Muslim communities, the workshops have aimed at gathering information from the Muslim civil society, reflecting their own experiences, opinions, and perceptions—through a platform where different experts, activists, spokespersons, and representatives of the Muslim communities can engage in a dialogue. With this in mind, a workshop has been organized in each of the field study locations. For each field study, a list of CSOs that have been found advisable and suitable to be invited to the workshop was prepared in advance. All Muslim CSOs, i.e., those established and managed by Muslim communities, as well as major faith-based organizations and institutions, which had a significant level of Muslim participation, have been included in each list. Official invitations have been sent out to CSOs through e-mail addresses and follow-up phone calls are made when required.
1 Introduction

The future of Islam and Muslims is no longer circumscribed by the immediate Islamic World of the Near and Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific. Europe, North America, Latin America and Caribbean, and Oceania, where Muslim presence had been historically limited, have been introduced with a fast-growing Muslim reality over the last few decades. A 2012 report by Pew Research Center (PEW) suggests that providing that the current trends (of fertility and immigration rates) continue, by 2050, Muslims will not only nearly equal the number of Christians and becomes one of the two largest religions in the globe, but also will make up 10% of the overall population of Europe (Pew 2015). According to two other reports by PEW (2012) and Kettani (2010), Muslims constitute the majority in 49 countries with around three quarters of all Muslims living in these countries while a significant share of the Muslim population, more than 20%, live as minorities in their autochthonous lands, such as Indian or Chinese Muslims. This means that at least 3% of the world Muslim population now lives far from their home countries, in their adopted countries.

In parallel with their global eminence, the literature on Muslim diaspora, and Muslim immigrants, specifically in the West, is growing year by year. Yet, much of the interest in diasporic Muslim communities lies in and revolves around few common topics: the rise of Islamophobia and discriminatory attitudes and rhetoric towards Muslims, anti-immigrant sentiments among Western societies, and the like. This means that for the greater part of scholarship the Western Muslim reality, and the Muslim communities of non-OIC member states, conceive and formulate in the binary of “victimhood” and “threat.”

During the field studies of the GMD Project, the research team found that Muslim immigrants, political activists, leaders, and organizations in the West are now excessively sceptical and concerned about becoming subjects for research, and studies that decidedly frame their whole subjectivity, presence, and experiences within worn-out binaries of “potential threat” or “victims of Islamophobia, systematic discrimination, and anti-immigrant sentiments and politics.”

This regretfully limited yet dominating interest in Muslim communities does not only work towards setting invisible yet academically, socially, and politically enforced boundaries for the respective scholarship but even more dangerously structures the global knowledge on Muslims in general. Out-worked phrases such as “victims” of Islamophobia, anti-immigrant sentiments, rise in the right-wing populisms or “threat” to the Western secularism, democracy, and liberal society is now becoming global discourses, such as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” about, as Foucault would put it, that are alarmingly fixing, diminishing, and negating the Muslim agency and potency. These discursive

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representations and practices do not only establish and structure the knowledge about the Muslims of the Western world but also fix the state and nature of the relations between the Muslim communities and the Western societies eternally. The result is concepts such as “acceptance,” “tolerance,” “adaptation,” and “assimilation” which mostly dictates the perspectives, demands, and claims of the Western societies, authorities, political, ideological, cultural frames, and structures govern the whole discussions about the Muslims of the Western world.

In such context, it is convinced that in order to deconstruct these boundaries and overcome such generalizing, reductive, and overt-politicized representations it is imperative that intellectual and academic actors of the Muslim community undertake their responsibility and play an active role in collecting, producing, processing and publicizing the knowledge concerning the Muslim communities of the non-OIC member states.

Despite a growing global interest towards them and despite the fact that a significant role is attributed to them in both anti- and pro-Muslim circles (as a future lever for change or as a growing threat on the global stage), the Muslim communities of non-OIC member states remain largely unknown. The data and information about even the basic demographic profiles of these communities are mostly scattered, inadequate, not updated, and more often than not unreliable. Particularly in the current European and American contexts, where debates about immigration and integration have become extremely heated and anti-immigrant sentiments, Islamophobia, and the rise of extreme-right started to fuel concerns about the future of Muslims in non-Muslim countries, a quality and all-encompassing research on Muslim diasporic groups is not only a socio-political responsibility but also a global imperative.

In such global, ideological and historical conjuncture, the principal objectives of the GMD have been to evaluate the societal, political, economic, and legal presence and influence of Muslim groups in non-OIC member states through desk research, field studies and comparative analyses. The analyses applied in this project are expected to contribute to the efforts in explaining why the status, influence and the presence of Muslim groups in various countries differ. From an academic perspective, the project intends to contribute to the literature by re-examining the conceptual frame related to Muslim communities and minorities, diaspora, migration, and societal influence. Further, as one of the latest most comprehensive investigations on the Muslim minorities, the GMD Final Report offers much more to the host countries, home countries, international organizations, and all actors and bodies that have an interest in or an impact on the Muslim diasporic communities, immigrant groups, refugees and minorities.

The general objective of the GMD project is to establish a comprehensive and reliable empirical data source on the Muslim communities in the non-OIC member countries as well as to provide an in-depth analysis of their demographic profile, legal and socio-economic status, political visibility and representation, and future prospects.
In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, during the three pilot field studies, the research team observed that despite the increase in both size and importance of diasporic Muslim communities, the level of interaction and cooperation between different ethnic, socio-cultural, and denominational Muslim groups remain strikingly low. It was observed that diasporic Muslim groups of the same context have very limited knowledge of the other Muslim groups and almost no information about Muslims of other countries. Put differently, despite its growing international and transnational influence and significance, the global Muslim community is more fragmented and isolated than ever. This picture, needless to point, enhances the importance and role of the GMD as a provider and creator of an international and transnational space for Muslim interaction. In this context, the Final Report of the GMD project provides an integrated overview, which combines the previous reports in the series. The goal of the Final Report is to bring together all the previous studies to understand as a whole the context and situation of the Muslim diaspora communities.
2 The concept of the Muslim Diaspora

Signifying particularly the dispersal of the Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, viz., the paradigmatic triad of diaspora studies, the concept of diaspora and its usage remained limited largely to the religious and theological realms. It was only in the second half of the 20th century that the term visibly emerged in other fields of studies, such as politics, literature, sociology, and anthropology, and gradually expanded to cover and designate the involuntary dispersal of other communities, specifically those of African origin. As pointed out by many scholars, towards the end of the 1980s, the proliferation of the concept has been taken to such a striking extent that it is in danger of becoming yet another overused word that can mean almost everything but signifies nothing (Stock, 2010: 27). In many contexts, the term is now employed synonymously with a number of related concepts such as migration, transnationalism, exile and the like. Rogers Brubaker’s felicitous designation of “diaspora” as a dispersion of the meanings of the term in a semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space” captures the situation perhaps in the most fitting way. In the face of such a challenge, many scholars find a resolution in formulating robust conceptual frames and rigid definitions that only leads to further problems.

The GMD project does not use a categorical definition of diaspora by identifying noteworthy criteria and suggesting which communities are truly diasporic and which are not. As Cohen (2008) emphasizes, “no single contemporary diaspora will fulfil all the definitional desiderata” (513). The Muslim diaspora, in general, and Muslim diasporic communities, in particular, are no exception to this. Thus, instead of formulating a normative definition of the concept of diaspora vis-à-vis its primal investigation and case of the Muslim diaspora, the GMD project relies on all important aspects of the term diaspora, that are reflected in detail in Annex-1 of the GMD Inception Report. It suffices to suggest that for the purpose of this project, Muslims living in non-OIC member states are defined as “Muslim diaspora” even though these communities are characterized by immense diversity, they still share the Muslim identity as a global referent, binding them with other Muslims across the globe. In fact, the very diversity and disunity that is always coupled everywhere with a desire to eliminate it is itself diasporic. Based on these arguments and premises, the GMD project identifies the Muslim diaspora as a “super diaspora”, a diaspora that is dispersed among and over different Jamaats, cultures, ethnicities, and nationalities.

The GMD project is aware of the presence of autochthonous Muslim communities and minorities, but for practical reasons and difficulties in identifying people whose ancestors came from elsewhere, the project deals with all Muslims living in non-OIC member states. Further, whether individuals from a Muslim community identify with their Islamic, identity or not, or whether they practice Islam or not, do not preclude them from being involved in the scope of the GMD project. Irrespective of their personal religious views, they continue to
share certain social and political experiences coming from a Muslim background and having adopted a non-Muslim majority country as home.

Diversity, positionality, performativity, differences, layers, sections and fragments are not exclusive to any one diaspora. Society, at the risk of highlighting the obvious, is made of parallel societies of genders, races, ethnicities, denominations, classes, cultures and the like. The Muslim diaspora is as diverse, fragmented, sectioned, classed and gendered as any other diaspora, including sub-categorical ethnic Muslim Diasporas like Pakistani, Turkish or Iranian. Not only identities and cultures but also Diasporas are inherently and invisibly multi-hyphenated. Hyphens in this perspective are as many references to connective links as to tensions and contestations. Tensions and conflicts are not lacking in any identity. Thus, the Muslim diasporic experience could and should be examined in respect to the tensions (inter-communal and intra-communal), stages and periods (of adaptation, settlement, cohabitation, and the like) and options (assimilation, promotion, accommodation, visibility, engagement, or exclusion and so forth) that they are contained and are founded upon.

The tensions, periods, stages and options are more or less applicable to all political and historical diasporic contexts, in and beyond the European one, in which Muslim individuals and communities have re-rooted themselves. None of these tensions or issues is specific to Muslim communities and minorities. Any diasporic group with different ethnic, national, linguistic, religious and cultural roots from that of the host society may go through similar stages or experience similar tensions. Opportunities and disadvantages, tensions and peace, misery and comfort, invisibility and over-visibility are present in all diasporic experiences. In such cases, the host societies’ reservations and concerns about the lack of interaction, integration, and adaptation of migrants co-occur and collide with the diasporic groups’ concerns about losing their cultural, religious and ethnic identity. From such a perspective, the situation of Muslim groups in non-OIC member states can be identified as truly diasporic.

Muslim communities and minorities are also characterized by the existence and dynamism of the multi-stranded social relations they form and sustain with their country of origin as well as with other diasporic communities living in different contexts. The recent emphasis on and interest in cyber-connection and transnational networks in the diasporic context finds a unique example in the Muslim diaspora. Scholars such as Barbara Metcalf (1996) and Pnina Werbner (1996) best capture the significance of these developments and networks within the Muslim diaspora. According to Metcalf (1996), the “social space of networks and identities created in new contexts away from homelands,” together with the “cultural space that emerges as Muslims interact, and the physical space of residence and community buildings founded in new settings” comprises what she defines as a Muslim space, or the “imagined maps of Muslims diaspora” (18).

Different models and theories of diaspora give more attention to different subcategories of the Muslim diaspora. In each one, however, the Palestinian diaspora continues to occupy a central place. In fact, from the perspective of the classic and modern view of diaspora, it is a “diaspora proper” or by far the most “diasporic” of the Muslim Diasporas. It has also been
important for the Muslim diaspora since it continues to serve as a point of connection, solidarity, and commonality between different denominational, ethnic and national Muslim groups, and impacts on the Muslim diasporic groups’ approach to the concept of diaspora. With this political and critical approach, one significant question emerges is there no term in the languages of the Muslim communities and minorities for the signification of diaspora and diasporic experience? Interestingly, the Arabic term “al-Shatat” which also signifies displacement and expulsion contains a similar meaning to diaspora (Kenny, 2013: 71).

Palestinians use that term to describe a process of expulsion on a colossal scale, the systematic depopulation of towns and villages, and the erasure of their history and culture. Many of the refugees have lived for generations in agonizing proximity to a homeland from which they are permanently excluded, even as Jews from all over the world enjoy a “right of return.” While these features are highly distinctive, the Palestinian case has several characteristics that fit within the familiar framework of diaspora. Catastrophic in origin, al-Shatat involved dispersal to multiple destinations at once and was accompanied by a strong sense of banishment and exile. (Kenny, 2013: 71)

However, some scholars advocate against the identification of Muslim communities and minorities as a Muslim diaspora. Silvestri (2016), for example, claims that the centrality of the transnational and de-territorialized dimensions of religion in the global articulations of Islam (stressed by Roy), “is not sufficient evidence that Muslims constitute a diaspora”. For Silvestri “the abiding territorial connection with the origins of a community” is definitive in deciding whether it is diaspora or not (319). Although later listing Muslim diaspora among the de-territorialized category others being victim, labour, imperial and trade. Cohen, on the other hand, argues, “religions generally do not constitute Diasporas in and of themselves” (cited in Vertovec, 2000: 10). Cohen describes religions at best as posing phenomena “cognate” to Diasporas. This is largely because religions often span more than one ethnic group and, in the case of faiths that have come to be widely spread around the globe, religions normally do not seek to return to, or to recreate, a homeland. From Cohen’s (1997: 189) perspective, while religions do not constitute diasporas themselves, they “can provide additional cement to bind a diasporic consciousness” (Vertovec, 2000: 10).

Given that many models and theories of diaspora underline or depart from a religious and theological starting point, due to the prominence of the Jewish, Greek, and Armenian paradigms (look at Annex-1), the marginalization and subordination of religion to ethnicity and nationality as pointed by Baumann (1998) is of interest (Vertovec, 2000: 8). It appears that the political gravity of ethnic and national association and connection has dwarfed the importance of religious binding. In the case of the Muslim diaspora, the picture becomes more complex since it is not only error-prone but also extremely difficult, if not impossible, to dissociate the political, national and ethnic from the religious binding here—from both etic and emic perspectives. This decidedly associative nature is one reason for the importance of the Muslim diaspora in diaspora scholarship. Others important elements can be listed as follows:
**Connecting:** From cyber-arranged marriages to Halal trip apps and 24/7 active online consulters, the Muslim diaspora is cyber-connected around the world. Muslims are arguably one of the most transnationally active, wired and cyber-connected groups among all Diasporas and thus provides an opportunity to examine the new interfaces and turns-faces of diasporic connection.

**Gendering:** The veil controversy in many non-OIC member countries, Muslim women’s comparatively more visible religious identity (because of their attires), and the domestic, normative and patriarchal positions and roles (as cultural carriers and preservers of ethno cultural identities) that they are placed in and shouldering, make the gender issue in the context of the diasporic Muslim communities much more important in comparison to other diasporic communities. Thus, the Muslim diaspora offers an unmatchable opportunity to investigate and analyse the gender dimension of diaspora.

**Blooming:** Because of the securitization agendas in the post 9/11 world and the rise of Islamophobia, Muslim communities and minorities began to work together generally in both political and organizational ways that brought about further connections and dialogues. A political will, interest, and direction towards solidarity and unity is emerging and the Muslim communities are going through what is referred to as an “expressional and illustrational stage” in which different aspects of diasporic character (their formation, formulation, construction, and effects) are becoming far more visible and noticeable. As a result, the Muslim diaspora offers a unique example to observe a diaspora in the process of blooming.

**Becoming:** Muslim writers, artists, and activists are describing what it is to be Muslim, to be immigrants, and to be diasporic from all corners of the world. They are narrating, composing, textualizing and performing their experiences and delineating the re-construction of a new global and diasporic Islamic identity. Analyses of these cultural, literary and artistic productions will help to explain the current Muslim diaspora and its dynamics. Even more importantly, they will also enable us to follow the steps of how a diaspora, a diaspora-in-becoming, is materially, literary, culturally, organizationally and symbolically produced and reproduced.

**Resolving:** The diaspora, as seen in almost all historical and contemporary examples, is a unique space to begin an international, interfaith and interethnic dialogue. Consequently, the Muslim diaspora is also an exceptional space for inter-communal dialogue to attempt to find solutions for the major crises facing the *Ummah* and the *Dunya*. Thus, it is essential that the Muslim diaspora be invited and included in the process of problem solving and peace building.
Demographic Profile

Examination of Muslims’ demographic profile in target countries brought up significant commonalities. One of them is the imprecision of official data. In almost all target countries of this study, official statistical data concerning Muslims were not accurate, regarding not only their numbers but also their ethnic and racial breakdown. Three major reasons could be underlined for this. In some target countries, for example, France, Spain, Japan, Argentina, and the United States collecting official data on ethnoreligious qualities of the population has been restricted/prohibited either constitutionally or officially. Moreover, in countries where it is non-prohibited the new influx of Muslims was not officially registered. Another reason is that some official statistics about Muslim demographics were released at the beginning of this decade. Therefore, this study had to use non-official survey sources to collect data on Muslim demographics. Since this study examined countries where Muslims are minorities, the findings show that their percentages are between 0.1-8%. More precisely, the percentages are in Britain 4.8%, South Africa 2.5%, Japan 0.15%, Canada 3%, Australia 2.5%, France 8%, Germany 6%, Spain 4%, the US 1.1%, Argentina 1.3%.

On the other hand, secondary literature, including official data, and field studies gave divergent results about Muslims’ numbers in target countries. This is because of the differences between official and unofficial survey results due to Muslim migration from Africa and problematic areas of the Middle East. In South Africa, the official number of Muslims in just over 1 million but interviewees stated that with the new Muslims from sub-Saharan African countries and Indian sub-continent and Pakistan, their percentage has now reached 3%, which is equal to 3, or even 4 million. In Japan, secondary sources give a very large interval on Muslims’ numbers estimating between 150,000 and 200,000. Some well-known researcher interviewees estimate that Muslims’ total number was 170,000 in 2016.

In Canada, representatives, scholars, and NGO’s of the Muslim community provided a variety of answers about the numeric presence of Muslims, ranging from half a million to more than 5 million. Yet, the National Household Survey of 2011 estimated Canadian Muslims’ number 1,053,945. In Germany, the interval of the Muslim population is even larger. The estimates are between 2.1 million to 5 million. In the US, the estimate of the unofficial data ranges from 2 million to more than 7 million. Muslim NGOs, research centres, academic and news articles are putting this number between 5 and 7 million. A similar discrepancy is observed in Argentina. Fieldwork data estimated the number of Muslims in the country between 450,000 and 900,000. Regarding the discrepancies, Spain is a bit different since the numbers from the fieldwork and official surveys were not significantly different, estimating the Spanish Muslims’ numbers between 1.5 and 2 million.
Ethnic/National Composition
A main commonality of Muslims’ national composition in target countries is their diversity. This makes it difficult to develop a comprehensive categorization of Muslims regarding their ethnic/national composition. In South Africa, Muslims could be categorized as Black African, Coloured, Indian/Asian, and White. In Britain, this categorization could be white (British, Irish, other white), mixed (White and the Black Caribbean, White and Black African, White and Asian), Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladesh, Chinese), all black (the Black Caribbean, Black African), and Arab. In Canada, this would be South Asians, Arabs, West Asians, and Blacks/Aboriginal. In Australia, a geographical categorization can be made, such as South Asian, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle Eastern. In France, this would be the Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Sub-Saharan Africans, and Turks. In Germany, a more country-oriented type of segregation could be drawn such as Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran, Morocco, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Syria. A similar type of segregation could be made for Spain; Morocco, Pakistan, Algeria, Senegal, Mali, Gambia, Bangladesh, Mauritania, and Syria. In the US, the segregation is more ethno-racial and broken down as Black, White, Asian, Arab, and Hispanic.

Another major finding is that there has been a significant increase in the Muslim population in target countries in the last decade. In South Africa, the rise in this number is due to the constant influx of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. In Britain, this rise has been due to Muslims’ high fertility rates. From 2001 to 2016, Muslims’ numbers rose from 1.55 million to 3 million. In Canada, from 2001 to 2011, the rise is 82%, which increased the Muslim population to 1,053,945 according to the Canadian National Household Survey, 2011. In France, a similar increase was the result of both high rates of fertility and continuous migration, especially the illegal migration from China and South East Asia, which was estimated at 60,000 in 2006. The increase in the French Muslim Population since the 1960s is also a result of high fertility rates and the continuation of migration via family reunification and marriage, skilled labour immigration, and political asylum. In Germany, there is a significant rise in Muslim population due to the asylum seekers from the Middle East. In Spain, the numbers are also rising due to the Spanish immigration boom between the late-1990s and 2010, and higher marriage and fertility rates among Moroccan Spaniards.

Regarding their in-country concentration, Muslims mainly prefer big metropolitans. In South Africa, Muslims are heavily populated in the Western Cape, in Britain in London, in Canada in the Greater Toronto Area and Montreal, in Australia in Sydney and Melbourne and in Argentina in Buenos Aires. The other important element of Muslim demographics in target countries is the age distribution. In many target countries, a great deal of Muslims (around 50%) is either young or at working age. Only a small percentage is senior or elderly. In Canada, according to the National Household Survey of 2011, the largest age group, between 24 and 45, comprise 35.9% of the Canadian Muslims. The second-largest group with 13.8% is the elementary and middle school children, and 10.7% of them are university students. Senior
Muslims comprise only 5.6% of the total Muslim population. Similarly, in Britain, the largest group is aged between 25 and 64 with 48%, and the second largest group is between the ages of 5 and 14 with 21%. The seniors over 65 only make up 4%. In Australia, according to the National Census in 2016, the highest concentration of Muslims is between the ages 20 and 39 with 233,458 out of 604,240. Similarly, in the US, the Muslim community is the youngest religious minority. The age group of 18 to 29 makes up 44% of the American Muslims.

Expectedly, some target countries have peculiarities regarding the demographics of their Muslim population. Japan is very formidable in this sense, where 40,000 of 170,000 Japanese Muslims are of Japanese origin. An interviewee from Japanese fieldwork claimed that this native Japanese Muslims’ number has reached 50,000, which means that one in every three Muslim is a Japanese convert. Many of these converts are highly educated individuals, which mean their conversion occurs after going through an extensive period of reading, research, and arbitration. This is a very significant peculiarity since the proportion of converted Muslims in countries like Germany, Britain, Canada, and Australia is almost negligible.

Another peculiarity is in Canada. Canadian government’s social security support system improved Muslims’ status drastically. The fieldwork revealed the fact that when the Muslims first came to Canada in the 1980s, they lacked premises to facilitate religious and cultural services. The interviewees stated that their first masjids were basements and houses but with the support, encouragement, and resources that were made available by the Canadian authorities, Canadian Muslims have managed to build their own mosques and cultural centres. France’s peculiarity is regarding Muslims’ numbers and geography they come from. The French population has the largest number of Muslims in Europe, 5 million, with the highest concentration from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

The peculiarity in Spain is the fast-growing number of Muslims. The fieldwork data showed the increase in Spanish Muslims’ numbers could increase the impact and significance of their demands. Their demands are expressible and are taken seriously only when there are a high number of claims. In the US, the peculiarity is the great number of native-born Muslims. Percentage wise, according to the available data, 89% of the Muslims in the US are American citizens.

Argentina’s peculiarity revolves around the decreasing number of Muslims. In 1991, Argentinean Muslims were 1.6% of the population, which decreased to 1.3% in 2010. This has been happening due to several reasons. Firstly, Muslims’ cultural elements, including food, drinks, and customs have been eroding. Secondly, publications on Islam in Spanish are very limited. Thirdly, because of mixed marriages younger Muslims lose their links to Islam. Another peculiarity has to do with the concept the Argentineans use to address the Muslims. Muslims are called Los Turcos due to the large influx of immigrants from Syria and Lebanon at the beginning of the 20th century when these were territories of the Ottoman Empire.
Religious Profile

The religious profiles of the Muslims in target countries are quite divergent which makes it inaccurate to categorize them under certain themes. Therefore, single country analyses would give outcomes that are more clear-cut. In South African Muslims’ profile, “Coloreds”, which are the Cape Malays, is a significant element. The number of Malays in the Cape is so formidable that this group is called Cape Malays or Cape Muslims. The members of “Coloreds” are almost 2 million and from Hottenton, Bantu, Malagasy, and East and South Asia. Another element of South African Muslims is their deep-rooted history. Muslims migrated to South Africa in three waves. The first one is the involuntary migration of political prisoners and exiles from today’s Malaysia. The second wave is the indentured labourers and traders from India to work in the sugar-cane fields in Natal province. The third wave is the African and Indo-Pakistani Muslims that migrated for primarily economic reasons after 1994. Islam in South Africa is estimated as the largest religion of conversion. Several NGOs, for example, the Islamic Dawah Movement of South Africa, the Africa Muslim Agency, and Islamic Propagation Centre International have been proselytizing in the region.

There are other socio-religious reasons for the rise of conversion in South Africa. Firstly, Islam offers a refuge from drug and alcohol, moral erosion and corruption. Secondly, Muslims institutions and organizations are actively preaching and spreading the Muslim faith in the country. Thirdly, Christianity’s controversial association with Apartheid and white supremacy brought about a loss in confidence in Christianity among Black Africans. Fourthly, a great deal of exiled South African students exposed to Islam during the Apartheid struggle. Finally, certain Muslim activists and organizations in the struggle against Apartheid played an important role, which increased their profile. In addition to them, Islamic education institutions, and the contributions and guidance of Islamic scholars, ulamas, and sheiks are critical in comprehending the success of Islam in South Africa. The effect of scholarly Islam increased especially with the influence of revivalist and modernist Muslim thinkers, visits by prominent scholars of Islam to South Africa, South African students’ interaction with Muslim students and intellectuals in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This is further boosted by the influence of the Muslim media and publications propagating a revivalist outlook. These two effects also resulted in a paradigm shift in South African Muslims’ Islamic identity, which is more identifying themselves within the global ummah rather than with their country of origin.

The religious profile of the Canadian Muslims reflects the vast number of Muslim migrants that came to the country due to Canada’s economic prosperity and advantages, educational opportunities, and the freedom of faith and expression granted under Canadian constitutional laws. As a result, several NGOs and education/research institutions representing Islam and providing Islamic education were opened in Canada. Every major Canadian city has more than one Islamic educational institution. Although Muslims’ largest migration influx was after the 1960s, Canadian Muslims’ historical presence in the country goes back to the mid-19th century when dozens of pioneering Muslims arrived from mainly the Levant region of the Ottoman Empire (today’s Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine), mostly seeking to find a new home.
and life. Another significant element of Canadian Muslim profile is that anti-Muslim backlash and Islamophobia have very faintly affected it due to the country’s commitment to the ideals and values of multiculturalism. Yet, the fieldwork underlined that after 9/11 this commitment was eased and Muslims, who were unnoticed for decades not only gained immense visibility but also became the subjects of scrutiny and surveillance. Hate crimes against Muslims, particularly women wearing the hijab, increased by almost 15%. Yet, the anti-Islamic discourse in Canada has never gained the popular appeal it has reached in the US. Organizationally and politically, Canadian Muslims have a strong bond with US Muslims, particularly via student associations.

British Muslims’ profile was firstly affected by Britain’s colonial history. Due to their experiences in the Muslim parts of the British Empire, the British inherited a positive image of Islam, which gave British Muslims almost unrestricted right and privileges like the other citizens of the British Commonwealth. This was shaken in the 1970s by the race-driven policies of immigration, which relied on British governments’ explicit concerns with “colored” immigration. Similar to the other target countries after 9/11, Muslims in Britain were also labeled as problematic. Especially the anti-immigrant far-right British National Party has been emphasizing an anti-Islam rhetoric.

French Muslims’ profile has very old historical roots, if not the oldest in Europe. The first touch of the Islamic tribes to today’s French geography was by Saracens around year 889 A.D. An indication of these roots were that the oldest mosque in Europe, Grande Mosquée de Paris was inaugurated in 1926. With the 1990s, French state’s scrutiny over the Muslims increased both due to the hijab issue and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group’s bombing in the Paris metro. Another element of French Muslims’ profile is “consular Islam”. Especially Algerian, Moroccan, and Turkish communities’ religiosity have been established and administered by their country of origin due to their strong links with their home countries. While French Muslims’ home countries have been administering their communities’ Islamic profile, the French state has been constructing a French form of Islam or Islam de France. Under this, the French state established the French Council of the Muslim Faith for balancing Muslims’ commitment to their faith and French identity. The above-mentioned countries’ consulates and the Council are still intermingling to develop a compromised understanding on a French form of Islam.

In Argentina, Muslims’ profile has a strong historical links with the migrants from ex-Ottoman territories in the mid-19th century. Although many of them are Arabs and almost 70% of them are Christians they are called “Turco(s)”. A significant element of Argentinean Muslims is their very low visibility in socio-cultural fabric. Only in a very short period during Carlos Menem’s presidency, Muslims moved almost to the center of politico-cultural agenda. Yet, after the 1992 and 1994 attacks on the Jewish community, Muslims’ profile was degraded under the influence of distrust and fear. With the 2010s, this influence was relieved and the younger generation of Argentinean Muslims are becoming more familiar with their roots.
In the general profile of German Muslims, Turks have a particular dominance. Iranian, Lebanese and Iraqis, together with Ahmadis from Pakistan are other elements of this profile. The Spanish Muslims’ profile has quite a long history although the numbers are relatively small compared with other European countries. Ideologically, Franco imposed state Catholicism deleted Spanish Islam’s institutionalization. The main reason for Muslims’ migration to Spain was the economic boom in the early 1980s. Therefore, the economic crisis in 2012 curbed the Muslims’ incoming. In general, the presence of Islam in the country is a “migrant Islam”, which affected the religious authority, community leadership, and the presence of actors in public debates. Yet, both officially and organizationally, Spanish Muslims developed a strong profile with 1,300 Islamic religious institutions, 1,274 mosques, and 42 Muslim federations. The Muslim community in Spain was one of the very early-recognized communities in Europe with an Agreement of Cooperation in 1992 underlining Islam’s role in the formation of Spanish identity. After 9/11, Spanish Muslims also faced discrimination in Spanish public space especially due to hijab and receiving permits for building new places of worship. Despite these restrictions, Muslims’ history is still very powerful and a distinguishing feature of the Spanish Muslims’ profile.

The background of Japanese Muslims’ profile relies on Turco-Tatar Muslim refugees from Central Asia and Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Another element of the Muslim profile in Japan is the knowledge on Islam due to research centres and associations focusing on Islam and the Islamic world. Another significant element of Japanese Muslims’ profile is the degree of religious freedom they enjoy regarding the strictly secular socio-political fabric. Although the legal and political framework is flexible, there is a lack of integration programs providing language courses as well as orientation and counselling services to the newly arriving immigrants, which makes the Japanese fabric less accommodating and promoting.

Muslims in Australia have a greater impact than their proportional makeup of the total population. Compared to other target countries, a larger percentage of Australian Muslims are from Asia, Europe, and Africa rather than the Middle East or Arabic countries. The Australian Muslim profile also has a long history going back to the 1500s relying on the sea trade between Australian Aborigines and the Makassans. Australian Muslims had gone through a strict anti-colour immigration ban between 1901 and the late-1960s until the Turkish-Australian bilateral treaty in 1967 to strengthen the labour force with unskilled migrants. Especially with the wider multiculturalist approach of the 1970s, the restrictions affecting Muslims’ immigration also relieved which gradually increased the numeric size of Muslim profile, especially in the late 1980s. A great percentage of current Muslim profile in Australia is skilled migrants, except the refugees from Somalia and Iraq.

In the US, the Muslim profile has deep historical roots tracing back to the 16th-century Muslim travellers, sailors, and slaves. A significant historical portion of the profile is the Africans who were brought to the US as slaves. American Muslims had a significant influence in the
American Civil War. In the 19th and the 20th centuries, the largest bulk of the Muslim profile was composed of the Yemenis and the Turks from the Ottoman Empire.

Some commonalities can be drawn regarding the analyses above. First, fieldworks of this study showed that regardless of their demographic ratio, a significant majority of the interviewees underlined the great importance of Islam in their lives. Although their ratio of going to the mosque everyday changes, they congregate regularly at Friday prayers. More generally, almost every target country’s Muslim profile has deep historical roots tracing back to politico-social turbulences. Muslims usually migrated to search for refuge and religious flexibility. Those migrations happened in waves. Especially in the 20th century, the economic boom triggered these waves that target countries experienced. The main expectation of Muslim migrants was to earn enough money in the host country then go back home. Yet, many of them stayed and became citizens of the host country, with which they formed the backbone of Muslim profile. Another commonality of the Muslim profiles in target countries was their diversity. In these profiles, some ethnonationalities could be a bit more populous than others could, but not very dominant. In almost all target countries, Muslim profiles have gone through different levels of discrimination, if not still. A major and a common cause in this was 9/11, which put almost all of these profiles under official and non-official scrutiny. Muslim profiles are also in a constant change with the rising awareness and education level of younger generations, although Argentina and Japan could be exceptions to that. With a better understanding of the socio-psychological fabric of the country, younger generations balance their Muslim identity with that of the host countries more successfully than their parents do.
4 Views on Migration and Integration

4.1. Experience of being a Member of the Muslim Community

In terms of experiencing being a Muslim, a foremost theme is to have smooth relations with the host society, the government, and other non-Muslim minorities. The workshop and the interviews of this study gave significant results about this matter. Beginning with South Africa, more than half of the workshop participants defined Muslims’ relations with the larger society as exceptionally good or good. Yet, a few stated that Apartheid continues to affect inter-religious and communal relations due to inter-racial tension, socio-economic disparities, communal nepotism, sectional loyalties, prejudices, and stereotypes. Yet this experience of Apartheid’s influence differs among communities. For example, the interviewees underlined that Malay Muslims in South Africa have better relations with their Christian neighbours than Indian Muslims’ do.

In Japan, according to the fieldwork interviewees, to have smooth relations with society Muslims’ occupation, language abilities, and general socio-economic status have particular importance. Yet, the lack of integration programs, such as free language courses, orientation and counselling services in Japan curbs Muslims’ potential to develop their socio-economic status. The main reason for the lack of integration programs is that Japan does not see itself as a permanent immigration country. Japanese governments rather tend to support short-term labour migration programs and do not put too much emphasis on integration policies and programs. On the other hand, native Japanese Muslims, or Japanese converts have better relations with the rest of society. The main reason is their high education and socio-economic level. Moreover, with extensive research, Japanese converts, unlike immigrated Muslims, manage to accommodate their Muslim identity smoothly in Japanese culture.

In France, the French state has been trying smoothly to stabilize the relations between the French Muslims and the rest of society. The French state has been following a policy of legitimizing the French Islamic community. This policy is predominantly aiming to reduce the influence of Muslim governments’ influence on French Muslims and reduce Islam’s growing weight and visibility in everyday life. Secondly, the French state views Muslims from a national security lens, which almost automatically perceives many Muslims as a threat. This also bolsters Muslims’ negative outlook towards the French official perspective. To render and ease this tension, the French government tries to construct up a French Islam.

In Germany, the host society has a tacit expectation from the Muslims to develop smooth relations with them. The expectation is that they will culturally adapt to the German values. The interviewees and workshop participants stated that the general argument about the so-called Muslims’ failure of integration is only a blame-shifting strategy and manipulative political tactic. According to the participants, the larger German society’s constant and systematic discrimination against Muslims because of their distinct cultures and religions,
denying their housing in the central areas and not employing or treating them on an equal footing with the natives and still expecting them to integrate fully does not seem fair. On the other hand, the majority of the Muslim community were born in Germany, German is their native language and they have lived in the German system for their entire lives, therefore, this expectation is somewhat irrational and axiomatic in nature.

In Spain, the interviewees claimed that general Spanish society is not particularly Islamophobic but there are segments in the society, which are. Moreover, non-Muslims are very reluctant to accept Muslim establishments in their neighbourhood, since these creations reduce their real estates’ economic value. If a Muslim group builds a mosque in a neighbourhood, it reduces the economic value of the rental market, which triggers reactions in the non-Muslim settlers of the area. In other words, refusing Muslim establishments in Spain does not mean that Spaniards are particularly Islamophobic.

In Australia, particularly until 9/11, Muslims were natural components of Australian society. The fieldwork showed that the first-generation Muslim migrants, especially the Lebanese, perceived themselves as guests but their children developed stronger attachments. This has become a general psychological tendency of Australian Muslims, which is that second and third-generation migrants have smoother relations with the general society with a higher level of Australian-ness.

In the US, the fieldwork showed that there is quite a positive picture regarding Muslims’ relations with the rest of society. Particularly for New York, the interviewees stated that New York is very liberal and people are used to interacting with Muslims every day without any serious issue, which makes Muslims feel comfortable compared to other states. Similar to Germany, the “melting pot” model in the US, expects all immigrants to assimilate, culturally at least to the American identity.

In Canada, interviewees’ statements showed that Muslim NGOs are becoming more and more open to working with other people. Particularly mosques are open to any faith to visit. The Canadian Muslims also organize quite a few activities for non-Muslims. This is an important change in the general outlook of the Canadian Muslims since for a long time they were very insular. With the heavy official emphasis on multiculturalism, the Canadian Muslims eventually began to get out of their shells, highlighting the multi-faith fabric of the country. The fieldwork also revealed an interesting point on Islamophobia. Although the Canadian Muslims experience discrimination and Islamophobia, their relations with the host society has still not much damaged since the Muslims refrain from making generalizations regarding the general society being racist or Islamophobic. The interviewees stated that the Islamophobic discourses in Canada have been mainly because of the influences of the US-prompted unfavourable media reports, which bind Muslims with terrorism and radicalization. Yet, due to the landmass and the population ratio of the country, these discourses do not hit the whole population. Even the large number of refugees does not threaten a large segment of the Canadian population. Another situation in Canada, which protects Muslims’ identity, is that the Canadian system does not expect immigrants to turn into Canadians, as the US does.
Muslim immigrants are entitled and encouraged to preserve their religious and cultural identities. This makes integration less of an issue for both Muslim immigrants. As a result, the Canadian officials and non-Muslim public are quite responsive to actions targeting Muslims via protecting their religious and ethnic rights.

In Argentina, the Arabs, the largest ethnic group of Muslims, integrate into the non-Muslim society quite quickly and effectively. Yet, in this integration, many of them could not protect their identity.

Another element of the experience of being a member of the Muslim community is the enjoyment of religious rights and liberties. In this sense, South Africa is a very significant example. Unlike most European countries where legal and political rights and freedoms are mitigated and practically complicated, South African Muslims enjoy their religious rights and liberties together with all other groups equally. South African interviewees summarized the politico-legal environment as accommodating, supportive and protective towards Muslims’ religious rights and expressions. Manifesting religious identity is also well protected by the South African constitution. Especially, after the Apartheid regime, Muslims started to enjoy an even more encompassing freedom of religion. In addition to religious rights, Muslims’ rights are protected in educational, cultural, linguistic, and organizational realms. Nonetheless, South African Muslims encounter some difficulties in their applications for registering their educational institutions. Yet, this does not affect the general influence of South African Muslim organizations on legal decisions affecting Muslims. For example, the interviews underlined that a school banned the wearing of the hijab among female students, but South African Islamic groups managed to channel sufficient pressure to have the case dropped in their favour. Similarly, in Japan, the interviewees expressed the high degree of religious freedom they enjoy. They also underlined the positive outlook of the Japanese legal and political context vis-à-vis the Japanese Muslims. Although the constitutional guarantees regarding legal, political, and religious freedoms are comprehensive, some of them remain on paper.

In Germany, the interviewees and workshop participants claimed that the constitutional structure in Germany and the far-reaching rights provided for individuals as well as religious communities offer many advantages for German Muslims. Yet in a societal sense, German Muslims’ activities are that well received. German society perceives Muslims’ activities related to Islam as religious, not cultural, and therefore not very acceptable. This unacceptance also turns into an expectation of German society. The participants stated that some Germans were expecting Muslims to suddenly change and forget about their religious differences and sensitivities as if touched by a magic wand.

In Britain, the interviewees and workshop attendees expressed divergent views about Muslims’ enjoyment of religious rights and liberties. Some underlined a high degree of praise for their lives, particularly regarding the freedom of speech, equality before the law, being treated with dignity and respect as a human being. The respondents suggested that being a Muslim is much better in Britain than being a Muslim in any Muslim-majority country. Yet,
some others stated freedom and equality stated on British legal documents and everyone in practice did not always experience the customary law. On the other hand, almost all of them are content about the welfare state approach in Britain, especially regarding free education, health service, and housing.

In Spain, particularly towards the end of the 1980s, the Islamic reality was opened to discussion and negotiation. On 26 November 1992, a new politico-legal process, with the notario arragio (meaning deeply rooted) agreement was started. The agreement was the first official recognition of Islam and the Muslim community by a European state, following Austria. Spain recognized the Islamic reality with 14 articles dedicated to rights, benefits, and protection of the Muslim community. Yet, some interviewees still stated that the majority of Muslims in Spain are either unaware of the rights that were granted in the 1992 agreement, or, simply making excuses instead of demanding them.

In the US, some interviewees claimed that the US is the best country for Muslims to live in due to the extent of Muslims’ enjoyment of their rights. Although this is a big statement, their overwhelming view is that the freedom of speech, religion, and worship in the US creates a potentially a very good environment for Muslims. The interviewees in the US also emphasized opportunities regarding education. They said regardless of religious identity, anyone could access the best, elite US universities, which could open the best job opportunities. On the other hand, they do not dismiss the challenges such as bigotry, Islamophobia and anti-Muslim bias.

In Canada, the respondents also drew a very positive image by labelling Canada as being one of the most accommodating political and legal contexts for Muslims. Cultural and religious rights are effectively practiced in daily life and very few of them stay on paper. The interviewees claimed that in all three levels of government, federal, provincial, and municipal, Muslims’ relations with official bodies are very good. The legal and political framework is quite accommodating for the Muslims.

Another major theme is the Muslims’ experience in target countries of halal consciousness. This consciousness and consumption of halal products is high in countries with well-functioning and established Muslim organizations. They control the certification, supervise and inspect the halal market, and raise awareness about halal culture and promote halal consumption. Particularly in South Africa, these organizations control the certification, and supervise and inspect the halal market, and also are actively working on raising awareness about halal culture and promoting halal consumption. With these activities, the organizations claim that they are advocating for Muslim dietary and religious rights. In Spain, even if Muslims economic contribution is mainly restricted to agriculture and construction, they have also been contributing to the development of the Spanish economy through halal business significantly. There are three major halal certification and accreditation bodies in Spain and now these bodies preparing to open branches in Guatemala and Argentina. Currently, there are over 50.000 people involved in the halal business as either human resource team members and supervisors or slaughterhouse workers.
Another important theme to consider is the effect of legal regulations and organizations on migrants, and particularly Muslims. One likeness is this sense that only very few target countries enacted specific acts regulating Muslims’ affairs. Through these regulations, Muslims can benefit from better organizational rights and freedoms. On the other hand, what some of the target countries do are state-oriented Muslim organizations acting as interlocutors. In South Africa, the law does not require religious groups and organizations to register; however, once registered, such groups and non-profit organizations can qualify as public benefit organizations, which allow them to open bank accounts and exempts them from paying income tax. The law also enables them to be multi-centered and multi-faceted. With this South African Muslim, organizations are in very close touch with their respective communities.

In France, a state-established and oriented body of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) serves as an official interlocutor with the state in the regulation of Islamic worship and public ritual practices. The Council is an outcome of the French state’s above-mentioned conceptualization of French Islam. The Council monitors and adapts Islam to French values. To an extent, it institutionalizes Islam in the French social sphere.

A similar structure also operates in Germany, called the German Islamic Conference. Although its structural origins are different from the French Council, the Conference also maintains Muslim communities’ communication with the German state. Moreover, in Germany, communities needed to organize and mobilize themselves if they demanded anything from the officials. If they are organized effectively and demand legally, it is relatively easy in Germany. Yet, because of their dividedness and problems of representation, Muslim organizations are not that successful in achieving their demands.

In Spain Casa Arabe, a state-organized Islamic cultural center, presents Islam to the Spanish citizens as an internal element of Spanish society and culture. Since the number of Muslims is growing significantly in the country, the Spanish state took it seriously to introduce Islam to Spanish people, to show them the peaceful and tolerant faces of Islam, which is still insufficiently known in Spain and other European countries.

### Advantages of living in that country for Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantage</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Prosperity</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious and Cultural Freedom</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education System</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democratic System and Human Rights</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare State</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful Integration and Cohesion Policies</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n = 7,147; respondents were from UK, Germany, France, Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina

The GMD Surveys that were conducted in both phases of the research included a large number of questions on the experience of being a member of the Muslim community in the
respective countries investigated. One common question was the advantages and disadvantages of the country for the Muslims living in it. The respondents were asked to provide up to three answers for this question in each survey. In both phase countries, Muslims appear to emphasize different factors as the most important advantages in their respective host countries. In Phase I countries, while the most frequently cited advantage changed from country to country, the second most important advantage for Muslims was invariably reported as ‘religious and cultural freedom’. As the most important advantage, Muslims in the UK singled out the strong democratic system and human rights in the country, those in Germany emphasized the German welfare state as the most important advantage, while the Muslims in France slightly favoured the education system as the most important advantage of France for Muslims.

The Muslims surveyed in the second phase of the study very clearly emphasized the importance of economic prosperity as a very important advantage of their respective countries for the Muslims living in them. In fact, it was reported as the most important advantage in Australia, Japan, and Canada, while cited second most frequently in Spain, USA, and Argentina. The only country where the Muslims did not cite economic prosperity in the top two responses was South Africa, where the relatively affluent Muslim community appears to value religious and cultural freedom and protection of human rights more than the economy. Apart from Argentina, where the Muslims also appear to value religious and cultural freedom more than economic prosperity, the only other exceptional case was the US, where the participants of the survey suggested that the American education system was the most important advantage for the Muslims in this country.

The survey respondents in both surveys were also asked questions about how much importance they give to Islam as a religion. The survey respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of several things including religious practice and rituals for a Muslim. In all 10 countries in both phases, the respondents suggest that religion is either important or very important for them.
Next, the respondents were asked to what extent they believe that they were fulfilling the requirements of being a Muslim. Here, the responses again converge, although this time seemingly at a lower average. In the 1st phase countries of the UK and Germany, the greatest numbers of Muslim respondents suggest that they fulfil the requirements of being a Muslim on a level that is above average, followed by the second largest group of respondents who reported fulfilling religious requirements to an average extent. The exception was France, for which it was vice versa: the largest group of Muslim respondents suggested fulfilling religious requirements to an average extent while a smaller number said they were fulfilling requirements of being a Muslim on an above-average degree.

In 5 out of 7 countries, the most frequently given answer was ‘average’. The other popular response, most often provided as the second most frequently given one, was ‘above average’. One outlier country appeared to be Japan, where the greatest number of respondents suggested that they believe they fulfil the requirements of being a Muslim to a ‘very high’

To what extent do you believe you fulfill the religious requirements of being a Muslim?

- Very Low: 2.5%
- Below Average: 7.7%
- Average: 38%
- Above Average: 23%
- Very High: 18.5%

Note: n = 3,063; respondents were from UK, Germany, France, Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina

extent, while the second most popular response was ‘above average’. Another interesting finding was from Canada, where the second most frequently given answer to this question was ‘below average’, the only instance of this in all 10 country surveys.

The respondents were further asked about how often they go to the mosque to pray. The purpose was to get a sense of objective behaviour that is beyond the subjective evaluation of the respondents. The average response in the 10 countries appeared to be around ‘once a week for Jum’ah’, with comparable numbers of respondents on either side. However, it is noteworthy that a greater number of respondents particularly in South Africa, Spain, and Japan suggested going to the mosque to pray more frequently than once a week.

A group of questions that were introduced in the second phase of the study aimed to gather more detailed information about Muslims’ experiences as migrants in their respective host countries. These included questions concerning the reasons of emigration (i.e. why they left their
countries of origin) as well as reasons of immigration (i.e. why they chose to come to this country and not to another) together with what kind of problems they experience as migrants in these countries. It needs to be highlighted here that these questions were only asked to the relevant participants. In other words, if a respondent suggested that he/she is an indigenous citizen of a country living there for centuries or that he/she is a converted Muslim without a country of origin, irrelevant questions about migration experience were not asked.

In terms of reasons for emigration, such as why the respondents (or, in some cases, their parents who emigrated from the perceived country of origin) moved away from their countries of origin, there is an unmistakable emphasis on economic reasons. In fact, in all phase II countries except Canada economic reasons were suggested most frequently as the motivation for emigration. In Canada, where the economic reasons moved to become the second most frequently cited reason, political reasons were suggested as the most important motivation for emigration, by a huge margin. Educational reasons were also frequently suggested in many countries, which suggested that many Muslims emigrate from their origin countries in search of good education opportunities. Lastly, a significant number of respondents suggested that their emigration was motivated by family-related reasons, reminding that migration is very rarely an individual decision, but it is usually a household or family-level strategy.

Having covered the ‘push factors’, such as factors that motivate individuals to emigrate from a certain context, the survey proceeded to understand the main ‘pull factors’ (the factors that motivate individuals to choose a specific context over others as the destination for their movement). Here again, it is easy to see the dominance of economic reasons in making the decision for migration for a majority of the respondents. In all 2nd phase countries, the economic reasons were either the most or second

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### Problems faced by immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language Problems</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Problems</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems with Lifestyle</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Problems</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Problems</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological Problems</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Problems</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n = 703; respondents were from Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina.

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most frequently cited reason for immigration. In three countries, (Australia, Canada, and the US) the most frequently given response was ‘political reasons’. It is not surprising that the Muslims in these three ‘traditional immigration countries’ found them to be the most politically accommodating. In fact, because of the prominence of migration and migrants in the history of these three countries, the Muslims suggest the reasons related to the political structures of these countries were the most important reasons for their migration. A third important reason for immigration appears to be the reasons concerning the family, which was given by a very significant number of respondents. This, again, shows the importance of family in making migration-related decisions. Also, in many cases, migrants follow the footsteps of family members and other earlier migrants that they know while making their decisions.

The survey respondents were further inquired about the problems they encounter as migrants in their respective countries. Here, the most frequently cited problem was a logistical one in its nature. Overall, the most often suggested problems were those of language. In other words, the respondents said that they suffer from language problems, as the top or second top answer.

In combination, the second most often cited problem encountered by Muslim migrants were the ‘cultural problems’ and ‘the problems concerning the lifestyle’. In 5 of the 7 phase II countries, these were either the most frequently or the second most frequently suggested problems of Muslim migrants. Another significant problem appears to be related to the economic problems in many countries as well as the usually relatively low socio-economic status of Muslim communities. In Canada, the US and Argentina ‘financial problems’ were most frequently suggested by Muslim migrants. Overall, out of the 10 countries, language and financial problems dominated the problems faces by Muslim diaspora communities.

Have the Muslims adapted to the life in the countries they live? The survey respondents were asked this question next. They were given a statement that most Muslims have successfully adapted to the way of life in the country and asked to what extent they agreed.

‘Most Muslims in this country have successfully adapted to the customs and way of life here’?

- Totally Agree (16%)
- Tend to Agree (40.2%)
- Neither (24.2%)
- Tend to Disagree (12.6%)
- Totally Disagree (3.8%)

Note: n = 2,688; respondents were from Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina

There appears to be a strong tendency in all countries to agree with this statement. Those who ‘tend to agree’ with the statement were either the majority or the second largest group in all countries. The highest degree of agreement came in South Africa and Canada, where
sizable numbers of respondents totally agreed that most Muslims, in fact, have successfully adapted to the customs and lifestyle in these countries. It is also noteworthy that not in a single country people who disagreed with this statement were in the majority or even comprised the second largest group.

Another aspect of the experience of being a Muslim in these countries is how the representatives of the national and local government bodies are treating them in the public sector. When the respondents were asked to ‘grade’ the treatment of Muslims in the country from ‘excellent’ to ‘very poor’, the unanimous response was the one in the middle: “OK”. In other words, in all seven countries, the respondents suggested that the way the Muslims were treated in the public sector was OK. The general tendency, it could be added, was towards the positive, since the second most crowded group of respondents graded the treatment of Muslims as ‘good’. Only in Japan, a significant number of respondents stated that the treatment of Muslims in the public sector in Japan was ‘poor’.

One significant issue that has come to prominence in recent years is the halal food issue. Many Muslim minority communities living in non-Muslim majority contexts find it difficult to access to halal food, while many non-Muslim countries as well as private sector actors started giving more importance to the halal food needs of the Muslims worldwide. Therefore, the respondents were asked two questions about this issue. First, they were asked how sensitive they are about halal food and how frequently they actively look for halal products when they are shopping for food.

The data presented in the above tables clearly show that a vast majority of the respondents are ‘always’ considerate about shopping halal products and that they are willing to buy more costly products for this. Lastly for this section, the respondents were asked given all the advantages and problems of the country for its Muslim inhabitants, whether they would recommend another Muslim to immigrate and live in the same country. An indication of an overall positive evaluation, a large majority of the respondents said that they would. A much smaller group in each country suggested that they would not be willing to make such a recommendation yet they would remain neutral. Only in South Africa, around 18% of the respondents suggested that they would not advise another Muslim to come and live in South Africa.
4.2. Sense of Belonging

The main element of Muslims’ sense of belonging is the level of inclusiveness. The fieldwork showed that one element maintaining this has been the collaboration between legal framework and socio-psychological patterns, which accommodates all religions. In South Africa, the interviewees underlined Muslims’ harmonious coexistence with South African society and the government. This is because of the exceptional inclusiveness of South African legal and political framework. In France this sort of inclusiveness is non-achievable. The interviewees stated that living in an Islamic society in France is only an ideal. What they live in France is a diluted Islam. Muslims need to curb their daily practices for not to face unfavourable reactions in the workplace. In Australia, general claim about the Muslims is that later generations’ level of inclusiveness is higher than their parents’ generation. Yet, this generalization relies on the skills and knowledge of these later generations. Some do not have relevant skills and knowledge including education and language required to adapt into Australian society. In the US, Muslims’ inclusiveness is quite high. The interviewees stated that Muslims could be seen at every position and institution, including but not limited to police officers, politicians, doctors and workers. Especially Muslim professional sportsmen are more influential in making the larger society see and normalize Muslims’ presence in the society.

Another element is the general society’s accommodation of Muslims. In South Africa, the interviewees stated that most of the segments of the non-Muslim society have grown up with Muslims and are familiar with Islam. Although this is the tendency of the majority, the global anti-Muslim sentiments and Islamophobia affect some non-Muslim elements. In France, general society’s accommodation was dented because of the fundamentalist expression of Islam in the ghettos with the increasing unemployment of Muslim youth. This is bolstered with the clash between the French state and the Muslims on several issues, such as the hijab. With the 1990s, hijab then all face coverings were banned in French schools and official space. Unlike Anglo Saxon multiculturalism, France accommodates Muslims within the framework of a unilateral republicanism and laïcité.

Muslim NGOs and Imam’s social and educative efforts also affect Muslim communities’ sense of belonging. In South Africa, these efforts go back to Islamic education and the founding fathers who were the first Islamic instructors and leaders, such as Tuan Guru and Abu Bakr Effendi. Moreover, in the khutbas Muslim imams and instructors put a great emphasis on this sense of belonging via inter-communal relationship. Educative efforts are significant in Japan as well, although there are more personal. Especially Japanese converts decide to be a Muslim after serious research and arbitration. As a result, they elegantly build their Muslim identity with minimal, if any, tension with their Islamic identity. In Canada, some mosques organize their cafeterias as social engagement and activism platforms for their communities. They also provide free food for those in need, Muslim and non-Muslim. This is extended to providing shelter to homeless people at storm and freezing temperatures. Canadian Muslim NGOs also organize yearly events called Building Bridges bringing around 500 people from different faith groups, such as Christians, Jews, Bahia, and Sikhs to demonstrate their faiths’ true nature. In
Argentina, mosques, women’s groups, directories, commissions, and youth groups act as platforms for reproducing and presenting Islam. These presentations are less ethnic than general. Even for Argentinean mosques, ethnicity has a minor importance.

In the sense of belonging, marriage is another factor. Recognition of Islamic marriage by host country is an important sign of the accord between the country’s legal provisions and Muslim Civil Law. In Japan, this is particularly significant. A significant number of Japanese Muslims chose Islam after marrying a Muslim. This increases the number of mixed families where one spouse is a Muslim of immigrant origin and the other is ethnic Japanese, which intensify the interactions between Japanese Muslims and immigrants. In South Africa, marriage is also an important element, but so far, Islamic marriages are not officially recognized. In the US, the fieldwork showed that inter-cultural marriages within/out the Muslim communities which is bridging and blending Muslim and non-Muslim communities. In Argentina, inter-faith marriages caused the erosion of Muslims’ religious values than increasing their belonging to the Argentinean society.

In the GMD Surveys, sense of belonging was an important question. The respondents were asked about their sense of belonging to five different categories on a scale from weakest to strongest. These were ‘Islam’, the country in which they live, the origin country, ‘Europe’, ‘Ummah’ and the ethnic group of the respondent.

The strongest sense of belonging in France, UK and Germany were reported for Islam. Other than that, the respondents suggested a healthy level of belonging to most other categories in the UK, Germany and France. Among the three, Muslims in the UK reported the weakest overall sense of belonging to the suggested categories. The weakest sense of belonging in the UK survey was reported for ‘Ummah’ while for the origin country, Europe and respective ethnic groups of the responses did not seem to invoke a strong belonging in the UK. In Germany and France, the respondents displayed a comparatively stronger sense of belonging along the spectrum. One notable point of divergence in Germany was the relatively lower sense of belonging to ‘Europe’ among the Muslims. In the Phase II surveys, the categories asked for this question were reduced to three. Firstly, to see them in a comparative perspective, respondents were asked to evaluate their sense of belonging to their country of residence and country of origin. Then, the respondents were separately asked to evaluate their sense of belonging to their ethnic group.

The surveys produced diverse results for this question. The strongest sense of belonging to the countries of residence are recorded in Canada, the US, and Argentina. In Canada, more
than 86% of the respondents reported either a strong or a very strong sense of belonging to Canada. Similarly, more than 81% of the respondents suggested a strong or very strong sense of belonging to Argentina, while this combined number accounted for almost 65% of the

- 38.5% To the country they are currently residing in
- 38.9% To their/their parents’ country of origin
- 39.5% To their ethnic group

Note: \( n = 3,114; n = 2,630; n = 3,121 \); all the respondents were from UK, Germany, France, Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina

survey respondents in the US. Interestingly, in all these three countries, the sense of belonging to origin countries were also reported to be either strong or very strong by, albeit smaller, majorities of the respondents. Apart from these, slight majorities of the respondents in South Africa and Australia suggested a strong sense of belonging to their respective origin countries, while most other respondents reported neither strong, nor weak belonging to countries of residence and origin.

The picture is somewhat different when the same respondents were asked about their sense of belonging to their respective ethnic groups. Without exception, the greatest number of respondents in all seven Phase II countries reported either a strong or a very strong sense of belonging to their ethnic groups. The strongest responses were recorded in Japan and South Africa, where the combined numbers of respondents who replied ‘strong’ and ‘very strong’ accounted for more than 78% and 76%, respectively. The weakest sense of belonging to ethnic groups was reported in Australia, where only around 1/3 of the respondents suggested a strong or a very strong sense of belonging to their ethnic groups.

4.3. Discrimination and Violation of Rights

One significant element is the difference between actual and procedural rights. Even if Muslims, or in general minorities’ rights, are well described and designed in the legal and constitutional framework of the target country. In practice, they are well practiced in the official and public realm. In Britain, some interviewees stated that distinguishing procedural and actual rights is important particularly in political participation and representation. Muslims are free to participate in politics but this is qualified by practices, which work to effectively exclude them. There are several practices preventing Muslims’ exercise of political
freedoms, such as passport revocation, temporary exclusion orders, secret trials and special advocates as well as counter-terrorism legislation.

Similarly, in Spain, the 1992 Agreement established 14 articles, which officially recognized Muslim cemeteries, mosques and their access to halal food. Yet, several issues rose in the application of the agreement. These could be listed as Spanish official authorities semi-failure to deal with the ever-fast growth of the Muslim population; the Spanish and Muslim authorities, individuals, institutions, and organizations’ lack of knowledge and conscious or unintentional ignorance; the official and societal reluctance towards the implementation mainly due to the rising anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments and the internalized discrimination; and the disengagement and the lack of assertion among certain sectors of the Muslim community because of the learned helplessness, marginalization and discrimination.

The increased threat perceptions after 9/11 towards Muslims have been the main global trend for discrimination. Almost all target countries followed this trend, although with varying intensity. In some of them, attacks against certain nationalities or communities are linked with Islamic groups, which aggravated discrimination against general Muslim society. In France, the riots in 2005 made the French government tighten the grip on Muslims’ mobilization and organization. They also encouraged the already active stereotypes of Muslims to be more widespread and harsher. Especially after the Charlie Hebdo attack, French official and social pressure increased not only on the Muslim identity but also on its practices.

In Spain, the interviews revealed the fact that the unfair and discriminatory approaches against Muslims create a reluctance in their integration efforts. One very clear example of this discrimination is obtaining Spanish citizenship. For immigrants coming from Spanish speaking countries and old Spanish colonies, the residency requirement in Spain is only two years before their application for citizenship. Immigrants from the rest of the world, Moroccans, because most immigrants come from Morocco, it is 10 years. This affects Muslims’ inclusiveness. The interviews showed that Muslims in Spain do not try harder to integrate because they do not feel included. This makes them socially detached and disengaged.

In Australia, the effect of 9/11 has been very clear. Since Australia closely follow the US in both its foreign policy and threat perceptions, radical Islam took a central place in Australian national security almost immediately after 9/11. The interviewees repeatedly stated that until 9/11 people in Australia were unconcerned about Muslims, in both their faith and daily practices. Muslims used to be just another migrant community, nothing special, nothing more, nothing less. After 9/11, Muslims have been under the spotlight regarding to, even, their Australian-ness. Many of them have been categorized as the “other”.

The US gives us the clearest example of the 9/11 effect. The fieldwork confirmed that even before 9/11, there has been discrimination against Muslims, but after the tragic event, it became more acceptable, politically and even socially, to express your anti-Muslim sentiments publicly. With Donald Trump’s Presidency, the environment in the US has become even more challenging for the Muslims. An interesting detail about the US is that Muslims do
not face the same level of Islamophobia in every state. Interviewees stated that Southern states pose stronger Islamophobia than northern and more liberal states like New York.

Even in Canada, where the respondents did not specify Islamophobia as the main challenge, there has been a scapegoat populism towards the religious and racial other. This has resulted in numerous instances of hate speech, violence, persecution, and discriminatory actions against the Muslims. The gravest instances were mosque vandalisms, and attacks, which ended up in serious casualties. In some target countries, even before 9/11, there has been clear discrimination against Muslims. This usually operates under the expectation of not displaying any religious symbols or practices in the official and to an extent public domain. In Germany, the Neutralization Act of Berlin is one such example. The Act aims to prevent the display of any religious symbols, including the headscarf, in the workplace and public institutions. According to the interviewees, this Act creates another victim, sets another boundary, promotes and endorses another prejudice: that a woman in a headscarf is suppressed and therefore is a bad influence. This law also encourages co-workers to discriminate against their veiled colleague.

Another issue is that due to Muslim populations’ rapid increase, host societies see them as scapegoats for rising unemployment and crime rates. Particularly in France, the more funds were dragged out of the French budget for covering unemployment with social security payments, the more wobbles in the economy are being induced, which also means that more pressure is being exerted on the Muslims.

In Phase I countries, the main disadvantage for Muslims was unanimously reported to be ‘racism and Islamophobia’. This finding makes sense in Europe where a steady increase in right-wing populism, anti-immigration discourses and xenophobia has been observed for some years. Therefore, Muslims in the UK, Germany and France suggest that the very first main disadvantage for them as a Muslim to live in these countries is racism and Islamophobia that they face. The other main disadvantages for Muslims in these countries are also related to discrimination by the society and discrimination by the state. The economic troubles, which appear to be seen as much more important problems for other Muslim minorities are not considered such significant issues in these three major European countries.
As it was indicated above, the situation is somewhat more complicated in the more diverse Phase II countries. Firstly, racism and Islamophobia are certainly important issues in these countries as well. In Australia, Spain and the US surveys, racism and Islamophobia were cited most frequently as the major problem encountered by the Muslims in these countries. Significant numbers of respondents in all countries gave the same response. What distinguishes Phase II countries from the Phase I ones is the predominant place of economy and economic troubles of Muslims. As the main problems experienced by Muslims, a large number of respondents, particularly in Japan, Spain, Canada and Argentina, mentioned either the negative economic situation that they are experiencing or unemployment. One exceptional case that stands out in this question was South Africa, where the Muslim community reports suffering most intensely from crime and lack of security.

The survey in the second phase also included more direct questions on the experiences of discrimination by Muslim communities. In particular, the respondents were asked whether they have experienced discrimination because of their identities in the past 12 months. It was encouraging to find that, apart from a small number of exceptions, a majority of Muslim respondents in all seven countries reportedly have not experienced discrimination. Yet, as the data shows, the number of respondents who suggested that they were discriminated against is still significant, particularly in some categories. For instance, somewhere between 15 and 25% of the respondents in most countries reported having experienced discrimination based on their ethnic and religious identities. Experiences of discrimination because of language are also common albeit reported on a lesser extent. In Japan, particularly, a majority of the respondents suggested that they were in fact discriminated against on the basis of their Muslim identity and lack of linguistic abilities. On the other hand, discrimination because of age, gender, and disability is reported to be low.
Those respondents who suggested that they experienced discrimination were further probed whether they reported these experiences to relevant authorities. The overwhelming response was a negative one. In fact, the number of individuals who said that they have reported their experience of discrimination were never more than 12% of the respondents with experiences of discrimination. This might show an unwillingness on the part of Muslims to voice their experiences of discrimination, motivated either by a sense of powerlessness or vulnerability or a lack of knowledge about their rights and the legal system in these countries. National, international, and NGO parties, therefore, need to take into consideration this silence on the part of victimized individuals.

Apart from these concrete experiences of discrimination, the respondents were also asked whether they felt being looked down because of the Muslim identity. From the survey data, it
appears that Muslims in Spain are the ones that feel this way most seriously. In fact, a combined 67% of the respondents in Spain suggested that some people look down on them because of their religious identity. A similar observation, albeit to a lesser extent, could be made about Japan, where more than half of the respondents reported the same feeling of being looked down because of their Muslim identity. While all other country surveys also find a similar tendency of a large number of respondents to agree with this statement, only those respondents in Canada and the US decisively disagreed. A combined almost 80% of respondents in Canada and over 60% in the US suggested that they did not believe that some people look down on them because they are Muslim. In total, nearly 30% of the respondents tend to agree that they have been looked down upon because of their religious identity.

### 4.4. Opinions of the Muslim Communities

The surveys in both phases of the GMD research included a significant number of questions that were designed to collect information that reflect the views and opinions of the Muslim communities in the target countries. In some cases, these questions were framed in the form of, somewhat provocative, statements and asked the respondents to mention to what extent they agreed or disagreed with that statement.

One such statement in the Phase I survey concerned the view of respondents on the compatibility of Muslim identity with British, German, or French identities, depending on the survey country. In all three European countries, the larger numbers of respondents found them to be compatible. In other words, in the UK, Germany, and France, the majorities of respondents suggested that they did not see any contradiction or disagreement between the Muslim identity and the British, German, and French identities.

When the respondents were asked a further question concerning integration, a more mixed finding was obtained. This time, the respondents were asked whether they agreed that it was not possible for a migrant to integrate in the country of residence while at the same time sustaining relations with his/her country of origin. In other words, the question aimed to pose actions, related to sustaining relations and integrating in the country, instead of a more abstract evaluation of identities. In the UK and France, a
majority of the respondents disagreed, by a much larger margin being in the latter country. In other words, the majority of respondent in both of these countries suggested seeing no contradiction between integration and sustaining relations with the country of origin. However, the situation was remarkably different in Germany. Here, a combined over 60% of the respondents suggested agreement, which meant that they did agree that it was not possible for a migrant to integrate while sustaining relations with the country of origin. This shows that, while the Muslims in Germany see no contradiction between the Muslim identity and German identity in principle they do believe that sustaining relations would hamper Muslims’ integration to German society.

Next, the respondents were asked whether they observed a change in their respective countries in the last years. First, they were asked whether they believed that the government practices towards Muslims are deteriorating in the last decade. Then, they were asked whether they believe that practicing Islam in the country is getting more difficult in recent years. For both questions, the Muslims in the UK responded most positively. For the first question, a very large number of respondents in London disagreed that British government’s practices were getting significantly worse off, while a tiny minority agreeing with this statement. For the second one, again, a large segment of the respondents did not agree that practicing Islam in the UK was getting more difficult, although some 15% of the respondents reported agreement with the statement this time. More than 26% of the total respondents in the three countries agreed that practicing Islam was getting more difficult.
Germany appeared to occupy the middle ground for both questions. A majority of respondents were not negative about the changes related to government policies towards Muslims or the ease with which to practice Islam in Germany. Survey respondents in France, however, were the most decisively negative on these two questions. More than 70% of the respondents suggested that the French governments’ practices towards the Muslims in the country have got significantly worse in the last decade, while almost 70% suggested that they feel practicing Islam in France is getting more difficult in recent years.

Next, a number of questions asked the respondents to evaluate different contexts in a comparative way. Firstly, the respondents were asked to compare the country in which they live and their country of origin on the amount of religious rights that are available for them in both contexts. Respondents in Germany and France decisively disagreed with the statement that there were more religious rights in Germany and France, than the respondents’ countries of origin. The respondents in the UK were not as straightforward with their comparison. A massive 82.7% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement, while comparable numbers of minority respondents either agreed or disagreed.

The theme of comparisons continued with the question that asked respondents to compare their countries of residence in terms of equality, freedom and rights that are accorded to Muslims, this time, with a number of countries. When comparing their country of residence with the US, the British and the German survey respondents suggested that, they were better, while the French appeared to believe they were very similar. The survey respondents in the UK and France, on the other hand, believed that Muslims had better freedom and rights in Muslim countries, while respondents in Germany disagreed.

**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of religious equality, freedom, and rights as compared to:</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Same/Similar</th>
<th>Worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Countries</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Origin</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Countries</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n = 2,066; respondents were from UK, Germany, and France

43%

21% people totally **disagree** and 22% disagree that there are more religious rights for Muslims in this country compared to their country of origin

Note: n = 473; respondents were from UK, Germany, and France
One comparable question that was asked in the second phase of the study asked whether the members of the Muslim community are accepted and treated as full-fledged citizens in their respective countries of residence. In most countries, the general picture was a positive one with larger numbers of respondents agreeing with the statement compared to those who disagreed. The agreement was strongest in three countries in particular, namely South Africa, Canada, and the USA. The only exception where a higher number of the respondents did not think that Muslims were accepted and treated as full and complete citizens compared to the number of those who did was Spain. 55% of the respondents in the seven countries agreed or tended to agree that Muslims are accepted as full-fledged citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of trust</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Muslim Leaders</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Government</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of Muslim Countries</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n = 2,552; respondents were from UK, Germany, and France

### 4.5. Trust in Institutions among Muslims

The issue of trust, particularly in institutions, is very important for minority communities. Therefore, there were questions designed to measure trust and confidence of Muslim communities in both phases of the study. In the Phase I survey, the respondents were provided with a list of countries, organizations, and institutions, and were asked to describe the level of their trust in them on a scale from ‘very weak’ to ‘very strong’. The tendency of the respondents in all three countries were neither trusting nor distrusting the majority of national and international actors.

Only the Muslims in Britain displayed a strong level of trust to their government, while the weakest level of trust to the national government was recorded in France. The respondents in the French survey also proved to be quite sceptical of international organizations.
particularly the United Nations and the European Union. A remarkably strong degree of trust was reported in the UK survey towards the OIC. When the attention turned toward international to national actors, the general picture does not seem to change much. Again, the respondents in the UK appear to be the most trusting while those in France indicate the weakest degree of trust to almost any actor or institution. The national media in all three countries manages to appear as the least trusted institution by Muslims, while the security forces are the ones on which there is greatest degree of diversity. In the UK, respondents report a strong level of trust for the British police, while respondents in Germany lean towards neutrality, and the respondents in France, once again, displaying the weakest degree of trust in the French police forces.

In Phase II countries, two crucial institutions were singled out and the respondents were asked to indicate their level of confidence, on a scale ranging from ‘full confidence’ to ‘no confidence at all’, in the judiciary and security forces in their respective countries. Apart from South Africa and Argentina, respondents from all countries report having a strong degree of confidence in the judiciary and security forces in these countries. The strongest degree of confidence was described by the respondents in Canada, where a combined more than 90% of respondents suggested strong or full confidence in both judiciary and security forces. The respondents in the US were almost as strong in their confidence in these institutions. The respondents of the South African survey suggested the weakest degree of trust towards the security forces. Considering the fact that the number one grievance and problem of Muslims in South Africa was mentioned to be crime and lack of security, this finding is hardly surprising. It can be interpreted as a lack of capability on the part of security forces, rather than a particular problem with the Muslim community living in the country.
5 Perceptions on Socio-Economic Status

5.1. Socio-Economic Profile

Although the highest percentage of the first-generation Muslims in target countries immigrated for boosting their socio-economic profile, it did not end up as they expected. Although they managed to earn more than they could have in their home countries, not too many of them became a member of the upper middle class. This creates a significant deal of diversity within the Muslim communities. There is a portion of well-educated professionals; on the other hand, there are skilled and lower class labourers or unskilled unemployed groups. Although Muslims can be seen in almost any sector of public domain, many of them are either labourers or traders. At the top of the socio-economic strata, there is only a small cluster of Muslims, but the majority are workers, labourers, or unemployed. Some second and third generation Muslims managed to achieve a higher socio-economic profile due to their education and language skills. For example, in Australia, South Africa, the US, Britain, and Canada a noteworthy number of second-generation Muslims are in law and medicine. Regardless of the sectors they work, they have a formidable contribution to target countries’ economies. Another important determinant of Muslim communities’ socio-economic profile is how well settled they are. If they have a long historical background and are substantially well-settled, they have a more visible and higher profile. The socio-economic profile of Muslims, especially immigrated Muslims, is also affected by their underemployment rate. In some target countries, Muslims educated/trained in other countries have to undergo a lengthy process or reaccreditation to use their skills and experiences.

In South Africa, particularly Indian Muslim youth is opting to go into law, medicine, and civil service. According to the interviewees, Muslims’ contribution to South African GDP is approximately 14 to 15%. Regardless of this ratio, Muslims still suffer from unemployment. A main reason for this is that Apartheid had a significant impact on employment, more specifically there is an effective order job precedence, which puts Black females on the top, followed by Black males, Colored females, Colored males, Indian females, and Indian males. Almost in all sectors, this segregation is applied.

In the US, the interviewees stated that the Muslim community has been continuously improving itself and being better settled in everyday life. One significant department where a significant number of Muslims work is the New York Police. Another important detail about the US Muslims is that they are better educated than many other religious minorities. Yet this is surprisingly decreasing with younger generations. The first and second-generation immigrant Muslims were much likely have an above average education compared to the third and further generation Muslims. Unlike the other target countries, in the US Muslim girls have better education than Muslim boys do.
In Spain, Muslims’ socio-economic profile is less diverse than the other target countries. Many of them are in lower segments of social strata, working in agriculture and construction sectors. Since many Muslims come from rural areas and Spain is the farmhouse of Europe, they are heavily employed in farms. These are usually un-wanted and un-demanded jobs. In these sectors, they provide cheap labour force to Spanish economy. A small group of them are professionals, academics and business people. This whole situation makes Spanish Muslims economically less integrated, involved and committed. The interviewees stated that Spanish Muslims are not an economically strong community that can organize an economic lobby. Although new generations are doing better, thanks to their parents increasing investment in their education, they are organizationally still weak. Like in many other target countries, the Spanish Muslim population is young compared to the rest of the society. This is a potential for Muslims not only to be a future advantage for the Spanish economy but also faring better economically in the future.

In Canada, the unemployment rate is very high among the Muslims due to the disconnection between Canada’s immigration policy and licensing bodies. In Canada, the percentage of foreign-educated immigrants working in professions they had been trained for is less than 25%. Canadian Muslims also suffer from comparatively lower employment rates. This applies to both first generation immigrants and Canadian-born Muslims. Although second and further generations have degrees from Canadian institutions, they still face economic marginalization. Similar to Europe and the US, Muslim parents encourage their children to study either medicine or engineering, which causes a low representation of Muslims in social and political sciences, humanities and liberal arts. Indirectly, it affects Muslims’ voice in the fields of critical thinking, politics, administration, policy development, and intellectual knowledge.

In Japan, the socio-economic status of Muslims is particularly related to the level of education and skills. Most Muslims in Japan are economic, not skilled, migrants, whom do not have significantly higher levels of education and skills. Due to the Technical Intern Training Program, more Muslim workers with lower education and skill levels are increasing their employment percentage, but still not considerably. In this sense, Muslim students studying in Japan and deciding to stay could have a potential to be upper-/middle class of Japanese society. Another segment of Japanese Muslims’ socio-economic profile is entrepreneurs and self-employed. These are mostly Indonesians and Pakistanis in the automobile and automotive industry, maintaining a very good standard of living.

Argentina poses a peculiar example for Muslims’ socio-economic status. They have been living in the country for decades but their socio-economic profile is quite low. One exception to this might be some members of the Syrian community, whom has been living in the country for decades, well integrated and managed to find a place in the upper-/middle class of the social strata. In other words, there is a difference between different Argentinean Muslim ethnicities’ socio-economic status. Economically, Argentinean Muslims work in various sectors. Most Syrian and Lebanese are in the textile industry, and run open-air bazaars. Senegalese are
Figure 0.1: A selection of city maps prepared for Muslim visitors by Japanese municipalities and official bodies. Photo was taken during the GMD field study.

predominantly street vendors both in the center and outskirts of big cities. Other groups are in agriculture in small towns. A small percentage is in the service sector, such as university professors or white-collar workers. These are usually the refugees from the war-torn regions of the Middle East, whom already achieved and practiced these skills in their home countries. A much smaller portion is in science. One interviewee stated that Muslim scientists contributed to the health sector, for curing a very peculiar disease in Argentina: *Chagas*.

In France, the general socio-economic profile of Muslims is not particularly high either. The economic recession of the 1970s transformed immigrated Muslim workers from valuable assets into hostile competitors for low-paid and un-demanded jobs. The unemployed or the retired are known as *les hommes debouts* (the standing men) chatting next to a kebab shop that serves halal meat. For the second and third generation immigrant Muslims, French culture generated a term called *Beurs*. They are educated in France, spoke fluent French, were more familiar with French history and culture than their parents were, and more importantly felt French. Their approach to the French society is important in terms of their social profile. They reject integration since they are French citizens and therefore they do not see why they should have to transform themselves to be a part of the society in which they should naturally be considered as full and equal members. A much significant element of French Muslims’ socio-economic profile is the level of unemployment. In the outskirts of Paris, Lyon, and Lille, Muslims face unemployment several times more than the national average. With this level of unemployment, Muslims are struggling to integrate economically. As a result, Muslims do not keep high-level posts of the public and private sector. Yet, there are pockets of Muslims in the upper-/middle class levels, although in very small numbers.

In Australia, although several governments run support services to improve the social inclusion of ethnic communities, a significant portion of Muslims are still marginalized in socio-economic realm. Even the second and third generation with Australian education, face problems in employment. Like in many other countries, Australian Muslims are mostly employed in low and medium skilled jobs. The continuing traditional attitudes of Australian Muslim families affect Muslim women’s employment. In heavily Muslim populated suburbs,
women are usually looking after the children and elder members of the extended family, rather than being in the workforce. Muslim women’s employment is further strained by the divergences in socio-cultural element and biases against them. The fieldwork also highlighted that daily religious practices and requirements of Islam hinders Muslims’ employment. Some Muslim employees stated that they are prepared to work in places where alcohol is sold, gambling establishments, where they eat non-halal meat, or where they cannot pray due to the lack of time or place to worship. As a result, there is serious diversity in their employment status. There is a significant concentration of Muslims in the service sector both in federal and local government, together with legal and medical sectors. Another big group is tradesmen and technicians. A smaller group is executive level managers.

In the surveys, in addition to questions that attempted to understand objectively the socio-economic status of the Muslims living in target countries, there were also questions that aimed to have respondents subjectively assess their own socio-economic situation. In both Phase I and Phase II surveys, it was found that the respondents usually considered themselves to be at an average socio-economic standing.

### Income and Economic Status of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Status¹</th>
<th>Financial Situation²</th>
<th>Socio Economic Status³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>35.9% - Immigrants</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.6% - Mostly Satisfied</strong></td>
<td><strong>Average - 60.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary stay (16.2%), 2nd Generation Migrants (17.4%), Autochthonous (15.8%) and 3rd or 4th Gen. Migrants (8.7%)</td>
<td>Completely satisfied (14.1%), Mostly satisfied (11.6%), Neither satisfied (26.7%), Completely dissatisfied (3.1%)</td>
<td>11.9% respondents were above average and 16.3% were below average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Status¹</td>
<td>Income Level⁵</td>
<td>Job Confidence⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>43.1% - Employed</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.2% - Lower Middle</strong></td>
<td><strong>37% - Very Confident</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students (20.1%), Self-employed (12.2%), Housewives (8.5%), Unemployed (6.9%), Casual Jobs (4.7%), and Retired (2.3%)</td>
<td>28.9% were upper middle class, 6.7% were very poor, 6.3% were poor, and 5.2% were wealthy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n = 2,378; n = 2,671; n = 2,593; n = 2,682; n = 474; n = 1,510; all the respondents were from Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina

Phase II survey included more questions on the socio-economic indicators of the Muslim communities. One significant determinant of the socio-economic status of Muslims is their legal status. Legal status determines whether or not an individual is allowed to work, which rights they have and what kind of a relationship they will develop with the society and state. As expected, most respondents in the surveys were either first generation or second-generation immigrants. In other words, either they moved into these countries themselves or were born within the country to immigrant parents. The only context where autochthonous
citizens were a majority within the Muslim community was South Africa, where the majority of Muslims were descendants of Asian Muslims who were brought to this country several centuries ago either as slaves or indentured labourers by the colonial administrations. Due to significant numbers of conversions into Islam, the same group of Muslims make up of a significant part of the Muslim community in Japan and Australia as well while there are Muslims in Argentina that are the descendants of Muslims who had been living in this country for many generations. In terms of the working status of respondents, there is a clear dominance of the employed respondents, who work as wage labourers. There are a high number of students in some countries’ survey samples as well.

Again, for a subjective evaluation, the respondents were asked how satisfied they were with the financial situation of their respective households. The greatest number of respondents across countries reported being mostly satisfied with their households’ financial situation. While the second largest group of people tend more towards a neutral stance, suggesting they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; in Australia, South Africa, and Canada 14 to 17% of respondents said they were completely satisfied. Around 10 to 15% of the respondents across all the countries voiced dissatisfaction with their finances; the highest number being in South Africa with a combined 22.3% who are either mostly or completely dissatisfied.

While questions about experiences of discrimination in general were asked elsewhere in the survey and already presented above, the respondents were also asked whether they were being discriminated against in the workplace in various ways. While outright majorities declared not having been discriminated against in the workplace, very significant number of respondents reported experiences of discrimination. First of all, it needs to be mentioned that a clear majority of the respondents in Japan (60%) believe that as Muslims, they were discriminated against when they applied for a job as well as when they competed against others for a promotion (65%). In an alarming way, quite sizable groups of respondents from other countries also report being discriminated against when they apply for a job (Australia 18.9%, Spain 25.2%, USA 13.2%), with respect to their salaries (South Africa 19.4%, USA 25.4%), and when they are considered for a promotion (USA 14%, Spain 8%). However, overall when examining the Muslim diaspora in all the countries a high percentage has stated that they have not been discriminated against in the workplace.

Discrimination in the workplace
69.6% say they have not faced discrimination when applying for a job¹
72.9% say they have not felt discriminated against in terms of salary²
74.8% say they have not felt discriminated against in terms of promotions³
88.6% say they have not felt discriminated against in terms of facility usage⁴

Note: ¹n = 2,471; ²n = 2,297; ³n = 2,254; ⁴n = 2,252; all the respondents were from Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina
The respondents were also asked whether they felt confident that they would keep their job in the coming 12 months or whether they felt insecure about it. In all countries, large majorities of the respondents suggested that they were either fairly confident or very confident about keeping their current jobs. The participants in the Japan survey, once again, displayed the lowest level of confidence on this matter.

To understand what assets were essential for Muslims to find a job in different diasporic contexts, the respondents were asked to list the important assets that they believe a Muslim needs to have in order to find a job in each country. The responses depicted a rather technocratic picture where without exception in every single country the two most frequently given responses were level of one's qualifications and professional experience.

Again searching for a perception of equality, a question on whether Muslim individuals were granted with equal opportunities and access for employment in public offices was asked. In most countries, the majority of the responses agreed that this was the case while in a couple of countries respondents depicted a darker picture. In Japan, a significant 28.7% of the respondents did not think Muslims have equal opportunities and access. The situation was worse in Spain with more than 55% of the respondents disagreeing with this statement and which underlined a perceived sense of inequality of opportunities to achieve employment in public offices.

5.2. Educational Issues

Both secondary literature and the field visits this study show that Islamic education is one realm where Muslims are still trying to construct. In almost every target country, Muslims have been dealing with education related issues. Several issues can be listed regarding Islamic education. One major problem is in target countries there is no specific legal regulation on religious education, and organizations providing it. Either depending on the country at stake there is “no support no control” or “no support yes scrutiny” approach is applied. Islamic schools are treated as private education institutions but not religion-oriented private education institutions. There is no specific funding to support their activities either. These institutions maintain their financial standing largely through funds and donations of their communities. Another important issue is the underachievement of Muslim students particularly in higher education. This affects the integration and presentation of Muslims almost directly. Muslim students’ underachievement in education becomes a major impediment for their performance within the system and for their integration and representation themselves in the host society. Problems in integration further increase the alienation of the Muslim youth from the mainstream culture and potentially marginalize them. These problems also increase fragmentation within Muslim communities.
In South Africa, there is a segregation between different ethnicities of Muslims regarding their educational attainment. For example, African origin Muslims has a lower level educational attainment than other ethnicities. On the other hand, the Indian and Malay communities have a score of Islamic education centres, schools, and institutions for higher education. Another segregation happens regarding gender. Females also have lower educational attainment level even among affluent communities. The fieldwork showed that particularly within the Indian Muslim community of Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng, many parents adopt a reluctant and conservative attitude towards young Muslim girls’ attaining secular education, which in their mind harbours a propensity to corrupt the “purity” of the Muslim woman by exposing her to the dangers and temptations that arise from social secularism’s educational hazards. As a result, many girls do not continue their education beyond primary school level.

In Spain, one of the main challenges is also the Islamic education of new generations. In secular education, the Spanish Muslim youth is doing quite well, particularly better than their parents are. Yet, when it comes to Islamic education, the interviewees’ comments were not necessarily positive. Accordingly, Muslim parents are generally satisfied with the quality and equity of schooling in Spain but not regarding Islamic education. The predominant reason for the very small number of instructors accredited for Islamic education is related to the number of Muslim students enrolled.

In the US, the fieldwork revealed a similar challenge to the education of younger generations. The interviewees stated that a quality education at an Islamic school can be very expensive, on the other hand sending children to public schools could “dilute” their Muslim identity. In Canada, some interviewees reiterated the situation that private Muslim education institutions have high fees. Therefore, large Muslim families could face the difficulty of sending all their children to these institutions.

In Britain, Muslim educational institutions and their staff and students enjoy a variety of educational rights and freedoms. There are several Islamic schools in the country and their students and staff both benefit from the freedom of attire in schools. Yet, according to the interviewees, these schools still suffer from getting equal rights to enjoy public funding on par with the thousands of Christian schools and the small number of Jewish schools in the country. The interviewees of the fieldwork reiterated the problem of underachievement of Muslim students by emphasizing the lack of interaction between families and teachers, and socio-economic and linguistic obstacles. Particularly regarding socio-economy, the interviewees stated that unless the Muslim families accumulate enough socio-economic, cultural, and educational capital and resources, their children’s chances of receiving a quality education, attend a good university and thrive academically is significantly low.

In Germany, the fieldwork also revealed a very similar educational situation for the Muslims in Britain. There is a link between Muslim families’ socio-economic status and access to quality of education their children. Although the educational system seems to be open to everyone and higher education is free in the country, paradoxically enough the influence of socio-economic capital and resources on the quality of education a student receives is immense. A
Muslim student cannot access a quality level of high and university education unless his/her parents accumulate enough socio-economic capital. In other words, educational capital is passed from one generation to another, which ultimately results in maintaining people in the same socio-economic class as their parents before them. As a result, due to the lower socio-economic status of their parents, immigrant Muslim children become low-achieving students.

In France, like in other target countries there is an increase in the second and third generations’ educational attainment, including graduate level. Yet, this is not a general pattern. Although French education system’s primary concern is equality, in the ghettos large concentrations of immigrant children suffer from a lack of quality education.

In Australia, there is a good rise in Muslim youth’s education level. The second and third generations have certainly been doing better than the first Muslim immigrants have. Yet an interesting point regarding Muslims educational attainment in years 9 and 10 comes to fore. There is a significant dropout rate in these years, i.e. the first two grades in high school, especially in low-income neighbourhoods. Regarding Islamic education, Australia is a different example. The Muslim community greatly benefits from Australian governments’ education support funds. Almost two third of Islamic colleges’ budgets are covered by these funds. Moreover, English is no more a barrier for the Muslim youth. There are also a good percentage of the second and further generations continuing their graduate studies in Australian institutions.

The surveys included a number of questions on education of Muslim communities in the target countries. First, in both phase surveys, the levels of educational attainment of the respondents were asked. It appears that overall the educational level of Muslim communities in major non-Muslim countries are between secondary-school graduate and university-graduate. The most educated samples were those of Canada and the US, while the least educated sample was recorded in the UK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ Education Attainment Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literate (no schooling)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n = 3,153; respondents were from UK, Germany, France, Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina

In Phase II countries, more questions were asked to understand the educational context particularly for the Muslim children. To this end, respondents were asked whether they believed that Muslim children in their countries have the same chances for a quality education as everybody else. With the significant exception of Japan, majority of respondents in all countries agreed with this statement. In Japan, however,
some 60% of the respondents suggested that Muslim children did not have the same chances for a quality education in this country. One significant fact to consider about Muslim community in Japan is that the majority of the community describes their status in the country as ‘temporarily living and working in the country’, not even as immigrants. This lack of security and stability in the legal status of Muslims in Japan, together with the limitations this may have for the types of schooling the Muslim children can enrol in might explain this view of the Muslim community in Japan. However, as it shall be seen below, the Muslims in Japan offer other explanations as to why they believe Muslim children do not have equal access to quality education.

When those respondents who suggested that Muslim children in their countries did not have the same chances for a quality education were further asked why they thought so, a number of reasons were provided. While in some countries the largest portion of the respondents mentioned language problems as the most important obstacle, in countries like Australia, Japan, and Spain, the suggested main reasons included discrimination and prejudices against Muslims and various formal or informal bans on hijabs/headscares. When we look at the results as a whole, prejudice against Muslims is cited as the top response.

Another issue often discussed in relation with the education of minority and immigrant communities is whether extra-measures should be provided to ensure equal access to education. These may include various quotas, discounts on taxes or education fees as well as extra educational support including free language courses. When the survey respondents were asked whether they would expect such extra measures to be provided by the government, an overwhelming majority of the respondents across all countries agreed on the necessity of such extra measures.

Lastly, respondents were asked how satisfied they were with the quality of the schools and education system in their country. Again, the uniform response was one of satisfaction with some countries showing tendencies towards neutrality. On the other hand, the Muslim communities that were most satisfied with the quality of schools and the education systems were from Canada, Australia, and the USA. Nearly 46% of total respondents from all countries were satisfied with the quality of the schools and educations systems in their country of residence.
6 Attitudes on Visibility and Representation of Muslims

6.1. Views on Visibility and Representation

Like in other sections, it is not easy to draw one generalization regarding Muslims’ visibility and representation. Although Muslims in target countries are generally less visible than the other socio-religious elements of the society, there are exceptions to this. In many other countries of this study, the respondents stated the problems of their visibility and representation by putting forward several reasons.

One reason, which is explained in detail below, is the rise in far-right politics merged with Islamophobia and anti-immigration trends. Due to these, the respondents in Britain repeatedly stated that Muslims are not well represented in the media or the politics. Another reason is the historical background of Muslim communities. If the community is newly immigrated, they are not organized efficiently enough to be visible and well represented. Via longer engagement with the system of the host country, Muslim communities could accumulate their human and financial capital.

General society’s lack of awareness about the Muslims naturally affects Muslims’ visibility. In Japan, this is particularly the case. This does not only minimize Muslims’ visibility but also leaves issues of Muslims unaddressed. Especially for political representation, the socio-economic profile plays an important role. Since in many target countries the biggest percentage of Muslims is not on the upper-middle class or higher, they usually do not have time to develop a constituency. In the US, the respondents claimed that politics is a game for the rich and many Muslims do not have to engage with it. Another element affecting Muslims’ political representation is the political climate of the country. For example, in Australia, the interviewees stated the stagnation in national politics does not appeal Muslims to represent actively themselves.

Party politics also determine Muslims’ political representation. If party politics do not give space to the MP to prioritize its ethnicities’ interests, which is pretty much the case, party interests come first. Therefore, the MP could not predominantly bring its ethnicity’s demands to its representative platform’s agenda. The interviewees in Australia complained about this by stating that Muslim MPs represent the interests of their party and themselves.

Muslim community members’ political background also defines their political participation and visibility. If they come from countries with a robust democratic culture, they were far more ready to participate in politics. In addition, women from backgrounds that emphasized traditional gender roles found it much harder to engage in politics compared to women born in target countries with strong democratic engagement, such as Australia, Canada, Britain, Germany, and France. On the contrary, in Spain, some Moroccan members of the Muslim
community claim that participating in the politics of a non-Muslim country or even showing interest in politics itself, does not quite reconcile with Islamic teachings.

Muslim community’s particularly the first-generation members’ attachment with their home countries’ politics curb their political engagement as well. This is particularly the case in the enclaves of Australian Muslims. Lebanese and Turkish first and even some second-generation members are more interested and engaged with the politics of Lebanon and Turkey than Australia. This is also the case in Spain. In Spain, especially the Moroccan Muslims are more engaged with their country of origin.

Regarding visibility, an important theme is how Muslims see religion as a part of their personal space and identity. If they take it too personally, they do not show it in daily life, let alone talk about it. Japan is a very clear example. As one of the interviewees stated “if you start talking to [the Japanese] about your religion, if you try to convince them or convert them, you will lose them”.

Another important criterion is Muslims’ citizenship status. If they are citizens, it is always difficult to develop a significant visibility or representation. In Japan for example, the majority of Muslims do not hold Japanese citizenship and the community, therefore, cannot be politically engaged, at least nationally. The citizenship status affects Muslims’ influence on the local level. In countries where local governance has a good impact on the national, this could expand Muslims’ visibility. The US example proves this. The respondents stated that especially in 2018 elections, Muslims pressed very hard at the local level, which is more important than the federal since the local level contains the first respondents. With this work, especially the second and third generation immigrants became assembly members and state senators.

Weaknesses in Muslims’ representation are a result of the deficiencies of Muslim organizations and their minimal influence on national or local politics. This is especially pronounced in Spain. Spanish respondents argued that the deficiencies are not a result of maladministration but also the absence of governmental and official financial support. This is especially worsened with the increase of Spanish governments’ strict scrutiny on Muslim organizations’ administration. This scrutiny especially in politico-psychological sense has been carried out by the accumulated power of the Church and the Spanish Military.

An interesting exception for Muslims’ representation is the Japanese case. The interviewees stated that one of the major reasons for Japanese Muslims’ political disengagement is the lack of discrimination and a strong sense of religious freedom in Japan. Therefore, they do not feel the need to mobilize politically. Regarding Muslims’ visibility and representation, the South African example is also taking point. Especially during the first and second post-Apartheid governments, Muslims were credited with a high level of visibility and political representation due to their activism and contribution to the process. This representation and visibility were way above the South African Muslims’ proportional vote share and numbers. In other words, South African Muslims’ contribution to the democratic system was very significant but their representational share was greater.
The main reason for Muslims’ high-level visibility in South Africa is due to their dedication and perseverance in protecting their Islamic identity and values. Muslims’ visibility is considerably greater in Cape Town or Durban. Although Muslim visibility is still quite significant in South Africa, regarding parliamentary representation, particularly at the party level, it has been diminishing in the past decade. There are a couple of reasons behind this. The first is the Muslim youth’s apathy towards politics and a greater focus on education, the second is the requirements of politics, which are quite contested and complicated. The gradual decline of political representation is also a result of the less need for community mobilization and political engagement. Therefore, Muslim organizations have gone to their comfort zones. On the other hand, South African Muslims’ visibility has a media dimension. Islamic media outlets have proliferated in the 1990s and 2000s, which were mainly run by Indians and Malays. These outlets both promote Islam and respond to Islamophobic discourses. Another important detail about South African Muslims’ visibility is that in the country there are around 1500 mosques and musallahs, around 90 Islamic schools, and several education-oriented NGOs. These NGOs run special programs, e.g. “New Muslims” focusing on introducing Islam to non-Muslim Africans via offering several facilities, services, and opportunities. These numbers of mosques and education organizations in South Africa are quite significant compared to the situation in other target countries.

Although Muslim communities in target countries are not as visible and influential in the socio-political sphere, Canadian Muslims pose an example contrasting the argument that Muslim minorities are usually invisible. They are visible not only in the public space, both official and private, but in Parliament, in local councils, and in other levels and areas of political representation as well. Canadian socio-political environment gives enough space to any minority to represent itself efficiently but Muslims still have not attained high-level and widespread representation due to their certain contextual, historical, and social shortcomings. Unlike the other target countries with open and flexible socio-political nature, such as Australia, Germany, and Britain, Canadian Muslim youth do not enjoy the rights and freedoms this nature provides but involve into the politics considerably. This is particularly the result of the anti-Muslim rhetoric of the previous Conservative government.

The surveys included a significant number of questions on the visibility and representation of Muslims in the target countries. Both in Phase I and Phase II surveys, the respondents were firstly asked questions concerning political representation and political participation of Muslim communities. Concerning the former, the overall sense from the Muslim communities is a negative one. In other words, it appears that a majority of the
respondents in most countries do not believe that Muslims are well represented in politics. However, some countries stand out in the responses. The most negative countries in this regard - those with the highest number of respondents that disagreed, were France (82%), Japan (78%), Spain (70%), UK (65%), Germany (65%), and Australia (57%). The one significant exception was Canada, where 55% of the respondents did in fact believe that the Muslims were well represented in the country politics.

After the question of political representation came the question of political participation of Muslims. In Phase I survey, the respondents were asked whether they found the formal and informal political participation of the Muslim community satisfactory. As it might be anticipated from the earlier responses, a greater number of respondents found the level of political participation by the Muslims unsatisfactory. Again, France was the most extreme case where a combined 70% of the participants supported this view, while the same figures for the UK and Germany were on the 37 and 32%, respectively.

For the Phase II countries, there were a higher number of questions inquiring about political participation of the Muslims. Firstly, the respondents were asked whether they believed that Muslims’ active political engagement and participation at local and national levels would be beneficial for Muslim communities. Not surprisingly, large majorities of the respondents in all countries agreed with the statement without exception.

Then, the same respondents were inquired about their political participation. Here, they were first asked how often they attend political events with other members of the Muslim community. The responses were extremely different. The great majority of the respondents from all countries said either never or rarely. There was, then, a big discrepancy between the Muslim communities’ belief that Muslims need to be more politically engaged and active, and their behaviour of very low level of political participation.

What is the principle way in which Muslims show political participation? When this question was asked and the respondents were given several choices from which they could choose multiple options, the most frequently stated channel of political participation was merely talking to friends. To remind, this question was only asked to respondents who suggested that they were involved in some form of political participation. Other than talking to friends, some
respondents mentioned that they made comments on the social media and a much smaller number of respondents reported taking part in public debates.

Those who do not participate in political processes, on the other hand, were asked why they were not actively involved in decision-making. They suggested as the number one reason that they did not believe that as an individual they could influence government decisions. In other words, Muslims stated a sense of a lack of political efficacy.

After representation and participation in politics, Muslims’ representation and visibility in media was questioned. Firstly, the respondents were asked to evaluate whether Muslims were well represented in the national media of the country in which they lived. Except for the slightly positive responses in South Africa and Canada, the overwhelming majority of Muslims in both phase countries disagreed with this statement. In other words, they did not believe that Muslims were well represented in the media in any of the 10 target countries of the GMD research. The strongest reaction came from France where a staggering 90% of the respondents disagreed with the statement. It was followed by Japan (78%), Spain (77%), Germany (71%) and the US (65%).

Do Muslims believe that they are well informed about the Muslim community that is living in the same country? It appears not. According to the survey data, apart from Canada, in all Phase II countries the majority of the respondents find themselves only ‘slightly informed’ about the Muslim community. Those who suggested that they were the least informed were the respondents in the Japan survey. In a context where Muslims believe that they were only partially and not well represented in the media, it is not surprising that most Muslims report that their main information source as the internet. It was followed by getting information through talking to people. Going back to mainstream media, the respondents were then asked how satisfied they were with the objectivity of reporting on Muslims in an average newspaper or TV channel news. As it can be expected depending on the responses to earlier questions,
the majority was not satisfied. In fact, apart from the exception of South African, in all seven Phase II countries the largest number of respondents suggested that they were either mostly or completely dissatisfied with the objectivity of reporting on Muslims in the media.

6.2. Lack of Unity and Representation

In almost every target country, the lack of unity is the most pronounced issue. There are obvious deficiencies in intra-/inter-communal interactions. The lack of unity is strongly related to the level of Muslims’ representation, which is also quite problematic. The lack of a well-developed and well-functioning Islamic education, which puts a light on the ethno-cultural differences in Islam also curbs Muslim youth’s inter-communal interaction and understanding. Another important issue is the structuring and functioning of worship centres. Mosques and masjids could be fruitful platforms by removing any linguistic dominance or preference, which could further increase inter-communal dialogue.

A related issue is the administration of these platforms. If they are operated by usually the first-generation male Muslims who are mostly detached and to an extent alienated from Muslim youth’s and women’s problems with status-seeking minds, it would increase the fragmentation in the community. Yet, many of them are mono-linguistic and mono-ethnic, and the language used is different from the common language of Muslim communities all speak. Such deficiency in unity and interaction prevents the transfer the knowledge and experience between different Muslim communities. Muslim communities mostly suffer from their lack of unity and representation especially regarding their organizational patterns. This results in either miss or non-representation of Muslims’ political, social and religious organs since they are not recognized by the host country’s official realm. The fragmentation within the communities also hinders an efficient allocation of government budgets to sort out some issues of Muslims. As a result, it becomes almost impossible to involve fragmented Muslim groups’ demands, needs, claims, concerns and issues into consideration effectively.

In Britain, the fieldwork attendees stated that there is both a super-diversity within the community and a lack of proper communication. The diversity of Muslims does not bring richness to the British Muslims; on the contrary, Muslim communities are separated as ethnic, national, or sectarian clusters, living in their isolated territories. The interviewees stated that one remedy for this is to develop political leadership and Islamic scholarship. They also underlined the importance of Islamic education and the administration of mosques and masjids without giving a linguistic or ethnic dominance for reducing the barriers between Muslims who have different ethnic, denominational, national, and linguistic backgrounds. As an organizational pattern, a single representative and leading platform for all Muslims could not be a remedy either. The Britain fieldwork showed that that kind of a platform has a potential to function under the auspices of the British official mind-set, which could end up with a single “official” voice.

In France, Muslim communities’ fragmentation is mainly within the first-generation migrants along national and ethnic lines. Despite such fragmentation, French Muslims have been trying
to represent themselves, although under the auspices of the French state. Muslims’ main representative organs in both local and national level are the mosques. Especially at the national level there are cathedral mosques carrying out the representative duties, which are connected to certain Muslim nationalities, for example the Grand Mosque of Paris is originally connected to the Moroccans. The Grand Mosque is recognized by the French state as the representative of Muslims. In other words, the national representation of Islam in the country relies on the acknowledgement of the French state. Another important organ is the Union of Muslim Organizations of France (UOIF), which encompasses 200 local NGOs and focusing on Islamic education by producing and disseminating teaching materials, organizing courses, and camps. There are also Muslim youth organizations and Islamic research institutes. Yet none of the organizations, even the cathedral mosques or the UOIF have managed to develop a unified or an amplified voice.

In Germany, the interviewees and the workshop attendees claimed that the lack of discernible unity and sense of connection is the biggest challenge facing the Muslim communities in the country and in Europe in general. The interviewees also stated that many legal and political issues Muslim face could only be resolved if this representation question is resolved. The question still lingers since Muslim organizations could not act in a decisive manner, which severely restrict their influence. This is because of the fact that German Muslims’ organizations are not legally recognized as public legal entities. Three significant requirements that these organizations need to fulfil for their integration into the German legal system, which are a clear membership structure, experience over time, and provision over time. In this respect, until today the only Muslim community that was recognized as such is the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat. Since this Jamaat is one of the smallest Muslim communities and the other major communities have been demanding the same status, this issue keeps coming up as a negative fact about Germany.

The interviewees also stated the need for an umbrella organization to express a unified stance and objection against the rising terrorism and inter-communal tensions and defend common democratic values and rights they need to create a joint voice and platform. Yet, as in other target countries’ Muslim respondents stated to establish such a platform the founders have to put aside sectarian and ideological differences, as well as their egos and power rivalry, and focus on more pressing practical issues and realities. On the other hand, some interviewees expressed a prospective problem for such a platform by stating that it could be that it will be open to external manipulations and corruption. Furthermore, such a singular and monolithic representative platform is not conducive to the ideals, values and ethos of Islam. Such platform would be like “a Vatican”, which is dependent on a single supreme leader. Therefore, such a hierarchical organizational body contradicts Islamic ethos since Islam is a religion of equality and not hierarchy. Moreover, the continuing fragmentation prevents an efectual distribution of generous budgets and application of solutions, regulations and initiatives to resolve certain issues and improve the lives of Muslims and immigrants.
In Australia, the fragmentation occurs via enclaves. The Muslim organizations in those structures are not strong and well organized and retain contacts inside that enclave, which becomes a melting pot. Muslims within the enclaves do not integrate with the general society. There is no cross integration. In Spain, the interviewees stated particularly the lack of vernacularization, which plays a critical role. In many Islamic religious centres and mosques the local languages dominate. Khutbas (sermons) in the mosques are delivered in Arabic or local languages, and they are mostly irrelevant to the present situation and the reality of Muslim individuals and the communities. The lack of representation heavily affects Muslims to develop unified and robust arguments against Islamophobic tendencies. The more de-politicized they are, the more Islamophobic pressure they need to bear. This representation should not only be a political one, it needs to be social, cultural, and populist in order to be effective in mainstream media.

### 6.3. Islamophobia, Racism and Negative Representation

Although these terms seem different regarding their meanings, they intermingle. Many Muslim communities experience them together, as if they are in the same package. The fieldworks showed that Islamophobia operates like racism. Muslims facing Islamophobia are demonized as they are facing racism. One argument is that if the Muslim community members keep their identity to themselves and do not get involved in politics, they do not feel Islamophobia pressure that much. Yet, many other arguments refuse this by stating that Muslims are not safe from Islamophobia even if they are apolitical but still carry the symbols “being a Muslims”, e.g. beard, hijab, cultural outfit. Several elements fuel Islamophobia and racism.

One of those elements is economic deprivation. Especially far-right politicians show Muslims as scapegoats of rising unemployment. In Britain, the interviewees stated that economic fluctuations, especially following Brexit, caused many Britons to miss out some of their privileges and right-wing side of politics began to blame Muslims since it was convenient to do so. Relatedly, right wing parties also fuel Islamophobia and racism. In Germany, the interviewees stated that the rise of conservative and anti-immigrant politics and the electoral success of populist right-wing parties, such as the AFD in Germany, increase the incidents of Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments. In Australia, although the right wing does not represent the majority of Australians, they, arguably, possess the necessary influence to hijack the national agenda against Muslims. Australian political scenery is not ultra-nationalist or xenophobic but does flirt with them. In Spain, the interviewees stated that the role of center-right politics and parties in the rise and prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiments has been immense. Right-wing parties’ influence relies on their “authority” to define who is “extreme”.

The 9/11 events were another element in both the formation and lingering of Islamophobia. In Germany the interviewees particularly emphasized the over politicization of religion after 9/11. With the incident, they stated, the interaction between Muslims and German society and state institutions began to change. Similarly, in Australia after 9/11, Muslim Australians
frequently experience racial vilification, threats of violence, and actual violence. In some countries, Islamophobia affects females worse than male members of the Muslim community do. In Australia for example, Muslim women face more challenges than their male counterparts do. Yet, the fieldwork showed education level of women could render these challenges. Islamophobia and racism operate in various realms. One significant domain, Muslims experience these concepts is business and employment.

In Germany, the interviewees stated that Muslims experience certain problems in the job market. There are “unwritten rules” and “invisible barriers” putting Muslims in a disadvantaged position. As an example, those individuals with a German name who applied for the same apprenticeship program were multiple times more likely to be accepted compared to those with “foreign” names or those who wear a headscarf. In their business, particularly some female Muslim employees, working in an official environment, have to remove their headscarves before they start working and put it back on at the end of the day.

In Britain, similarly Muslims face difficulties particularly in private sector employment. At the workplace, Muslims face discrimination more than Catholics, Sikhs, and Jews since they are less visible and vocal about their daily religious practices. In France, the wrong postal code or an Arabic sounding name pushes any candidate to the back of the line for god jobs. The Muslim workers’ children in the outskirts of big cities after their graduation could mostly get into lower class occupations and still cannot secure their jobs. They also face racism everyday particularly in their interactions with French public figures. In the workspace, Islamophobia is constantly operating; particularly regarding government agents’ investigation of Muslims in their place of work.

Another domain of similar experiences is media. The rising right in many target countries affect media’s coverage and emphasis on Muslims. If a radical Muslim organization, related incident happens in any part of the world, right-wing media groups in target countries magnify/amplify the incident and attempt to bring Muslim-related issues to the daily agenda even if they are unrelated with the incident. Muslims had to counter-argue that they have no relation with that particular event. Since these media organs do not particularly let Muslims to take part in their programs to defend their position, Muslims had to develop their own media channels, which do not usually have the same level of impact on the larger part of the society.

In the US, the interviewees underlined the increasing biases about Muslims’ representation in the media. In France, the media and cinema marginalized and excluded Muslims as well. Particularly, Maghrebi-French filmmakers have worked to counter this invisibility, marginalization, stigmatization and exoticization of Muslims, particularly the Arabs. In Germany, Muslims complain about two major issues about media. First, the TV programs about Muslims hardly involve any of their voices. Islam is debated without any Muslim participant. Second, the German media heavily discusses Muslims by associating them with negative concepts such as extremism and terror. Muslims are also presented as failed or unsuccessful people, and high profile Muslims in science, art, or business in Germany are very rarely shown in the media.
In Australia, the right-wing media has a similar tendency. There is an imbalance between news underlining Muslims’ positive image and the ones underlining the negative. There is more about the latter than the former. In Argentina, similarly Muslims are linked with terrorist attacks and controversial political events. In Spain, media has been following a similar security-oriented approach against the Muslims. Spanish Muslims are questioned as being peaceful, belligerent, or extremists. In Japan, there is no general media trend to discriminate Muslims via Islamophobia but since many news streaming in Japanese media on Muslims have been taken from Western news sources; the rising Islamophobia has affected them. Although these news stress artificial links between Muslims in general and terrorism, Japanese respondents stated that most Muslims in Japan do not have to deal with unwanted looks from the public. On the other hand, there is a significant deal of negligence on Muslim related demands. Muslim related negative incidents grasp more official attention than Muslims’ socio-economic requirements.

In Germany, the interviewees underlined that despite the increasing number of Germany-born Muslims since the 1970s, the German authorities and society had circumnavigated the issues and questions regarding Muslim and immigrant communities, and some of the problems that Muslims and immigrants are struggling with today are caused by this long-standing negligence. On the other side, German policy makers responsible for Muslims stated that the German state does not accept any religion in Germany, since such recognition does not match with the German legal system.

In Australia, although several types of integration policies are being discussed in the public realm, they are not very efficient to take the demands of disadvantaged Muslim groups. In the US, the fieldwork attendees stated that Islam does not receive the respect and value that it deserves from the American official mind. Moreover, Islam is being perceived as a second-class faith regarding its holiday celebrations and other social rituals. In Japan, the same negligence caused an interesting result for Japanese Muslims. The interviewees stated that the Japanese society neglects the Muslims community but it also protects them from any significant degree of discrimination or Islamophobia and shields them from unwanted public attention or scrutiny. These terms affect the general society’s outlook towards Muslims particularly with regards to appreciate or acknowledge their efforts for the common good. In Germany, the participants of the workshop stated that it was overwhelming to be required to convince others about the sincerity of their belonging to the society repeatedly while constantly being dragged into discussions about the distinctiveness of Islam and failure of Muslims integration.

Another important element of Muslims’ negative representation has been the tragic events in the Middle East, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. In other words, western-oriented international politics has been linking Muslims with international terrorism. The large influx of refugees due to the conflicts in these countries also fuelled anti-Muslim rhetoric in Canada.
Global Muslim Diaspora

7 Confidence in Relations among Muslim Communities

7.1. Involvement in the Muslim Community

Naturally, several factors affect the involvement in Muslim communities. One obvious factor is the difference between generations. The first-generation Muslim immigrants who came with very diverse backgrounds in almost every sense interact with the rest of the Muslim community very differently from their offspring, who were born in the host country. They usually have a better understanding and experience about their Muslim fellows from various backgrounds than their parents do. Unlike their parents, they lived in the same suburb or neighbourhood, went to the same school, and possibly faced similar issues and pressures from the non-Muslim elements of the mainstream society. In the US and Australian fieldworks this situation is pronounced, although not repeatedly. Also in France, the fieldwork showed that there is a clear generational break between the first, second, and particularly, third generation Muslims. In all these countries, the involvement in the Muslim community has been affected by the changes in the Muslim identity. The further generations are born and educated in the country at stake which changed the way they look at Muslim and non-Muslim communities, and Islam in general. This opens the gap between these “new Muslims” and their parents. In France, this change is clearly seen in the Beur movement, which restricted Islam to the “private space” during the 1980s. Similarly, in Canada, younger generations are truly internalized and embraced the policy of multiculturalism. Yet, this did not change the fact that the Canadian Muslim sector is still dominated by ethno-national, racial, and sectarian lines and loyalties. In Australia also, the second and third generation Muslims see themselves as Australians and more importantly challenge their religious-cultural background and the way it is administered by Muslim organizations. This is particularly visible in Australian Muslim NGOs and mosques. The first-generation Muslim males whom discard young leaders of Muslims, and as a result curb their involvement to look after their communities’ demands mainly rule these.

Another factor is the lack of commonalities between different Muslim ethnicities. This could be ideological, geographical or ethnic. In the US, the interviewees stated that if there is no common goal or a project, Muslim communities do not mix. For example, in New York Arabs do not mix with Pakistanis and Bangladeshis or with Albanians. This separation is not necessarily geographical, i.e. living in distant suburbs, but also ethnic and racial. The workshop attendees in the US articulated this difference by underlining the divide between the African-American Muslims and the other Muslim communities. Japanese Muslims’ case is somewhat similar. Although there is no obvious hostility among different Muslim ethnicities, they do not interact with each other either. Involvements are mostly carried out within same ethnicities and within Japanese mosques there is usually one dominant ethnic group. A similar pattern
can be seen in Canada, where relations amongst Muslim groups are conflict-free yet not so engaged. Muslim communities are on good terms, there is no interethnic or sectarian tension, but due to residential segregation and ethno-cultural differences, interaction is limited.

One significant factor affecting intra-community involvement is how the members carry out their daily needs. Some members of the community could not speak the language of the host country, which pushes them to live in their “Muslim” suburbs, to an extent enclaves or ghettos with their fellows. In their enclaves, they live separately from the rest of the society but in close contact with the rest of the Muslim community in the suburb. The less skills they develop for interacting with the rest of the society, the more involved they are in their community. This is particularly the case in Australia. In Sydney and Melbourne, Muslims in their own enclaves are not only physically but also socio-culturally are alienated from the more cosmopolitan and central suburbs. Some only use the language their country of origin with their fellows. This pattern is mostly valid for the first and to extent second-generation Muslim migrants, since their business schemes did not require most of them to engage with the larger non-Muslim society. Recognition and reliability of Muslim organizations by both the Muslims and the state apparatus also affect Muslim communities’ involvement. Recognized and reliable organizations help their members to have more functioning relations amongst each other and with the non-Muslim members of the larger society. In Germany, for example, the interviewees stated that via recognized organizations relations amongst various Muslim communities were improved.

The Surveys included a number of questions on the issue of involvement in the Muslim community. Starting from the Phase I countries, the survey respondents were first asked to subjectively describe how involved they believe they are in the Muslim community. The general response was a neutral to negative one in terms of involvement. In other words, Muslims in the UK, Germany and France did not consider themselves quite involved with the Muslim community.

Following this subjective evaluation, respondents were asked a number of questions that aimed to learn about their behaviour concerning their involvement in the Muslim community. To this end, they were first asked whether they were a member of a Muslim NGO. Although a majority of the

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**27%**

Interact with members of the Muslims community (other than family/relatives and co-workers) ‘few times a week’

**29.8%**

Attend social gathering with members of Muslim community ‘sometimes’

**32.1%**

Do not provide any support to Muslims voluntary organizations; 25.6% volunteer part-time; 20.6% provide financial support

**25.2%**

Are ‘Inactive’ in voluntary organizations of Muslim community in the country

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Note: n1 = 3,142; n2 = 2,589; n3 = 2,648; n4 = 2,609; respondents were from UK, Germany, France.

1-3 Respondents were from Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina.
respondents answered negatively, those who suggested that they were in fact a member of a Muslim NGO such as foundation or association was far from negligible. In fact, in all three countries, those with a membership to a Muslim NGO make up more than one third of the respondents. Respondents were also asked how frequently they interact with other members of the Muslim community, excluding their own family members and relatives as well as the co-workers that they interact when they are working. The responses given to this question diversify. According to the data, the Muslim community in Germany appears the most interactive among itself while the one in Britain seems to be the least interactive. The respondents in France were almost equally distributed in all answer categories.

The same question was also asked in the Phase II surveys. The responses seem to suggest that apart from Muslims in Argentina, which might be adversely affected by the low numbers and scattered living conditions of the Muslims, most Phase II countries host quite sociable Muslim communities. Particularly in Australia, South Africa, Spain and Japan, respondents suggest that they interact with other members of the Muslim community quite frequently. What kind of activities do the respondents do with other members of the Muslim community? They were given a list of activities and asked to indicate how often they do these activities with members of the Muslim community on a scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘all the time’. One common finding across three countries is the distaste toward word politics by the respondents. This was evident in the answers given on many questions and here again; the respondents unite on never attending political events.

The Surveys in the second phase did not provide the respondents with the same long list of activities. Instead, it asked the same question by grouping the activities together. Therefore, the respondents were asked how often they attended various social gatherings with the members of Muslim community. The overwhelming response is ‘sometimes’ which was the mid-point in the range from ‘never’ to ‘all the time’. Therefore, it seems to indicate neither inactivity nor very much activity on the part of the Muslim community. Do the Muslim community provide support to voluntary organizations? The respondents were asked this question next and they were given a list of potential ways to provide support for voluntary organizations. It appears that a majority of the respondents in five countries apart from Japan and Spain do not provide any support to Muslim NGOs. In Japan and Spain, significant numbers of respondents report volunteering on a part-time basis to support various NGOs. In the US survey, the greatest numbers of respondents suggest that they provide free advice and information on a range of issues as support. Another popular response across several country surveys was to provide financial support to these.

7.2. Relations of Muslim Communities: Level of Unity and Fragmentation

Several factors have been fragmenting Muslim communities in target countries. One of them is the issue of segregation or even to an extent racism inside the Muslim community. In the US, the fieldwork participants stated that non-Black Muslims in New York do not particularly
welcome some African Muslims. Some interviewees stated this is the continuing legacy of general racism in the US being taught to the younger generation African Muslims. In Argentina, this is between Arab-origin Muslims and Muslims from Senegal, Pakistan, Ghana, and India. In Spain, this segregation occurs in between the established Muslim community and the new Muslims, particularly the Moroccan Muslim community. Several shortcomings of newcomers cause this, such as the lack of education, self-reflection, and awareness for adaptation. These are worsened by established Muslims’ Euro-centric outlook and marginalization discourse, discarding the fact that adaptation takes a long time for these newcomers especially due to the linguistic, cultural, and social challenges they face. This segregation is worsened by the differences in religious orientation. This mainly occurs due to the community members’ interpretation of Islam. In the US, it was expressed as the differences between Salafi-oriented and Indian Muslims. In Argentina, this happens between the Iranians and Lebanese, and between the converts and traditional Muslim communities.

Another obvious reason for fragmentation is the lack or deficiency of communal interaction between Muslim communities. Many interviewees repeated that Muslim communities of different ethnic, national, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds have limited knowledge about each other. On the other hand, ongoing interactions bear tensions, unspoken feelings, prejudices, barriers, and unchallenged assumptions. The communities do not have proper knowledge about each other. Islamic education in the host country does not particularly provide a remedy to this either. This is particularly emphasized in Spain. The interviewees repeatedly stated that Muslim communities are afraid of each other, not because they do not know each other but they are strangers to each other. In Spain, the interviews brought up a few reasons sustaining this deficiency of communal interactions. These are racism, ignorance, conservatism, and ghetto mentality. Particularly ignorance is a result of the large number of uneducated Muslim immigrants from rural backgrounds.

Another important point in Muslim communities’ fragmentation is their level of integration. If the younger generations of Muslim members became deeply integrated into the host society, they become detached from their communities. A good example for this is Argentina, where due to the high-level integration of Arab Muslims, over 60% of their second generation are no longer fluent Arab speakers and their parents’ newspapers and journals of their communities have been discarded. They even change their names in order to reduce the influence of some elements of faith that would distinguish them from non-Muslim society.

Muslim organizations’ level of effectiveness creates an interesting sort of segregation. Some organizations are officially recognized and have a stronger influence on inter-community affairs. This results in a ranking amongst Muslim organizations, which fuels a power struggle on financial support from the state. For example, in Germany only recognized organizations are able to negotiate with the state or benefit from official financial support. Therefore, Muslim organizations complete with each other to be legally recognized which made them to see each other as rivals, instead of allies. A similar situation is pronounced in Spain. Two main bodies of Muslim representation in the country cannot reach an agreement because of their
struggle for power and influence. In Argentina, Muslim NGOs administrative structuring creates extra division. Muslims Centro Islámico de la República Argentina (CIRA) is run by Sunnis and Shia Muslims do not have administration influence on this main institution of Muslim representation. Although marriages, as suggested above, are strengthening Muslims sense of belonging, they could also increase the segregation within Muslim communities. In the US, some participants stated that the differences in cultural upbringing make them refrain from marrying a black female. Although this trend is changing, it gives a hint that there are continuing racial tensions, although at a very low level, within Muslim communities.

One main element in developing the inter-communal relations of the Muslims is their organizations’ outreach activities. In Spain, some Muslim NGOs organize cultural, musical, and spiritual activities to introduce Islam to others. They also organize silent meditation sessions as a part of the inter-communal encounter and inter-faith dialogue, in which people from different faith groups meditate in silence about the spiritual and transcendent experience of the human being and exchange their thoughts and feelings. Due to the effectiveness of these outreach activities, Muslim communities come together and share cultural values, in happiness and sadness, for example marriages, Eid celebrations. Yet, even for Eid celebrations there cannot be a harmonious coexistence since different Muslim communities celebrate Eid on different days. Muslim organizations’ charity activities could also unite Muslim communities via charity and fund-raising events. In Canada, this was experienced during the Syrian refugee crisis. In Argentina the main representational institution, CIRA has been trying to amplify the third generation Muslims’ interest to be more engaged with Islam. For this, they use Ramadan celebrations for circulating Islamic symbols, news and discourses amongst the attendees.

Global socio-political events related to Muslims also have a potential to unite Muslim communities, at least rhetoric-wise. The Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, Syrian crisis, the Kashmir issue, and the suffering of Uyghur people in China are some of them. For example, in Canada, some interviewees underlined this point but, understandably, they also stated that they can also help the Muslims caught in these incidents by charity and relief activities, bringing a political resolution to these issues is way beyond Muslim diasporic communities’ power.

The 9/11 had an interesting “positive” impact on the unity on Muslim communities. The pressure posed by the officials and some segments of the target society increased the awareness about Islam, which indirectly brought the Muslim communities closer together and helped building resistance. For example, the interviews in the US revealed that, at Barnes and Nobles, one of the biggest bookstore chains in the US, since 9/11, the best-selling book was the English translation of the Quran. Islamophobia does the same to some communities. The rise in anti-immigration and anti-Muslim incidents following Islamophobia brought a sense of unity and solidarity to the Muslims. This was particularly stated during the Britain fieldwork. In Australia, the Muslim youth counters Islamophobic tendencies by developing youth solidarity organizations assisting Muslims in various field of employment.
Another important factor increasing the interaction amongst Muslim communities is natural disasters. Although they do not necessarily unite every member of these communities, under providing humanitarian help and relief, Muslim organizations act together. In Japan, this occurred during the tsunami strikes. A rarely seen factor, on the other hand, is usually publications or media streams against the Islamic core values. The Danish cartoon affair of the Prophet Muhammad was an example, during which some Muslim organizations called upon the Japanese Muslim community to come together and condemn the act by protesting at the Danish Embassy.

The Survey data provides many important insights concerning the relations of Muslim communities in different countries. It would be proper to begin with the question on the subjective evaluation of the strength of relations between the Muslim communities among various other groups. In the Phase I survey the respondents were given a list and asked to describe how strong they think the various relationships were from very weak to very strong. It appears from the survey data that while the respondents in the UK generally had a positive outlook on the strength of the relations, the respondents in Berlin and Paris had generally a more negative view. The respondents in France and Germany seemed to get onto common ground with their UK fellows on the question of relations between the Muslim community and the origin country.

In Phase II surveys, the respondents were not given a list but merely asked to evaluate the strength of the relationship between the Muslim community and the host society. Once again, apart from the Japanese and Spanish cases, all other surveys found that the majority of respondents believed that the relationship between the Muslim community and the respective host society is a strong one. In both Japan and Spain, however, around half of the respondents characterized the strength of that relationship to be either weak or very weak.

Phase II surveys were equipped with extra questions to gather more information on the relations of the Muslim community. One such question concerned the level of engagement of Muslims in the public life. In most countries, the Muslim community is considered to be doing “OK”- not well but also not poorly. Spain was again an exceptional case where more than 70% of the respondents believe that the level of engagement of Muslims in public life is either poor or very poor.

Are Muslims interested in the politics of the countries in which they live? The survey data seems to show that particularly those in Spain, Argentina, Canada and USA do. It needs to be noted, however, that the level of interest is not very high. It is even lower among the Muslim communities in Australia and South Africa. However, other Muslim communities appear to display a healthy level of interest in the country politics. Next, the respondents were asked about the perceived level of influence that Muslim religious leaders have in political matters in each country. Here, the unified opinion was that they pose little influence, if at all. A significant number of respondents in Canada, South Africa and the US suggested that these religious leaders pose more than little influence, but overall their influence in political matters is considered quite limited.
How about the level of trust of Muslim communities to specific individuals? One group of such individuals are the political leaders that rise from amongst the Muslim communities. When the respondents were asked how strong their trust to such leaders was, most suggested a neither strong nor weak level of confidence. The level of trust appears to be lower in Australia and Spain compared to other countries, but overall it is quite close to the mid-point of the range in all countries. One frequent point of complaining among the Muslim communities is the dividedness and lack of cooperation amongst different Muslim organizations and religious groups. In the survey, the respondents were asked whether the level of cooperation between different Muslim groups was sufficiently strong or it should be improved. Not surprisingly, a significant majority of the respondents in most countries responded that the level of cooperation needs significant improvement. In fact, in some countries like Spain and Canada, those who suggest that the cooperation needs improvement makes up more than 80% of the respondents.

Another issue was the cooperation between the Muslim NGOs and the NGOs of the target countries. As to be expected, vast majorities of the respondents confirmed that improved cooperation would benefit not only Muslims but also everyone involved. Next, the respondents were asked how satisfied they were with the Muslim civil society organizations in their countries of residence. The answers confirmed the earlier finding that Muslim community believes that many aspects of the Muslim NGOs need improvement. Overall, the level of satisfaction was neither good nor bad, except for South Africa and Argentina. In these countries, a greater number of respondents are satisfied with the Muslim NGOs than those who are dissatisfied. Spain and Canada are the other countries where there is a relatively more positive view on the Muslim NGOs. In Australia, Japan and Canada, however, the outlook appears more negative.

42.2% are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with Muslim civil society organizations

42% tend to agree that improved cooperation and dialogue between Muslim community and civil society organizations can solve concerns of Muslims

Note: 1n = 2,664; 2n = 2,624; all the respondents were from Australia, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Canada, USA, and Argentina

After the local religious leaders of the Muslim community, how do the Muslim minorities perceive the leaders in Muslim countries? The data shows a quite negative outlook, in fact, a majority of the respondents in all the surveyed countries, except for Argentina, said they did not have confidence in the Muslim country leaders. When asked whether they find the Muslim NGOs in the country to be well engaged and active, there was a diverging set of answers. Apparently the Australian, Spain, and the US survey samples find the Muslim NGOs to be well engaged and active, while South Africa, Japan, Canada and Argentina survey
samples find them inactive. A question that aimed to learn the stance of Muslim communities on diversity was asked to survey respondents. Here, truly vast majorities opted for a more diverse Muslim community and they suggested it would be better if the Muslim community in their country consist of people from different nationalities, jamaats and cultures.

Factors against Muslim solidarity

- Personal Ambitions – 11.8%
- Cultural Differences – 15.7%
- Lack of Leadership – 17.8%
- Differences/Divisions among Jamaats – 20.4%

One common question that was asked in both phases concerned the main factors that worked against the unity of Muslims in the country. In the Phase I countries the most frequently suggested factors were lack of leadership, sectarian differences and dividedness, and lack of representation. In Germany, respondents also argued that cultural differences within the Muslim community also make unity difficult. In Phase II countries, similarly, the most frequently voiced factor was the differences and dividedness among different Muslim groups across the board. It was followed, again, by lack of leadership and cultural differences. Therefore, it can be argued that, no matter how far away these countries are from one another or how different historical, political and cultural contexts they have, the Muslim communities still suffer similar problems that keep them from forming stronger communities that are unified in solidarity. This may be a strong call for the Muslims to question this about themselves.
8 Future Projections for the Muslims

8.1. Transformation of Life for Muslims

One major element, which has been transforming Muslims’ lives in almost every target country, was 9/11. The incident with the socio-political pressure coming from the US administrations created a global trend on Muslims’ scrutiny. Some target countries, for example Australia, Britain, France and to an extent Germany followed this event more closely than the others did. Canada, Argentina, and Japan are three countries, which did not very closely follow this trend and did not particularly increase the pressure on the Muslims. The 9/11 not only increased the discrimination in socio-economic realm but also placed them under serious official scrutiny in their everyday life. With the 9/11’s transformative influence, some Muslims had to change their lifestyle and even their names to curb the pressure coming from the official channels. On the other hand, increased official and social pressure in host societies pushed some members of Muslims to the corner, which increased their potential of radicalization.

The integration level and patterns of Muslims also affect their socio-economic and even psychological transformation. For example, in Argentina, the Muslim identity of many members has been eroding. Only a small minority of third generation Muslims in Argentina are interested in learning about their roots and religion. There is a value-based separation between Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, the larger society of non-Muslims has an expectation from the Muslims to adapt to their non-Islamic values and to an extent life style. This usually relies on the separation between culture and religion. Muslims cultural values are mostly acceptable with the host society but when they are amalgamated with religious practices and principles, it can produce strain in inter-communal relations.

Media, as in under several other titles is another important transformation of Muslim communities. In several target countries, such as the US, Britain, France, Australia, Canada, Muslims run their own media channels. Although they are still not popular and influential enough to counter the widespread negative arguments against the Muslims. There is obviously a development in the effectiveness of Muslim organizations in target countries, which is also a transformation in their representation and presentation. Increasing usage of social media also helps this transformation. Yet, as explained under several subtitles they are still not efficient enough to bring the demands and issues of their communities into their agendas. In more general terms, the transformation of Muslims’ life depends on their capacity to overcome internal and external challenges, dedication to try to excel themselves, ability to embrace their diversity, and commitment to engage socially, politically, and economically.
8.2. The Future Projections and Expectations

In several workshops and interviews, the future projections of Muslims have generally two outlooks. The first one is a brighter and a promising future relying on the confidence in the Muslim youth, high level of education, and Muslims’ potential and dedication to excel themselves. The second outlook is a bit concerned about certain features of Muslim communities and national and global developments they need to deal with. For the future projections, one main element is the citizenship ratio of Muslim migrants. Citizenship does not increase the weight of Muslim communities vis-à-vis the rest of the population in the strategic calculations of socio-political decision makers but also their political engagement. For example, in Japan, the majority of Muslims do not hold Japanese citizenship, which also renders the community’s political engagement level. In a traditional and immigration-wary country like Japan, Japanese Muslims’ involvement in politics would potentially be much more effective and fruitful compared to the involvement of Muslim politicians of immigrant origin.

In some target countries, Muslims mostly complain about the negligence of legal system regarding Muslims’ rights. Therefore, Muslim community representatives are scapegoats of the host countries’ legal system. To an extent, this attitude helps Muslim representatives to legitimize their failure to protect and enhance Muslims rights. Their implicit discourse is that there is always a legal or “invisible” barrier against Muslims’ efforts to develop their situation. Yet, the non-Muslim policy makers of the host societies emphasize that Muslim organizations should stop fighting established legal and political structure and the system and develop their professionalism, sensitivities and mutual communication.

Employment, particularly in private sector is an important realm that Muslim communities face a significant level discrimination. At state level, employment legislations and regulations could mitigate this discrimination but the private sector is closed to such corrective and constructive intervention. In this sense, regulations and legislations are required to improve Muslims’ employment levels in private sector. This requires more refined, multidimensional, and effective policies for long-lasting and constructive results.

Education is another pressing issue for the future of Muslims. It is a global challenge at both individual and community levels. Education is important for maintaining the Islamic identity and passed it to Muslim children, for inculcating them the values of Islam when educating them according to values that free them from any insecurities so that they feel like full citizens with full rights, and that they maintain their roots. Muslims need to renovate Islamic education, balance it with secular education, and give weight to graduate level for both genders. In several fieldworks, it was emphasized that increasing Muslim youth’s educational attainments and quality of education is a key to major socio-economic and even political problems Muslim communities are facing. With a better-educated Muslim youth, the diversity dilemma and the conflict over representation will become either less visible or redundant, altogether. The increase in the level of education could also improve inter/intra-communal
interaction, not only via reducing the language barrier but also the communities get the know about the communalities they share.

Muslim NGOs’ means to represent Islam and administer their communities need to be modified. These NGOs need to introduce Islam to others in society through more effective mechanisms that aim to counter unfavourable representations, stereotypes, and misconceptions. They also need to address the increasing level of intra- and inter-communal tensions, sectarian divisions, and sectional loyalties and develop a truly egalitarian and inclusionist structures with both established and emerging communities. Muslim NGOs should encourage their members to be more politically involved since widespread apathy among Muslims towards politics has caused a decline in the political representation and visibility of Muslims. Muslim NGOs also need to put forward the communalities their communities in order to foster their unity. This could be either via an umbrella organization or via collaboration between formidable NGOs. For this, Muslim leaders should be more aware of their communities’ both generational and gender-specific demands. Younger generation Muslims need to take more part in these organizations’ administrative and executive apparatus as well. This could bring a fine-tuned balance between sectarian, general, traditional, modernist elements of Muslim communities.

Transparency and efficiency are two important elements that Muslim NGOs need to put more emphasis on. Almost in every target country interviewees stated that Muslim NGOs are not immune to corruption, in terms of nepotism, fraud, and embezzlement. This has a noteworthy negative effect on Muslims’ confidence in their NGOs. The NGOs should be more inclusionist of various Muslim communities’ general, ethnic, generational, and racial claims and rights. In this inclusion, NGOs need to pay a specific attention to Muslim women’s role and influence. Many female interviewees repeatedly stated that especially established and comprehensive Muslim NGOs exclude female members of the community from particularly the administrative apparatus of the organizations. This not only minimizes Muslim women’s role on the activities and strategies of the organization but also discards women’s demands.

Against Islamophobic and xenophobic tendencies, the respondents in many target countries stated the need to be a more scholarly, open and embracing method of disseminating the cultural depth and richness of Islamic civilization. An important optimistic outlook about Muslim communities’ future focuses on the fact that Muslims have been providing a significant input to the socio-economic capacity of the country at stake. Especially via the educated and well-integrated Muslim youth this capacity has certainly been developing. Relatedly, the younger generations are more resilient than the previous. Especially with the increasing number of their youth, Muslims also has the capability to fill in the gaps of the labour force in rapidly and severely ageing populations, such as in Japan.

To reduce the lingering hurdles, Muslim communities need to develop channels and platforms of interaction to resolve internal conflicts, hostilities, and rivalries. It is also required to deal with the “fear factor,” i.e., the extent to which the fear that is politically manipulated and
circulated by certain power circles to keep Muslim potential separated, isolated, and under control.

Communities’ socio-political participation level also needs to be expanded. This participation should be both in media as well as local and national politics. In this participation, Muslims should not challenge the host country’s mainstream cultural values, rather they need to balance them. This could either be Muslims’ emphasizing the similarities between two cultures and/or bring two cultures’ representatives together to promote these similarities. In this process, Muslims should also seize the opportunity concerning the lack of existing knowledge and prejudices about Islam, and turn this into an advantage by informing the public about Islam and Muslims in positive way. For an effective coexistence of variety of cultures, there need to be a robust legal and political framework, in which Muslims need to have a say. This will enhance the cross-cultural acceptance, understanding and participation.

The surveys included questions on the future expectations of Muslims, as well. When the Phase I surveys asked the respondents how they would project the future for the Muslims living in that country, Muslims that live elsewhere in Europe and Muslims that live Muslim-majority countries, the respondents in Germany and France were significantly pessimistic. Those in Britain were more neutral and suggested that they believed the future will be pretty much being the same for Muslims in Britain, it will be worse for the Muslims who live in other European countries, but it will be better for the Muslims living in Muslim countries. Respondents in Germany suggested that they expect the future to be worse for the Muslims in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. They were, at least, more optimistic about the future of Muslims in Muslim countries, for whom they expected the future to be the same. Lastly, the most pessimistic of them all, the respondents in France predicted a ‘much worse’ future for the Muslims in France and a bad one for the Muslims across Europe. They were also more optimistic about the future of the Muslims in Muslim countries.

The same question was posed to the respondents in the Phase II surveys, however only for the Muslims living in the same country as the respondents. The outlook of these respondents was much more optimistic. In fact, without exception, in every single country survey those expecting a better future for the Muslim community in their country outnumbered those expecting the future to remain the same or become worse.

An additional question concerning the future expectations was added in the second phase surveys. Considering the importance of economics, the respondents were asked about their expectations for their financial situation in the coming 12 months. Again, the general tone
was an optimistic one with a larger number of respondents reporting expectations for the better. However, when the question was qualified with the financial aspect, the degree of optimism seems to have taken a minor hit.

Lastly, the respondents were asked about a potential return migration. More specifically, they were asked whether they would consider going back to their respective countries of origin to live and work there. Except for the respondents in Japan and South Africa, the majorities of the respondents in all countries suggested that they would not consider such a return movement. It makes sense that a significant majority of the Muslims in Japan might plan returning given the fact that they are considered only to be temporary migrants in the country. On the other hand, those Muslims in South Africa who can identify a country of origin for themselves also leave the door open for a future move, which could be motivated by the malaise created by the widespread nature of crime in the country and a lack of security.

8.3. The Future for the Global Muslim Diaspora

During fieldworks of this study, the concept of Global Muslim Diaspora was not completely well received or comprehended by the interviewees and workshop attendees. In other words, there are two overarching perspectives of the attendees on the concept: a hopeful and confident outlook that could be identified as optimistic and a reservedly positive one that could be termed cautious. In many target countries, a significant number of Muslims did not detach themselves from their original national self. On the contrary, they have developed a diasporic identity that rests on a double space as dual citizens of the host country and their country of origin. With such an understanding, host country’s Muslim community becomes a part of the global discourse of Muslim identity, which emphasizes its cultural distinctiveness.

The concept is applicable to Muslim communities since they have similar ideas and values, and face similar challenges and have similar needs even if they are dispersed. Moreover, stigmatization and attacks towards Muslim identity and Islam push Muslims towards developing a reactive diasporic consciousness. On the other hand, Muslims do harbour many differences even within the same country, such as sectional, sectarian, ethnic, national, racial, and cultural. In addition to these differences, Muslims integrated in a particular country usually adapt to that country’s politico-legal, cultural and social system and therefore develop a distinctive diasporic identity. The lack or deficiencies in intercommunal interactions brought up the fact that in many countries Muslim communities are almost strangers to each other.
Even if different Muslim ethnicities live in the same suburb, they live in their own enclaves with minimum interaction with one another. One remedy for this has been pronounced as developing Muslim media channels with streams bringing different ethnicities together. This will not only help these ethnicities to know each other but also develop arguments and possibly policies to counter the issues they commonly face. In several workshops, the concept was linked with the idea of home. Accordingly, diaspora was seen as a community which was no more in its homeland but live with the memory of home or a hope to go back home. This does not fit into many communities examined. For example, in the US, for a large majority of Muslims home is not anywhere but the US.

Another deficiency in Muslim diaspora is its diverse nature. It is so diverse and complex which cannot be called as a single diaspora. This is aggravated by the disconnectedness and some quiet tension with the countrywide communities. There is also a disagreement about Muslim communities of the same country should have a single voice. In some workshops, such as in Britain, the attendees stated the need for having a Great Mufti, like an Archbishop, to unite all muftis. Yet, such an organization will face problems in its governing structure, managing different theologies, and to deal with isolated and excluded Muslim communities. Moreover, some other attendees refused this idea due to the possibility that such authority cannot easily be as independent as required from the government of the country at stake. The OIC needs to develop a more universal rhetoric of humanity and values of humanity first. By linking, those values with Islam, a more democratic, open and inclusive international society could be created.

The Surveys for this study included several questions concerning the concept of Global Muslim Diaspora, views on the global Muslim Ummah and transnational solidarity among Muslims. As a starting point, in Phase I surveys, the respondents were asked whether they believed that the success of Islam depended on the unity of Ummah. Almost 50% of the respondents in Germany and a massive 74% of the respondents in France responded affirmatively. Those who agreed with this statement also outnumbered any other group in the UK as well, however, those who agreed only accounted for about one third of the respondents.

Then, the respondents were asked three questions about the concept of Muslim diaspora. First, they were asked whether they have ever heard of this concept, to which a slight majority responded no in all three contexts. Then, they were asked whether they believe that there is a Muslim diaspora in their country of residence. Half of the respondents in the UK suggested to believe in the existence of a Muslim diaspora in Britain, while only a minority in Germany argued the same. In the French case, again, a greater number of respondents suggested that
there indeed is a Muslim diaspora in France. Lastly, the respondents were asked whether it would be advantageous for Muslims if there were a strong Muslim diaspora in the country. In all their contexts, more people responded to this question positively than negatively. The second question above was asked in the Phase II surveys. In other words, the respondents were asked whether they believed that there is a Muslim diaspora in that country. The responses were overwhelmingly affirmative to this question. In fact, only in Japan a greater number said ‘no’ than ‘yes’.

Next, the respondents in the Phase II countries were asked whether they felt a strong bond with other Muslims around the world. The unanimous response was ‘yes, I feel a strong bond with all other Muslims around the world’. A smaller number of respondents in each country suggested that they feel a strong bond with people from some countries; while the number of those who suggested that they do not feel a strong bond was much smaller in each case. Finally, there were questions related to the OIC in both phase surveys. In the Phase I Surveys, the respondents were first asked whether they believed that the OIC represented the rights of the Muslims better than other governmental and non-governmental actors did. Then, the respondents were asked whether they think that the OIC must assume a more active role to achieve Muslim unity. The responses to this second question was much more positive, indicating that even though Muslim minorities might not be very knowledgeable about OIC, they still intuitively realize that an international umbrella organization for all Muslims could be very helpful in establishing a more unified and stronger Muslim bond.

The respondents were first asked whether they have heard the name of the organization. Although significant number of respondents also suggested that, they have heard about it, in every single case they were outnumbered by those who have not. Just like the respondents in the Phase I surveys, the respondents here too very strongly suggested that they believe that there is a need for OIC to play a greater role in representing globally the rights of Muslims and promote cooperation and security among them.
Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite the initial intention to not center this study on certain concepts (such as Islamophobia) that are now governing the scholarship and discussions over the Muslim communities of the non-Muslim majority countries, discrimination, Islamophobia, and rising anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant politics and sentiments in the Western world have been the most emphasized and voiced themes during the fieldworks. With the exemptions of South Africa, Japan, and Canada, in all field studies, these themes emerged as the most urgent and overwhelming issues facing Muslims now. Particularly in Australia, the USA, and France the representatives of the Muslim communities and organizations were seriously concerned about these issues. In the UK, Germany, and Argentina the concerns and reservations were also expressed, though to a lesser extent.

With the exception of Japan, Canada, and partially Argentina, all the contexts covered in the field studies have been observed to be marked by the lack of conversation and cooperation or even intra- and inter-communal contestations and conflicts. It was observed that for a better and harmonious coexistence in the adopted countries, a stronger social interaction, dialogue, and engagement is not only needed between the Muslim communities, the wider societies, and other non-Muslim groups but within the Muslim communities, as well. Even countries that appeared to be relatively free of such problems (very little or no sectarian, generational, ethnic or cultural tensions) portray a better picture in terms of intra and inter-communal relations, the need for the Muslim communities to outreach to different segments of their community, larger society, other minority groups, and the diasporic Muslim communities outside their own adopted countries have been pointed by many participants. In the UK, Australia, the USA, and France the main reasons for the lack of unity, interaction, and cooperation, as stated by numerous participants, seemed to be the super-diversity of the Muslim community in the country. Some also named an ineffective leadership mechanism and the organizational failures as the main culprits. Overall, it could be argued that the lack of interaction, dialogue, and unity among Muslims is the most voiced and concerned the problem of the Muslim communities in the non-OIC member countries.

In all contexts where the field studies were conducted, the issue of visibility and political representation has come to fore as one of the biggest problems. In South Africa, Canada, and partly in the UK, the Muslim communities had no problems related to social and political visibility and only some concerns about the level of political representation. In the rest of the countries, in the USA, France, Germany, and Australia the level of visibility and political representation observed to be very low. In Spain, while visibility of Islam and Muslims was not so low, mostly thanks to the historical legacy of al-Andalus, the political representation was close to nil. In Japan, partly because of the Muslim community’s size and short history in the country, partly because of the system, it was still early to speak about visibility and representation. Argentina, on the other hand, in terms of both the visibility and representation of Islam and Muslims, presented the most problematical context. Although
the presence of Islam and Muslims goes back to early 19th century and the size of the community is estimated to be at least half a million, even in its biggest city of Buenos Aires a sign of Islamic presence is a rare sight.

One of the main findings of the field studies is that the diasporic Islamic space is growing fast worldwide. This is thanks to not only the higher fertility and marriage rate among the Muslim communities but also because the economic and educational advantages and opportunities and egalitarian, multicultural, and accommodating political, legal, and civic frameworks of the adopted countries despite the issues and problems they involve continue to attract Muslims around the globe. The diasporic Muslim communities of the non-OIC member states are often composed of a community of individuals who are notably young and eager to integrate and work. Given the fact that the majority of adopted countries have a fast-aging population with a considerably low rate of reproduction, the Muslim community appears as a potential power for future development.

The vast majority of Muslim representatives, experts, activists, and leaders that have been interviewed throughout the field studies have projected a quite bright and prosperous future for their community and adopted country. Even individuals who adopted a cautious and reserved approach and expressed their concerns remained optimistic about the future course of Muslim development. One point emphasized anonymously was that the future for Muslims will be determined by Muslims’ capacity, dedication, and efforts to overcome internal (increasing Islamophobia, discrimination, xenophobia, and economic contraction and unemployment) and external (international crises, the global rise in far-right populism, anti-immigrant politics, etc.,) challenges. Nonetheless, the self-confidence in Muslim capacity and youth to overcome these challenges and build a better future for the Muslim community and the world was very clear and heartening. Below are listed the most important findings of the GMD with recommendations and implications for different stakeholders.

**For the Muslim Communities, Organizations, Institutions, and Leadership and Influence Mechanisms of the Adopted Countries**

1. As numerous participants have suggested in the roundtable discussions, interviews, workshops, and surveys, the stigmatizing political discourses in the media have actually a limited resonance in the larger society in many contexts, including the USA where the anti-Muslim media outlets and politics are strongest. This is to say, the media and politics are the main influencers, and thus culprits, in seeding the anti-Muslim sentiments and Islamophobic attitudes; the societies are mostly under their manipulative control. From this perspective the Muslim communities, leaders, and countries are advised to extend their organizational power and influence in the media and political realms. Establish strong media infrastructures; thus, is critical in fighting against the anti-Muslim discourse and the present a counter-narrative. Rather than using only conventional media, however, the focus should be placed upon social media with the target audience of Muslim and non-Muslim youth. Equally important is that
serious measures are developed and taken against websites, and other online channels and social media platforms that encourage both Islamophobia and Islamic radicalization.

II. Although the harmful and counterproductive effects consist of a very long list, some unintended collateral good and benefits come from Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments and politics. In many contexts, particularly in Australia, the UK, the USA, and Spain, the representatives of the Muslim communities have pointed that the stigmatization of the Islamic identity and the anti-Islam discourse and politics have fuelled the feeling of solidarity and unity among the diverse Muslim community, even led to the development of a diasporic consciousness. These feelings, furthermore, also have brought the Muslim communities and other religious and ethnic minority groups together to stand against the discrimination and injustices. However, this does pose yet another danger. That is negative representation in the media, the global rise in far-right politics, and anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim discourses and acts in the Western world have brought the Muslim communities closer in many contexts and this will eventually lead to the emergence of a reactive Muslim identity that is overdetermined by negative representation, discourses, and practices, and this is alarming and dangerous. Thus, the leaders, policymakers, politicians, NGO’s, and intellectuals of these contexts should be warned against this double-edged nature of the politics of Islamophobia and discrimination.

III. One of the main observations recorded during the field studies was that even in the contexts where the Muslim organizations and communities were more established and powerful, such as South Africa, Canada, the USA, and the UK, Muslim individuals and groups have very limited knowledge about discrimination and Islamophobia. This points out that little or no information and education is provided to the members of the community about these issues. In some occasions the research team realized that individuals did not know how to react when being exposed to Islamophobic and discriminatory treatment and discourses and had very limited information about how to claim their rights and the procedure of the reporting the incident. In some marginal cases, the individuals were not even aware of the anti-Muslim nature of the act. Thus, it is strongly recommended that the Muslim stakeholders, leaders, and the NGOs’ put a particular emphasis on establishing both formal and informal educational settings, materials, and activities in their fight against these issues.

IV. An often-ignored negative effect of the discrimination and anti-Muslim rhetoric is the socio-political self-marginalization, which often is the outcome of a growing scepticism toward politics. Even in countries where anti-Muslim rhetoric is weakest, such as Japan, South Africa, and Canada, this scepticism signals a psychological inhibition towards the public expression of political views and being socio-politically engaged among Muslim individuals. In accordance with this, as a counter-measurement, the Muslim communities, organizations, and leaders are recommended to inform the
Muslim public about the empowerment through political mobilization and the importance of social engagement.

V. On a more positive note, however, the new generations have been observed to be less influenced by this type of self-marginalization and inhibitions. Put differently, the Muslim youth and groups are finally emancipating themselves from the political, psychological, and socio-pathological damages and maladies of anti-Muslim rhetoric, center-right populism, Islamophobia and discrimination that have become prevalent in the post-9/11 Western world. This is why, the Muslim policymakers, leaders, organizations are strongly encouraged to invite the Muslim youth to the platforms where these issues are discussed. The Muslim youth, in other words, has been observed to be equipped with both theoretical knowledge and efficient and practical measures and means in fighting against Islamophobia and anti-Islam rhetoric.

VI. Particularly in Spain, France, and Germany, the Muslim communities and individuals are also disappointed with the failure of the respective official bodies and authorities in implementing and enforcing the rights and liberties that are recognized and allegedly protected by the legislation and constitutions. Although certain representatives voiced such discomfort and concerns in many contexts, particularly in these three countries, the participants in the interviews, workshops, and discussions expressively pointed that discrimination and anti-Muslim rhetoric, practices, sentiments are not challenged or discouraged by the government authorities, officials, protective measures are not taken, and concerns are mostly ignored. As many have stressed, organizational and communal power and influence in the political arena is a key element in order to push for relevant agendas and create official awareness. Thus, the Muslim organizations, institutions, and centres are invited to raise a united voice and push for the adoption and implementation of the protective measures, passing of relevant motions against Islamophobia, discrimination, racism, and anti-immigrant discourses and practices.

VII. The super-diversity and over-fragmentation of Muslim communities is a prevalent reality everywhere. The recognition of it, thus, imperative in developing practical and efficient solution to the challenges that are caused by this reality. A greater and firmer sense of unity among Muslims of the non-OIC member states, however, could be established and developed through the promotion and celebration of the commonalities and similarities rather than differences and peculiarities. Here the acknowledgment of diversity and maintenance of a truly inclusive and representational Islamic identity is equally important. Thus, the representational bodies, organizations, leaders, and policy-makers of the Muslim space should avoid imposing their own ethno cultural, denominational, and ideological outlook of Islam and Muslimness, as the “true, correct, and authentic” one. Such outlooks and attitudes will bring about the alienation and marginalization of certain segments of the community and harm the sense of belonging, solidarity, and unity among members of the Muslim diaspora and the Ummah.
VIII. It was observed particularly in Canada, Spain, the UK, and the USA that Muslim groups and organizations with a more secular outlook tend to put more emphasis on the spiritual and cultural aspects of Islamic identity and often avoids not only its political and performable aspects but also its social and communal aspects and requirements. This is to say, despite having a high level of sense of belonging towards the ethno-religious community and the Ummah, they abstain from being socialized and engage with the members of community. This inhibition towards the social and the communal aspects of Islam is mostly brought about the fear of being marginalized, stigmatized, and discriminated by the larger society. Another reason might be the inseparability of the religious and the social in the Muslim space of many countries. The Muslim NGO’s, religious and cultural centres and leaders, and communities, thus, are invited to create intercultural events where not only different denominations and faith groups can come together but also non-religious aspects of the Muslim life are demonstrated and shared.

IX. Linguistic diversity and the dominance of the first generations in the Muslim space, too, were noticed to be an important factor in the lack of intra- and inter-communal relations and disunity. In the countries where the younger generations of Muslims who are native speakers of the language of the adopted country have taken control of the Islamic space, e.g., the USA, Canada, and Argentina, the sense of unity and interaction is observed to be stronger among the members of the community. Being able to speak the same language, in other words, is effective in lessening, if not eradicating, the negative impacts of cultural, denominational, and ethnic differences and diversity. Thus, it is important that the Muslim communities, organizations, countries, and leaders emphasize the importance of the proficiency of the language of the adopted country and the creation of bilingual or multilingual cultural centres and places of worships. Put differently, multilingual imams and mosques are key elements in not only reaching out to the non-Muslim groups but in achieving unity and interaction within the community, as well.

X. Similarly, it was observed that the majority of first generation Muslims dictate and follow an ethno-nationalist understanding of Islam and Muslim life which in turn bring about sectional loyalties, closed clusters, and lack of interaction. Thus, the organizations, leadership mechanisms, and representative bodies of the Muslim community are strongly advised to include the Muslim individuals, experts, leaders, and activists of the second and further generations in their networks and administration, rather than simply opting for the more prominent older generations. Muslim youth is by far the most important source of influence and advantage for the greater and better change, the older generations can remain reluctant in sharing their positions and power. It is the responsibility of Muslim umbrella organizations and leadership mechanisms to utilize and promote the power and capacity of the Muslim youth. The research team found it quite encouraging and heartening that the Muslim youth of each country that the field studies have been conducted harboured a greater
potential and enthusiasm to focus on the unifying aspects of their religious identity and respect diversity within their greater Muslim community, rather than maintaining sectional loyalties and ethno-cultural differences. Thus, at the risk of repetition, the GMD project team suggests that the Muslim youth is included in every decision-making processes as a key element at local, national, and international levels.

XI. One of the most common reasons for the lack of interaction within the Muslim community is the intergenerational differences and tensions. As many participants in the workshops, discussions, and interviews have maintained, the survival or “finding their feet” was the first and foremost agenda for the first-generation Muslims. Adaptation and integration, for them, was not their priority. For the second and further generations, however, being accepted by the larger society and the new identity that they have gained through being educated, raised, and integrated into the adopted country is as much important as their ethno-national and religious backgrounds. The majority of the first generation Muslims finds such inclinations alarming. This clash between the desire of the younger generation to integrate and the ambition of the older generation to protect brings about intergenerational tensions, conflicts, and dissociations. Once again, the responsibility lies with the organizations, educational centres, instructors and community leaders to relieve the concerns of the older generations through pointing successful models of integration and identity maintenance and ensure the preservation of the religio-cultural identity, ideals, and values among the Muslim youth. Older generations should be reminded of the fact that integration and assimilation are different responses to need for adaptation. They should understand that being integrated into the system, society, and life of their adopted countries would also bring more connection, interaction, and unity among the diasporic Muslim community. It was observed during the field studies that a British Muslim living in the UK is more likely to be aware of the situation and profile of not only Muslim groups in the UK but also other Muslim communities around the world while, in comparison, a Pakistani Muslim living in the UK tends to have a limited knowledge only about his ethno-national sub-group.

XII. While the relations between the Muslim community and the larger society and other minorities are acceptably good in the public sphere, it was observed that particularly within the Muslim spaces where the first generation Muslims are dominant a socio-political instinct and cultural inclination for segregation and isolation is prevalent. This inclination was detected clearly in Australia, France, Germany, and the UK, though not in all Muslim sub-groups. It should be noted that in all these contexts, in parallel with their socio-economic status, classes, and historical presence Muslim sub-groups demonstrate different attitudes and outlooks in terms of interaction with the larger society. The Turkish community in France presents an overwhelmingly more enclosed and isolated Muslim group in comparison with the Moroccan community, partly due to the linguistic disadvantage while the Turkish community of the USA is quite successfully integrated. Ghettoization stands as a big challenge in unblocking of the
channels of social interaction. With the second and further generations, the problem of segregation becomes less worrying but there another concern comes to the fore in the Muslim space: the risk of losing religious and cultural identity. Prevalent particularly among the individuals and communities of the first-generation Muslim immigrants, the fear of losing contact with the ethno-religious identity at the expense of integration is understandable. Here, the responsibility lies with the religious leaders and figures of influence to address such fears and relieve the members of the community. The Muslim organizations, leaders, policy-makers and figures of influence, therefore, should encourage convincing models that accommodate both the economic, political, and social integration and the protection and maintenance of religious and cultural identity. The example of Canada and Canadian Muslims stands as an example, here.

XIII. In some countries, the Muslim contribution is mainly through the provision of the cheap labour force. For example, in Spain, France, Germany, and Australia, the relations between the Muslim community and the wider society tend to be weaker. This is partly due to the tendency among Muslims of such contexts to remain economically, politically, and socially disengaged. Muslim individuals and communities have a tendency to perceive their presence as contemporary, which often leads to less effort to integrate and interact. Both the established Muslim communities and certain segments of the larger society find this attitude unacceptable. The narrative frame of “come-work-earn-go back and investing home country” that is very common among Muslim immigrants, puts those who desire to establish a Muslim life in their adopted countries in a difficult position because in the eyes of the society this narrative frame equal the presence of Muslims in the country as an outsider and an imported cheap labour force. Thus, Muslims contribution has to be diversified and permanent if the Muslim community wishes to claim its rightful share, place, visibility, and representation in the country and establish an effective engagement with its society. As many participants from the established Muslim communities of Spain, France, and Germany have expressed, the failure and disinclination in socio-cultural integration damage the success of Islam and Muslims for it brings about a delay in the establishment of Islamic infrastructure and results in weaker socio-economic and political profiles and positions.

XIV. An aspect of the relations between the Muslim community and the larger society that often escapes attention is its gendered nature. Particularly prevalent among the newly arrived Muslim communities and first generations, the interaction between the Muslim community and other groups and the larger society is mostly, if not exclusively, androcentric. Partly because the Muslim women are confined to the private realms for ethno-cultural reasons (responsible from the caring of children and housekeeping) partly due to the language barrier (which consolidate their confinement to the private realm), the Muslim women, in other words, is the least interacting segment of the Muslim community. Women’s social segregation has many negative effects in overall
success of Muslim integration into and, engagement with the larger society and other minority groups. This phenomenon is common to almost all contexts covered in this project. Muslim communities and organizations’ reluctance to include Muslim women in the representation and leadership mechanisms deteriorates the situation. Feeling marginalized by their coreligionists, Muslim women becomes a disintegrated and disengaged element within the Muslim community. Thus, it is crucial that Muslim organizations have gender equality in governing boards and encourage Muslim women’s social engagement with the larger society. Muslim women’s confinement to the private, it should be emphasized, will lead to the confinement of Islam to the private, ultimately. In order to make Islam and Muslims an integral part of life in the non-OIC member states, the social, political, and economic inclusion and mobilization of Muslim women is of vital importance. Otherwise, the patriarchal concerns will confine Islam into the private realm.

XV. With almost no exception, it could be argued that Muslims’ political capacity is nowhere fully reflected yet in the political participation records. An improvement in formal political participation was observed among the Muslim communities, in almost all the countries, the field studies were conducted. In particular, in Australia, the USA, Spain, and France, it was observed that the rise in anti-Muslim rhetoric and far-right populism was effective. The increase in formal political involvement and electoral participation is doubtless encouraging and important. It is equally important, however, that this increase is the outcome of proactive socio-political engagement rather than being reactive, defensive, and aggressive responses to negative discourses directed at Muslims. The Muslim political organizations, policy-makers, and leadership mechanisms are, for this reason, advised to warn their communities about the risks, dangers, and limits of reactionary politicization and remind them the importance of developing and adopting transformative politics against the anti-Muslim right-wing populism.

In certain contexts, especially in Spain, France, the USA, and Argentina, the respondents portrayed quite a dark and despondent picture in terms of the visibility and representation of Muslims and Islam in the country. The most influential reason for this was observed to be the biased media coverage. In the majority of the media in these countries and others, the Muslim communities, individuals, and Islam are reduced to terrorism, invader-outsider immigrants, and security agendas. Such negative visibility and representation bring about isolation, fear, and anxiety towards politics and the political. In many contexts, it was disheartening to observe an inconsistency and contradiction between a quite high level of interest in the politics among Muslims and a low level of participation and involvement, which was often explained by the participants as a sign of self-marginalization and self-exclusion. What deteriorates this picture is that the Muslim community is lacking sufficient capacity and infrastructure to confront and respond to the discourse and narrative of the anti-Muslim media. Lacking financial resources, Muslim organizations often seek and
accept support from Muslim-majority countries. This, however, lay them open to overseas interference and control, which weakens the relations and trust between the Muslim community and the official authorities, bodies, and the larger society of adopted countries. Both Muslim and non-Muslim organizations, parties, political figures, activists, and policy-makers, from this perspective, should work together to establish strong and effective Muslim media outlets for the presentation and expression of Muslim voice and the counter-narrative. They also should remind Muslim individuals and communities of the importance of political power, mobilization, and engagement in improvement and change. The Muslim communities and individuals should be aware of the fact that silence, self-isolation, resentment, apoliticization, and self-restraint outlooks will only consolidate the power of negative representation and anti-Muslim discourse.

For Domestic or National Authorities, Bodies, the Larger Societies, Non-Muslim Groups, and Established Muslim Communities of the Adopted Countries

I. Being observed particularly in South Africa, Canada, and partly in the UK, when provided with truly accommodating legal and political framework and enjoy untramelled and unmitigated freedom of religious and cultural rights, Muslims can contribute greatly and inspiring to not only the economy but also to the politics and democracy of the adopted countries. In such contexts, Muslims and Islam are visible, active, involved, and strong. Unlike in certain other non-OIC member states that host Muslim communities, in such countries, Muslim capacity is not weakened by Islamophobic and discriminative outlooks, surveillance mechanisms, control measures and agendas, and marginalization. In such countries, it was observed that the Muslim community is more eager, proactive, and dedicated to establishing a truly harmonious co-existence with other faith groups and the larger society, as well. Put it succinctly, a genuinely egalitarian, emancipatory, and transformative framework is key to social harmony and welfare. The government and officials of the adopted countries, thus, are strongly advised to develop and ensure the effective operation of such legal and political frameworks.

II. Monitored particularly in South Africa, Canada, Japan, and the UK, when Islam and Muslims are not merely tolerated and hired but promoted and embraced, the sense of belonging to the society and country they live gets impressively high. In such contexts, Muslims relations with the wider society and other minority groups are observed to be exemplary good. It was also observed that multiculturalism, the celebration and promotion of multiple loyalties and identities, inclusive legal and political frameworks, and transformative politics are the key elements for better-integrated and interacting societies and harmonious coexistence. A true commitment to these values will benefit not only Muslims but also all. Even in these exemplary contexts, however, it was observed that the legal and political framework and legislations could be obstructed by the practice. The official bodies and the leaders of
host countries should be aware of the fact that inclusive and egalitarian legal and political frameworks even when protected constitutionally do not guarantee the protection of rights and liberties. Ensuring the operational efficiency of such frameworks, thus, is the responsibility of governing and legislative bodies, NGO’s, leaders, and policy-makers of the host countries and the Muslim community together.

III. In many contexts, including Japan and Canada where the Muslim space is relatively free of intra-communal and inter-communal tensions, it was observed that the lack of interaction between isolated and disengaged clusters could lead to the illusion of harmonious coexistence. Thus, the organizations, institutions, centres of the Muslim community are advised to provide platforms and facilitate activities to bring distinct Muslim groups together and invite them to engage in dialogue. As numerous participants have stressed throughout the field studies, an interacted and engaged community will also perform better in engaging with the larger society and other non-Muslim groups. In this perspective, the Muslim communities, the official authorities, and the wider societies of the adopted countries should be aware of the fact that disengagement and self-marginalization do not mean harmony and integration.

IV. Being observed particularly in South Africa, Spain, France, Argentina, and Germany, another obstacle for the greater interaction, cooperation, and solidarity among the Muslim communities, is the tensions between the emergent or arriving communities and the established ones. Often, the established Muslim communities blame the new arrived Muslims or emerging convert communities for failing in integrating into the new country, adopting the new ways, or for not working hard to better their situation. The established Muslims in Spain and France, for instance, often blame the Muslim immigrants for clinging to their cultural-traditional Islam and not adopting a vernacular that is more appropriate to Europe. The immigrant communities, on the other hand, often interpret the concerns of the established communities as prejudices of the anti-Islam politics and blame such communities as being hypocritical and hoodwinked by the illusionary Western ideals. The established communities are right in arguing that the lack of integration brings about a lower level of interaction and dialogue not only between the Muslim community and the larger society but also within the community. However, the patronizing and accusing discourses that they adopt often border on the problematic dichotomy of insider-outsider and Europeans-others. Thusly, the established Muslim communities, unintentionally, adopt the same imposing, marginalizing, and stigmatizing outlook and rhetoric of the anti-Muslim/anti-immigrant populist movements, and consolidate such dichotomies and discourses.

V. One of the most significant findings of the GMD project in the field studies was that the members of Muslim communities of non-OIC member states, contrary to popular belief, do not find a contradiction between their Muslim identities and a strong sense of belonging to their adopted countries and societies. The findings of the GMD surveys revealed a very high sense of belonging among the participants everywhere towards both the Muslim community of the respective country, the Ummah, and the host
country and its society. It clearly demonstrated that the prevalent conviction about Muslim immigrants being generally unable to integrate into non-Muslim societies and develop a sense of belonging towards these societies is false. Thus, this conviction needs to be publicly overturned and its fallacy should be highlighted through relevant platforms, channels, and networks. The official bodies and authorities, stakeholders, the media and the societies of host countries should be informed about these findings.

VI. Even in countries like Canada, South Africa, and the UK where Muslims were relatively happy with the level of visibility and political representation they have, it was observed that the most of satisfaction came from Muslim political figures occupying certain positions at different levels and realms of the political arena. This, however, as some participants also pointed out, does not mean that a satisfactory level of political representation and participation that is in proportion with the capacity and size of the Muslim community has been obtained. In fact, even in some countries where the level of visibility and representation is much better in comparison to the others, in terms of political engagement, influence, and representation, the Muslim communities have a long way to go. Nevertheless, the Muslim communities in these countries and others are young and new to the political arena, and in each of these countries, significant improvements in the electoral participation and official representation of Muslims have been recorded in the past few decades. This trend is promising and is expected to continue. To keep this trend in a growth mode, the Muslim organizations and relevant governmental and non-governmental bodies of the adopted countries should promote the importance and benefits of electoral participation and encourage the expression of political views and convictions among the members of the Muslim communities and other minority groups. Civic involvement, it should be emphasized, is key leverage to integration and social harmony.

VII. In every context that the GMD had a field study conducted, the legal and political frameworks observed to be open, inclusive, and egalitarian. In the views of the participants in the workshops, roundtable discussions, and interviews, the adopted countries portray a much better a picture than their home countries with regard to the rights and liberties they enjoy and constitutional protection of these. In some contexts, particularly in Spain, France, and Argentina, however, many participants raised their discomfort and concerns because of the operational dysfunctionality of the politico-legal framework. One of the negative impacts of the dysfunctionality of the framework is that it triggers an inhibition towards the political participation and representation among the members of the community. Losing their faith and trust in the political frameworks, individuals feel disinclined and discouraged to participate and involve in politics. As many respondents voiced during the field studies, the problems and difficulties that are faced during the implementation of these rights are often caused by a mere lack of knowledge, misconceptions, and prejudices. Reluctance to cooperate between the local authorities and the Muslim organizations can deteriorate the
situation while an effective dialogue and collaboration will contribute greatly to resolve such problems and difficulties.

VIII. Diasporic Muslim communities of the non-OIC member states have recently realized the importance of organizational power in their conversation and negotiations with the national and international bodies and actors and began to put specific emphasis in growing organizationally and institutionally. Any policy-maker and governmental bodies that aim to address problems and issues regarding the Muslim communities and minorities should thus involve such representative organizations and institutions in decision-making processes and discussions. Such bodies and actors are advised to consider these communities as active agents with well-intended demands and agendas rather than passive subjects. In fact, it was often voiced by the participants in the workshops, roundtable discussions, and interviews that many well-intended and generously funded projects and programs have fallen short in producing desired impacts due to not including the Muslim communities and organizations in these processes. In other words, initiating projects for the interests and benefits of the Muslim communities without having these communities included has proven to fail eventually.

IX. Muslim communities of non-OIC member states have become a significant political matter in both national and international levels. National and international discussions, decision making and policy development processes that are concerning these communities, therefore, call for the engagement of a wide range of political, administrative, and economic actors, including national and local governments of the host and home countries and international organizations such the OIC, EU, and UN. In addition to these stakeholders, other ethno-religious groups in the host countries present an important element to be included in the discussions and processes as an agent and counterpart, as well.

X. In line with this, as many participants in the field studies have often expressed, although more likely to suffer from economic marginalization, discrimination, unemployment, and underemployment, Muslim individuals of the diasporic contexts are very confident in faring better in socio-economic terms in the future. In the opinion of many, anti-Islam sentiments, prejudices, and discrimination against Muslim individuals are mostly caused by the lack of knowledge and interaction with Muslims. Muslim youth appears, once again, as key for the change. Successfully integrated, well-educated, and involved, younger generations of Muslims are believed to have the capacity and will to pull down the walls erected by ignorance and lack of interaction. Cooperation between the civil society, representatives, and official bodies and authorities are required to channel and optimize this capacity.

XI. One prevalent issue begs for urgent attention for a better future is the education of the Muslim youth. Together with the rising unemployment and underemployment figures, the educational issues (the provision of Islamic and religious education, the lack of Islamic teaching institutions and instructors, etc.) appear to be major setbacks
and challenges for the future. The Muslim communities, organizations, and institutions are invited to invest further in the education of the youth, establish required educational infrastructure and facilities, initiate scholarship and funding programs, and develop appropriate teaching programs and materials. In order to optimize the capacity of the Muslim youth and benefit from that capacity, the official bodies, NGO’s, and educational institutions of the host countries are also invited to collaborate in these efforts.

For the Muslim Governments, Organizations, and Leaders of the Sending Countries and the OIC

I. Perhaps the most effective and productive attempt to minimalize or eradicate the Islamophobic tendencies and practices in the wider society, the workplace, and the public sphere is to introduce true Islam to non-Muslims, as well. As hundreds of individuals have maintained during the field studies Islamophobia, racism, and anti-Muslim or anti-immigrant sentiments feed on ignorance and the lack of knowledge. To prevent such feelings, prejudices, practices, and tendencies firmly established and institutionalized forms of marginalization and racist politics, it is imperative that both Muslim and non-Muslim organizations, communities, leaders, and countries engage in preparation and dissemination of reliable materials (documentaries, movies, booklets, and the like). As was observed particularly in Japan, South Africa, and Argentina, the gap about the knowledge about Islam and Muslims is immense in some societies. The OIC, Muslim countries, and other relevant NGO’s, thus, are strongly advised to take a more active role in creating, distributing, providing, and narrating such knowledge about Islam and Muslims.

II. A general fallacy about Muslims of the non-OIC member countries is the perception of the Muslim communities as homogenous groups. The truth is any Muslim community in any Muslim-majority or non-Muslim majority country is composed of a considerably high number of different ethno-national, denominational, and cultural subgroups who experience Muslimness in a particular way and have different political, ideological, social, cultural, educational, linguistic, and economic demands, claims, problems, advantages, and disadvantages. Without a proper and encompassing understanding of structures, configurations, experiences, and practices that form, negotiate, and reform Muslim identities in a given context intra- and inter-communal relations cannot be improved. The members of the Muslim communities were monitored to have very limited knowledge about one another, as well. Thus, the OIC and the Muslim organizations and institutions of sending countries and adopted countries are recommended to initiate, direct, and disseminate studies and projects on creating and collecting information about the subgroup divisions and profiles of the Muslim communities in non-OIC member states. Knowledge could be a very effective and practical way to address the lack of interaction and unity within the Muslim community.
III. With the exceptions of South Africa where the two main Muslim communities have a long historical presence and Germany and Spain where the Muslim spaces are dominated by one or two main groups, Turks and Moroccans, another reason for the disunity and the lack of interaction within the greater Muslim community in many contexts was the insistence in the maintenance of the links with the countries of origin at the expense of not only integrating into the larger society of their adopted countries but interacting with other ethno-national Muslim groups. This outlook, too, was observed to be more prevalent among the first generation Muslims and fading among the second and further ones. Countries of origin and their organizations and leaders, thus, should encourage such disintegrated communities and their first-generation leaders to engage with not only the larger society but with other Muslim groups of their adopted countries. Strong psychological and cultural bonds should not be maintained, in other words, at the expense of political and social enclosure.

IV. In many contexts, especially in South Africa, Australia, Spain, France, the UK, and Germany, an important reason for the disunity and lack of interaction within the Muslim communities, was noted to be the reluctance of the communities, organizations, leadership and representative bodies to be inclusive towards other denominational, genderal, racial, ethno-national, and generational positions, claims, and demands. Thus, it could be argued that Muslims’ dedication to embrace and celebrate its super-diversity will have a great impact on the trajectory and direction of Islam and Muslims in non-OIC member countries. In other words, if Muslims of non-Muslim majority countries aim to create success stories of adaptation, integration, development, and advancement they have to accommodate the claims, needs, and rights of all genderal, generational, ethnonational, denominational, racial, and ideological elements in their greater Muslim community. Balanced and truly representative compositions need to be promoted by the Muslim umbrella organizations and countries. OIC and other representative bodies are encouraged to put specific emphasis on reflecting the genderal, linguistic, generational, ethnonational, racial, and denominational diversity of the Ummah. Solidarity and unity could only be attained when all identities feel included, belonged, and promoted.

V. It was encouraging to observe that the Muslim communities, organizations, and representatives of non-OIC member states were truly devoted to introduce and promote Islam and Muslim culture and engage in inter-faith activities. A religious, cultural, historical, and artistic aspect of the Muslim world and life was introduced and promotes during such events. Such activities are effective and powerful responses to the manipulation of the anti-Muslim rhetoric and right-wing populism, which reduce and confine the Muslim communities and Islam to the realm of the political. Such activities, in other words, are efficient ways to challenge the over-politicization of the Muslim identity and Islam in the media and politics of the adopted countries. Thus, the Muslim organizations and communities of the non-OIC countries should allocate more funds for particular cultural and artistic events and activities. The official bodies of the
sending Muslim countries and the OIC, on the other hand, are strongly advised to collaborate with their counterparts in the adopted countries and invest more in social and cultural acts (events, organizations, social gatherings, and the like) rather than simply building places of worship and mosques.

VI. Voiced particularly by the members of the established Muslim communities, converts, and non-Muslim individuals in Spain, Germany, the UK, and France, another issue that has come to the fore concerning the relations between the Muslim communities and the wider host societies was the vernacularization of Islam and localization of Muslim identities. From the point of view of the Muslim communities such demands and efforts by the governments and societies of the adopted countries are mostly motivated and based on the prejudices about Islam and Muslims (Islam is not compatible with democracy, gender equality, and the like). In view of converts, members of the established Muslim communities, and non-Muslims who work or in contact with the Muslim community, the newly arrived Muslims cling to their ethno-cultural and national understanding of Islam with them and that does not only bring more segregation from the larger society but causes isolation within the Muslim community, as well. True, in comparison to the diverse Islamic space of the Muslim majority countries, the diasporic Islamic space is much more diversified. The interpretation of Islam and Islamic life in diasporic context can take such a diversified level that, as one of the participants in London workshop aptly put it “every Muslim is a denomination,” in diasporic Islamic space. This, naturally, leads to over-fragmentation and further disunity. When a community is suffering from fragmentation and disunity the establishment and maintenance of effective interaction, dialogue, and cooperation with other groups and the wider society are even more difficult. The answer to this, according to them, is developing an understanding of Islamic life that is compatible with the values, ideals, and political, economic, legal, and social framework and fabric of the adopted country. The advocates of this view believe that vernacularization is a key to both a greater interaction and harmony with the wider society but also to efficient dialogue, cooperation, and unity within the Muslim community. Thus, the Muslim communities, countries, and NGO’s are encouraged to organize events, meetings, and conferences where a true Islamic answer to the localization of Islamic way of life and Muslim identity, along with the advantages and drawbacks of vernacularization, the educational and religious aspects of it (the training of imams, the language of khutba sermons, the Islamic education curriculums, the education of Islamic instructors, and the like) are discussed. Sending countries, here, are particularly encouraged to put the welfare and best interests of the diasporic community before their ethno-national and cultural concerns.

VII. The lack of visibility and representation (and sometimes of knowledge about) Islam and Muslims at certain contexts, e.g., in Japan, Australia, and Argentina, could also be viewed as a potential opportunity to construct a positive narrative and promote it. Put
differently, in countries where the contact between the Muslim communities and the society and knowledge about Islam and Muslims is very limited the visibility and representation of Islam and Muslims in the national media are close to nil. In such contexts, although the Muslim communities do not enjoy positive visibility and representation, they do not suffer from established prejudices and negative visibility and representations either. The OIC and other strong Muslim umbrella organizations are thus encouraged to invest, create, and disseminate teaching materials, booklets, documentaries, and movies that introduce and promote Islam and Muslims to the societies and non-Muslim groups of such countries. The most effective way to strike back at the discourse and negative representation of anti-Muslim media would be presenting and promoting aesthetically, technically, professionally, and academically accomplished and strong counter-narratives. As seen especially in Japan, Spain, Argentina, and the USA, when introducing and promoting Islam, focusing on the theological aspects of the religion could be counterproductive, thus, the relevant organizations and bodies of the Muslim countries and the OIC are strongly advised to put emphasis on the cultural, historical, and aesthetic richness of Islamic civilization in their introductory and promotional activities and materials.

VIII. One surprising finding of the GMD field studies and surveys was the low level of OIC-familiarity among the diasporic Muslim communities. In each field study, when asked if they had heard about the Organization of Islamic Cooperation before, only a few individuals who participated in the workshops and interviews answered in the affirmative. The survey findings revealed a similar picture with only about 15% of the participants, in average, stated that they heard about the organization before. Despite this low level of familiarity, however, the overwhelming majority of participants in all field studies expressed that there is need for a greater OIC role in representing the rights of Muslims and promoting cooperation and security among them. The OIC and Muslim organizations of both sending countries and adopted countries, thus, are strongly advised to invest further in the introduction and promotion of the OIC and its subsidiary, affiliated, and specialized organs and their activities among the Muslim communities of the non-OIC member states.

IX. The findings of the surveys and the research team’s observations during the field studies revealed a very low level of trust in the political and religious leaders and organizations of the Islamic countries, viz., sending countries and home countries, among Muslims of the non-OIC member states. The official authorities of the countries of origin should further investigate the reasons behind the low level of confidence in leaders of the Muslim countries and collaborate with the Muslim organizations of the adopted countries in order to gain or reconsolidate the confidence and trust among their diasporic coreligionists and ex-citizens.
Euro Islam- Austria: http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/austria/
Euro Islam- The Netherlands: http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/the-netherlands/


